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"[I]n the Garden of Eden every animal obeyed Man willingly. But
we blew it, and after the Fall all the animals lived as they pleased
and paid us no heed. Except for dogs, who
2 liked comradeship and
loyalty enough to give us another chance."
I.

INTRODUCTION

Mary Rodgers wept as her dog was dragged away by animal control
workers.3 She could barely stand to watch as Sasha struggled with the
workers, trying to break free to run up the familiar porch steps to her owner.
There was confusion in her eyes as she looked at Mary. Mary's instincts
had told her to run after Sasha, to bring her back to the house where she had

lived for years. But she did not. Instead, Sasha was forced into the back of a
van and driven to animal control where she would be put to death. 4 One

might think Sasha committed a grievous act to receive such a harsh
punishment. But she did not. She had never bitten nor hurt anyone. Her
sole infraction was that she was an American Staffordshire Terrier. 5 Mary
had no choice but to let Sasha go. The county required Mary to have an

2.
Timothy Foote, That is Not a Bad Dog-That's a Splendid Dog, SMITHSONIAN,
Apr., 1992 at 60, 69 (describing author and animal trainer Vicky Hearne's theory of the
relationship between man and dog).
3.
This story is fictional. However, it is an accurate example of what could happen
in a municipality that bans pit bulls.
4.
See Two Seized Pit Bulls to Be Euthanized, SARASOTA HERALD TRIB. (Fla.), Mar.
13, 2002, at BCE3; see also Saundra Amrhein, Unwanted, Unloved and Facing a Death
Sentence, ST. PETERSBURG TIMES (Fla.), Jan. 13, 2002, at 1 (stating that the Pasco County
Animal Control Center in Florida only adopts nineteen percent of the cats and dogs they take
in each year, and that "[l]ast year, the shelter euthanized 3,531 of the 5,279 dogs brought
in... [and] 3,796 of the 4,861 cats brought in"); Neal Thompson, The Euthanizer: Not a
Sheltered Life Death, BALT. SUN, May 21, 2001, at 1E. (noting that the Baltimore shelter
estimated that "euthanizing will continue at a pace of 10,000 to 12,000 a year"); Sally Kestin,
Too Late For Too Many, SUN-SENTINEL (Fort Lauderdale, Fla.), June 23, 2002, at IA.
5.
American Staffordshire Terriers are one of the three recognized breeds of dog
known commonly as a "pit bull." See discussion infra Part IV.A.
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extensive insurance policy in order to keep Sasha, 6 and although Mary
continuously tried, no insurance company would insure her.7
In the 1980s, a spate of dog attacks prompted local governments across
the country to ban pit bulls from many municipalities.8 While many
concerned citizens encouraged these bans, others believed that pit bulls were
being unfairly singled-out. Disgruntled owners claimed that such breedspecific bans violated their constitutional rights and numerous suits against
municipalities followed.' ° One by one courts addressed each of the
constitutional issues claimed by owners and in turn they dismissed each of
them."1 Courts responded to these suits almost uniformly. 12 The judiciary
had spoken: in the absence of state legislation
to the contrary, municipalities
3
were free to ban specific breeds of dog.'
Recent dog attacks in Florida and other parts of the county have again
brought the issue of banning particular breeds to the forefront. Citizens in
Florida, frustrated by the attacks, have called on their legislators to take
action.' 5 However, although courts have unanimously held that it is
constitutional for municipalities to ban pit bulls, Florida cities and towns are
unable to. Their hands are tied due to one line in section 767.14 of the
Florida Statutes that prohibits local governments in Florida from banning

6.
See discussion infra Part I.
7.
See generally Wayne T. Price, Choose-Beloved Pet or Homeowners Insurance?,
FLA. TODAY, May 13, 2002, at 1; Diana Marrero, More Home Insurers Blacklist Some Breeds
of Dogs, FLA. TIMES-UNION, Jan. 24, 2001, at Al; Mary Shanklin, Insurance Bite: A Vicious
Breed of Dog Could Cost You Your Coverage, ORLANDO SENTINEL, Jan. 7, 2001, at J1 (giving
examples of people who were unable to get insurance coverage because of the breed of their
dog).
8.
See Michael Bosc, Life Is The Pits for Pit Bulls, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., Aug.
17, 1987, at 12.
9.
See, e.g., Renee Graham, Mean Dogs May Face Sanctions, MIAMI HERALD, Aug.
10, 1987, at 1PB.
10. See discussion infra Parts IlI.C.1-5.
11. Id.
12. But see Am. Dog Owners Ass'n v. City of Lynn, 533 N.E.2d 642 (Mass. 1989)
(holding that ordinance which banned pit bulls was unconstitutionally vague because of
difficulty in determining if a dog was a pit bull).
13. See discussion infra Parts III.C. 1-5.
14. See Erik Lacitis, Every Dog, Big or Small, Must Have its Day in Obedience
School, SEATTLE TIMES, Apr. 2, 2002, at El.

15. See, e.g., Editorial, Pit Bull Ban, SUN-SENTINEL (Fort Lauderdale, Fla.), May 16,
2002, at 24A; Dave Cebrat, Editorial, Ban Pit Bull Dogs for Safety's Sake, SUN-SENTINEL
(Fort Lauderdale, Fla.), May 26, 2002, at 4F (calling for legislators to ban pit bulls).
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any specific breed of dog. 6 This has created a situation in Florida where the
judicial branch has pronounced breed-specific banning constitutional, but the
legislative branch prohibits it. In a knee-jerk response to the most recent
attacks, legislators have attempted to change the part of this statute that
prohibits the banning of specific breeds.1 7 Although these recent attempts
have failed, they represent dissatisfaction with current dog control laws."
The resurfacing of this issue has prompted a closer analysis of the
effectiveness of current laws in Florida. It has also triggered the question of
whether breed-specific legislation is the answer to the dog control problem,
or whether there are more effective alternatives.
This article begins by briefly discussing the issue of banning specific
breeds of dogs. Part II details the prevalence of dog bites in the United
States. Part Im1explains the current law in Florida pertaining to dangerous
dogs. Part IV analyzes in detail the history of dangerous dog legislation in
Florida. It also refers to Senate Bill 1644 that created section 767.14 of the
Florida Statutes, and proposed measures to change this statute. Further, it
explains significant prior case law pertaining to breed-specific legislation. It
includes an analysis of the constitutional theories upon which suits have
been brought and courts' decisions regarding these theories. Part V
examines pit bulls as a breed, and discusses the prevalence of illegal
dogfighting and how it relates to the perceived problems with pit bulls. Part
VI discusses the problems involved with banning particular breeds and the
ineffectiveness of this method of dog control. Part VII outlines several
alternatives to breed-specific legislation and the implications of these
alternate measures. Finally, in Part VIII, this article concludes that breedspecific legislation is not an effective method for resolving Florida's dog
control problem. It explains that since this method is ineffective, it is not a
rational means to achieve the legitimate government purpose of protecting
the public welfare.

16. FLA. STAT. § 767.14 (2001). "Nothing in this act shall limit any local government
from placing further restrictions or additional requirements on owners of dangerous
dogs.., provided that no such regulation is specific to breed ..... Id.
17. See discussion infra Part III.B.
18. See id.

https://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol27/iss3/1

6

: Nova Law Review 27, 3

2003]

Grey

I.

419

THE PREVALENCE OF DOG BITES IN THE UNITED STATES

Today, over one-third of American households have a dog. 19 Despite
2
their popularity, a significant number of dogs bite people every year. 0
While there are at least four hundred known breeds of dogs in the world,
only a few breeds have the reputation of being responsible for the most
bites.22 At the forefront of this list of "dangerous dogs' 23 is the dog
commonly known as the pit bull.24
The prevalence of dog bites in the United States has caused many
insurance companies to refuse homeowners' insurance to people who own
pit bulls or other dog breeds that the companies deem dangerous. 25 The
Insurance Information Institute claims that one-third of homeowner's
liability claims are due to dog bites. 26 They further assert that these bites
27
cost insurance companies $310 million annually.
In addition, insurance
companies allege that certain breeds bite more than other breeds, even
21
though others disagree.

19. THE ANIMAL ASSISTANCE LEAGUE, FACTS: DOG BITE STATISTICS, at
http://www.animalassistanceleague.com/facts.htm (last visited Mar. 22, 2003). "About 35%
of American households owned a dog in 1994-a total dog population of over 52 million."
Id.
20. AM.
VETERINARY
MED.
ASS'N,
DOG
BITE
FACT
SHEET,
at
http://www.avma.org/press/dogbite/factsheet.asp (last visited Mar. 22, 2003). According to
the American Veterinary Medical Association, "[als many as 1 million people annually
require medical treatment for dog bites. Dog attacks send more than 334,000 people to the
emergency room each year." Id.
21. See Mark Derr, The Politics of Dogs, THE ATLANTIC MONTHLY, Mar., 1990, at 49.
22. See Price, supra note 7. "Nationwide [Insurance Company] refuses to write
policies to owners of chow chows, Doberman pinschers, German shepherds, pit bull terriers,
Presa Canarios, Rottweilers and wolf hybrids." Id. See also Shanklin, supra note 7. "A
growing number of insurance companies have started blacklisting breeds such as Rottweilers,
pit bulls, Doberman pinschers, German shepherds, chow chows and wolf hybrids." Id.
23. See Price, supra note 7; Shanklin, supra note 7; Marrero, supra note 7.
24. See discussion infra Part IV.A.
25. See Price, supra note 7 (noting that Nationwide Insurance Co. and MetLife Auto
& Home will not provide homeowners insurance for people who own pit bulls); Marrero,
supra note 7.
26. Price, supra note 7.
27. Id.
28. Compare Marrero, supra note 7 (discussing the perception among insurers that
certain breeds are more dangerous than others), with Price, supra note 7 (quoting Stephanie
Shain, director of outreach for the Washington D.C.-based Humane Society of the United
States: "the breed is not an accurate indicator if a dog is going to be aggressive or not").
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Not all insurance companies refuse insurance coverage to people based
solely on a dog's breed. 29 However, based on a dog's history, even these
companies may require that the policy contain a provision that if the dog
bites someone, the insurance company does not have to pay. 3
For
homeowners who are unable to get insurance from a private company, they
can usually fall back on the state's Joint Underwriting Association (JUA) to
cover them.31 However, although "[lthe JUA will insure homeowners with
breeds known for being vicious," even the JUA "will not cover any dogrelated claims. 32 Aside from dogs that are considered dangerous, insurance
companies are not likely to provide coverage if any type of dog, regardless
33
of breed, has ever bitten a person.
This creates a problem for homeowners who have a dog that is
blacklisted. Homeowners insurance is vital for people who are buying a
house.
If they do not have it, then they are personally liable for the
damages done by their dogs. Furthermore, without insurance, homeowners
will not be able to get a mortgage. This leaves them in a predicament of
choosing between their family pet and owning a home. 36 People who choose
to have insurance instead of their dog often have to leave their pet at an
animal shelter and hope that someone adopts them.37
Owning dogs can preclude people from owning homes, forcing them to
rent instead. However, many apartment complexes will not allow tenants to
have certain breeds of dogs.
Landlords fear that they will be sued if a

29. See Shanklin, supra note 7 (noting that State Farm and Allstate will consider
factors other than breed before denying coverage).
30. See Price, supra note 7.
31. Shanklin, supra note 7 (stating "[The JUA is a] state-supported insurance pool
[that] covers homeowners when no other insurance company will. The JUA will insure
homeowners with breeds known for being vicious .....
32. Id.
33. See Marrero, supra note 7 (stating "you can almost kiss your chances of getting
future coverage goodbye if your dog, even a poodle, pierces human flesh").
34. Id.
35. FLA. STAT. § 767.04 (2001).
36. See Price, supra note 7.
37. Shanklin, supra note 7; see also Marrero, supra note 7 (stating "Danya Parks, a
programs manager of the Jacksonville Humane Society... said most of the 15,000 dogs the
shelter takes in each year are in fact rottweilers, German shepherds, chow chows and pit bulls.
And it may be even harder to find them homes if people find insurance companies will not
protect them when they take those dogs in.").
38. See Price, supra note 7.
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tenant's dog bites another tenant or guest. 39 Their fears are not unfounded.
40
Landlords can be held liable if a dog bites someone on their premises.
Insurance companies are generally given a good deal of latitude in
refusing coverage to potential customers that they view as high-risk.4' For
example, insurance companies can refuse coverage to people who are
predisposed to a certain illness or have a preexisting medical condition.42
Although this may seem unfair, local governments cannot mandate
companies to provide coverage for people.4 3
Ill. CURRENT FLORIDA LAW PERTAINING TO DAMAGE BY DOGS

Florida has had significant experience with breed-specific legislation.
Pit bulls became a hot issue in the 1980s, and Florida was not immune to the
pit bull hysteria that had gripped the country. 44 A number of municipalities
enacted ordinances to deal with dangerous dogs, some specifically banning
pit bulls.45 The City of Miami ordinance, for example, required owners to
have $50,000 of insurance in order to be able to keep their pet.46 The state
39. See Shanklin, supra note 7 (stating "after a number of people have been bitten at
her rental houses, [animal shelter director and dog lover, Lorrie Nassofer] will no longer allow
canines at those homes... [last month, her insurance company paid $85,000 to the family of
a child who was bitten at one of Nassofer's rental houses").
40. See § 767.04; see also Giaculli v. Bright, 584 So. 2d 187 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App.
1991); Bessent v. Matthews, 543 So. 2d 438 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1989); Olave v. Howard,
547 So. 2d 349 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1989); Vasques v. Lopez, 509 So. 2d 1241 (Fla. 4th
Dist. Ct. App. 1987); Robinson v. Espinosa, 502 So. 2d 527 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1987);
Anderson v. Walthal, 468 So. 2d 291 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1985).
41. See State v. Peters, 534 So. 2d 760, 763 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1988) (noting that
city could not require insurance companies to issue policies to pit bull owners).
42. See Am. Sun Life Ins. Co. v. Remig, 482 So. 2d 435, 436 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App.
1985).
43. See Peters, 534 So. 2d at 763.
44. See, e.g., Graham, supra note 9 (stating "[tihat hysteria reached a peak in
California this summer. After two pit bull attacks in nine days, more than 300 pit bulls were
turned into the Los Angeles County Animal Care and Control Department.").
45. Christopher Wellisz, Doggone! Caring Officer Retires, MIAMI HERALD, Jan. 21,
1988, at 1BR (stating that "[in 1979... [a] pit bull... severely mauled a 6-year-old
Hollywood boy, Frankie Scarbrough.
The attack prompted a controversial ordinance
controlling pit bulls.").
46. MIAMI-DADE COUNTY, FLA., CODE § 5-17.3 (Supp. 1999).
In order to protect the public and to afford relief from the severe harm and injury which
is likely to result from a pit bull dog attack, every owner of a pit bull dog shall maintain
and be able to provide evidence of the owner's financial ability to respond in damages
up to and including the amount of fifty thousand dollars ($50,000) for bodily injury to
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legislature, however, had not yet enacted any statutes to deal with dangerous
dogs 47
.
A.

Chapter 767 of the Florida Statutes

The legislature responded to the outcry for dog control laws by enacting
FloridaStatutes sections 767.10-15. 48 The legislature specifically stated, in
its legislative findings, that its reasoning for enacting these statutes was to
correct the inadequacy of the current laws in dealing with unprovoked dog
attacks. 49 It established and defined the factors necessary to determine 5that
a
0
dog is legally "dangerous," and therefore subject to certain restrictions.

or death of any person or damage to property which may result from the ownership,
keeping or maintenance of such dog.
Id.
47. See Fla. H.R. Comm. on Local Gov't & Vet. Aft., HB 839 (2001) Staff Analysis 2
(final Mar. 20, 2001) (on file with comm.) [hereinafter H.R. Comm. HB 839 Staff Analysis].
Prior to 1990, animal control was generally regulated on a local basis, as the Florida
Statutes did not specifically provide for regulating dangerous dogs. However, in 1990,
the Legislature passed HB 1345 which provided a procedure for certain dogs to be
classified as dangerous and required that such dogs be registered. The bill also established requirements for control and confinement of dangerous dogs, as well as an
appeals procedure.
Id.
48. FLA. STAT. § 767.10-15 (2001). This statute was created by Senate Bill 1644.
The bill passed favorably through the Agriculture, Judiciary-Criminal, and Appropriations
Committees. The Senate then voted on it, and the next day, the House unanimously passed
the bill. See H.R. Comm. HB 839 Staff Analysis, supra note 47.
49. See§767.10.
The Legislature finds that dangerous dogs are an increasingly serious and widespread
threat to the safety and welfare of the people of this state because of unprovoked
attacks which cause injury to persons and domestic animals; that such attacks are in
part attributable to the failure of owners to confine and properly train and control their
dogs; that existing laws inadequately address this growing problem; and that it is
appropriate and necessary to impose uniform requirements for the owners of dangerous
dogs.

Id.
50.
§ 767.11(1)(a)-(d).
"Dangerous dog" means any dog that according to the records of the appropriate
authority:
Has aggressively bitten, attacked, or endangered or has inflicted severe injury on a
human being on public or private property;
Has more than once severely injured or killed a domestic animal while off the owner's
property;
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Section 767.12 provides, in detailed description, the process for
classifying a dog as dangerous. 5 ' It authorizes animal control employees to
51
investigate occurrences that may lead to a dog being considered dangerous.
While an investigation is occurring, the dog in question may either be
impounded or held under certain restrictions by his owner.53 However, a dog
will not be considered dangerous if it was protecting someone from an
"unjustified attack., 54 After allowing the owner to appear at a hearing,
animal control will then determine whether the dog in question is in fact
dangerous.55 The owner can appeal the decision, 56 but if he loses, he will
Has been used primarily or in part for the purpose of dog fighting or is a dog trained
for dog fighting; or
Has, when unprovoked, chased or approached a person upon the streets, sidewalks, or
any public grounds in a menacing fashion or apparent attitude of attack, provided that
such actions are attested to in a sworn statement by one or more persons and dutifully
investigated by the appropriate authority.
Id. (emphasis added).
51.
§ 767.12.
52. § 767.12(1)(a).
(1)(a) An animal control authority shall investigate reported incidents involving any
dog that may be dangerous and shall, if possible, interview the owner and require a
sworn affidavit from any person, including any animal control officer or enforcement
officer, desiring to have a dog classified as dangerous. Any animal that is the subject
of a dangerous dog investigation, that is not impounded with the animal control authority, shall be humanely and safely confined by the owner in a securely fenced or enclosed area pending the outcome of the investigation and resolution of any hearings
related to the dangerous dog classification. The address of where the animal resides
shall be provided to the animal control authority. No dog that is the subject of a
dangerous dog investigation may be relocated or ownership transferred pending the
outcome of an investigation or any hearings related to the determination of a dangerous
dog classification. In the event that a dog is to be destroyed, the dog shall not be
relocated or ownership transferred.
Id.
53. Id.
54. § 767.12(1)(b).
A dog shall not be declared dangerous if the threat, injury, or damage was sustained by
a person who, at the time, was unlawfully on the property or, while lawfully on the
property, was tormenting, abusing, or assaulting the dog or its owner or a family
member. No dog may be declared dangerous if the dog was protecting or defending a
human being within the immediate vicinity of the dog from an unjustified attack or
assault.
Id.
55. § 767.12(1)(c).
After the investigation, the animal control authority shall make an initial determination
as to whether there is sufficient cause to classify the dog as dangerous and shall afford
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have to register the dog pursuant to certain conditions.57 The owner also has
an obligation to notify authorities if certain instances occur.5 8 However,
given the likelihood that a dangerous dog may bite again, the penalties for a
violation of this section seem lenient.5 9

the owner an opportunity for a hearing prior to making a final determination. The
animal control authority shall provide written notification of the sufficient cause
finding ...and, if requested, [a] hearing shall be held as soon as possible, but not more
than 21 calendar days and no sooner than 5 days after receipt of the request from the
owner. Each applicable local governing authority shall establish hearing procedures
that conform to this paragraph.
Id.
56. § 767.12(1)(d).
57.
§ 767.12(2)(a).
(2) Within 14 days after a dog has been classified as dangerous by the animal control
authority or a dangerous dog classification is upheld by the county court on appeal, the
owner of the dog must obtain a certificate of registration for the dog from the animal
control authority serving the area in which he or she resides, and the certificate shall be
renewed annually. Animal control authorities are authorized to issue such certificates
of registration, and renewals thereof, only to persons who are at least 18 years of age
and who present to the animal control authority sufficient evidence of:
(a) A current certificate of rabies vaccination for the dog.
(b) A proper enclosure to confine a dangerous dog and the posting of the premises
with a clearly visible warning sign at all entry points that informs both children
and adults of the presence of a dangerous dog on the property.
(c) Permanent identification of the dog, such as a tattoo on the inside thigh or
electronic implantation.
Id. (emphasis added).
58. § 767.12(3)(a)-(d).
(3) The owner shall immediately notify the appropriate animal control authority when a
dog that has been classified as dangerous:
(a)
Is loose or unconfined.
(b)
Has bitten a human being or attacked another animal.
(c)
Is sold, given away, or dies.
(d)
Is moved to another address.
Prior to a dangerous dog being sold or given away, the owner shall provide the name,
address, and telephone number of the new owner to the animal control authority. The
new owner must comply with all of the requirements of this act and implementing local
ordinances, even if the animal is moved from one local jurisdiction to another within
the state. The animal control officer must be notified by the owner of a dog classified
as dangerous that the dog is in his or her jurisdiction.
Id.
59. See § 767.12(7) ("Any person who violates any provision of this section is guilty
of a noncriminal infraction, punishable by a fine not exceeding $500.").
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Section 767.14 in particular gives municipalities a significant amount of
leeway in enacting ordinances pertaining to the control of dogs. However,
one important line of Section 767.14 restricts how municipalities could treat
61
specific breeds.
Section 767.14 specifically authorizes municipalities to
enact further restrictions that are deemed necessary to protect the public
against dangerous dogs. 62 However, these restrictions cannot be breedspecific. 63 The statute allows ordinances that were enacted prior to its
passage to remain in force, but no new breed-specific ordinances can be
enacted. 64
These additions to Chapter 767 seemed to address the problem
communities had with how to handle dangerous dogs. However, the process
has been criticized as being too lengthy. Also, municipalities
have taken
6
issue with the restriction prohibiting breed-specific bans.
B.

Subsequent Attempts to Change the Statute
1.

House Bill 355

After it was enacted in 1990, no legislative challenges to the potentially
controversial section 767.14 were raised until the 2000 legislative session.
In 2000, Representative Tracy Stafford introduced a bill to amend section
767.14 by removing the line that restricts municipalities from regulating
specific breeds. 67 The bill was reviewed favorably by the House Committee
on Community Affairs, which added an amendment to streamline the process
for classifying a particular dog as "dangerous. 68 The House Committee on
Community Affairs noted that although the Florida League of Cities
69
supported the bill, the Humane Society was opposed to it.
There are
numerous reasons why the Humane Society opposes breed-specific
legislation:
60. § 767.14.
61. Id.
62. Id.
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. See Fla. H.R. Comm. on Agric., HB 355 (2000) Staff Analysis (rev. Feb. 1, 2000)
(on file with comm.) [hereinafter H.R. Comm. HB 355 Staff Analysis].
66. See discussion infra Part IH.B.
67. Fla. HB 355 (2001), availableat
http://www.flsenate.gov/data/session/2000/House/bills/billtext/pdf/h0355.pdf.
68. See H.R. Comm. HB 355 Staff Analysis, supra note 65, at 6.
69. Id.
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Although it supports the bill's intent to enhance public safety, the
[Humane] Society does not feel [that] allowing local governments
to enact ordinances that could place restrictions regarding ownership of certain dog breeds is the answer. According to the Society,
the problem the bill is addressing may not be a "breed of dog"
problem but rather a pet ownership and enforcement issue. The
Society also states breed specific ordinances will unfairly penalize
responsible dog owners, and it is these responsible dog owners,
whose dogs do not pose a threat, who will make an effort to comply
with any new ordinances. In addition, it appears as though the bill
does not provide any restrictions on what breed of dogs local governments can further restrict. However, the Society does support
any attempt to streamline the existing statute regarding the dangerous dog classification and appeal process. It believes that by
streamlining the appeal process, the law will be easier to enforce
and will minimize animal authorities' reluctance to classify a dog
as dangerous.7 °
The bill was then placed on the calendar to be voted on, but died on the
calendar after a month.71
2. House Bill 839
Although a challenge to section 767.14 had just failed in the previous
legislative session, in 2001 there was another attempt to amend it. Responding to pressure from the City of Fort Lauderdale that pit bulls were
scaring tourists on the beach, the Broward Legislative Delegation voted to
again try to change the statute. 72 This time they strategically crafted a bill
that would change the statute only as it pertained to Broward County.73
Representative Stacy Ritter, a Broward Democrat, sponsored House Bill 839,
70. H.R. Comm. HB 355 Staff Analysis, supra note 65, at 6 (emphasis in original).
71. E-mail from Division of Statutory Revision to author (June 20, 2002, 18:30 EST)
(on file with author). The e-mail states:
[a]ll bills die at the end of the legislative session after sine die adjournment. Bills that
are not passed are reported as having died wherever they were in the legislative process
at the time the session is adjourned. "Died on the calendar" means a bill was out of
committee and on the calendar when it died.

Id.
72. See Buddy Nevins, Bill Advances Pit Bull Ban Lauderdale, SUN-SENTINEL (Fort
Lauderdale, Fla.), Feb. 2, 2001, at 5B.
73. Fla.
HB
839
(2001),
available
at
http://www.flsenate.gov/data/session/2001/House/bills/billtext/pdf/h0839.pdf.
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which if passed would allow municipalities within Broward County to
regulate certain breeds in public places. In the Florida Legislature, countyspecific legislation, if agreed upon by the respective local delegation, usually
passes with little resistance.75 However, whether it was because Broward
Democrats have little clout in a Republican-controlled legislature or because
lawmakers feared that it could 7 set
a precedent for counties statewide, HB
6
839 died on the House calendar.
C.

SignificantPriorCase Law

Dogs have historically not enjoyed a great deal of deference in
American courts. In the landmark case Sentell v. New Orleans, 7 the plaintiff
sued a railway company, alleging that it had negligently killed his dog.78
The United States Supreme Court held that an ordinance requiring owners to
register their dogs was valid, and in the absence of registration, they were
"qualified" property and not subject to the same protection as "complete"
property. 79 The Court also indicated that their lack of protection by criminal
laws was also indicative of their status as "imperfect" property. 80 The Court
reasoned that, although at common law dogs were considered property, in
74.

Id.
WHEREAS, there have been numerous incidents of tourists being threatened by pit
bulls on public beaches, and
WHEREAS, there were 115 pit bull and pit-mix bites in Broward County in 1999 alone, and
WHEREAS, the number of attacks by these breeds far exceeds those of other breeds, and
WHEREAS, there is concern for the safety of the citizens of Broward County and its

tourists in public places,
NOW, THEREFORE,
Be It Enacted by the Legislature of the State of Florida:
Section 1.

Each municipality located within the geographic boundaries of Broward

County, Florida, shall have the option of adopting an ordinance regulating the control
and confinement of dogs in public places, with the authority for such regulations to be
specific to breed, including mixed breeds.

Id.
75.

See Buddy Nevins, Broward County Democrats Fearfor Local Legislation, SUN(Fort Lauderdale, Fla.), Mar. 4, 2001, at 1G.
76. See Brittany Wallman, House Advances Dog-Ban Bill, SUN-SENTINEL (Fort
Lauderdale, Fla.), Mar. 21, 2001, at 6B (noting that "[c]ommittee members unanimously
SENTINEL

approved the bill").

77.
78.

79.
80.

166U.S. 1169 (1897).
Id.
Id.at 1170.
Id.
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the absence of a statute, there was no criminal liability if they were the
subjects of larceny. 8' The Court noted that even if dogs were considered
"complete" property, they would still be subject to the police power of the
state, and could still be destroyed if they endangered public health. 82 The
Court also noted that while some dogs should enjoy the83protection of the
legislature, ones that are considered dangerous should not.
However, as there is now criminal liability for theft of a dog, this
original justification for considering dogs imperfect property is weakened.84
Also, although this early case does not explicitly address the constitutionality of banning a particular breed of dog, it indicated that a dog should be
destroyed only if it is without an owner or if it is vicious. 85 However, this
case also relied on other decisions which held as constitutional ordinances
which allowed police officers or ordinary citizens to kill any dog that was
outside the confines of its owner's home, even if the person who killed the
dog knew that it had an owner.6
The treatment of dogs has changed since Sentell was decided. Given
the popularity of dogs in America, and the subsequent rise in their status, it
seems no longer relevant to rely on this case as good law. 87 As animal
control divisions or Humane Societies have been established to deal with
stray dogs in communities across America, it seems arcane to rely on a case
that allowed people to shoot dogs on the street. 88 To do so would be akin to
relying on Plessy v. Ferguson, or other overturned cases that, in retrospect,
have served to embarrass the Supreme Court.9° Despite its current
irrelevance, Sentell has been relied upon by recent courts to uphold breedspecific regulations. 9'
81. Id.
82. Sentell, 166 U.S. at 1171.
83. Id.
84. See Lynn Manner, The New Breed of Municipal Dog Control Laws: Are They
Constitutional?, 53 U. CIN. L. REV. 1067, 1070 n.16 (1984) (noting cases that have
strengthened the status of dogs as property).
85. See Sentell, 166 U.S. at 1171.
86. Id.
DOG BITE STATISTICS, at
87. See THE ANIMAL ASSISTANCE LEAGUE, FACTS:
http://www.animalassistanceleague.com/facts.htm (last visited June 27, 2002).
88. See generally Sally Kestin, Too Late for Too Many, SUN-SENTINEL (Fort
Lauderdale, Fla.), June 23, 2002, at IA.
89. 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
90. In Plessy, a case which was later overturned, the United States Supreme Court
condoned racial discrimination. Id.
91. Vanater v. Vill. of S. Point, 717 F. Supp. 1236, 1241-42 (S.D. Ohio 1989); Colo.
Dog Fanciers, Inc. v. City and County of Denver, 820 P.2d 644, 653 (Colo. 1991); State v.
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While many people were pleased that cities were restricting or banning
pit bulls, others were unhappy. Owners claimed that their constitutional
rights were being violated by the ordinances. 92 Dog owners sued'on the
grounds that the ordinances were unconstitutionally vague, violated their
equal protection and due process, and were an improper use of the police
power. However, with rare exception,94 courts upheld the validity of the
ordinances. 95 Several dog owners sued, but the Florida courts decided as the
courts in other jurisdictions had. 96 A close study of a Florida case gives an
understanding of the issues that were brought up in other cases across the
country. In State v. Peters,97 pit bull owners challenged a City of North
Miami ordinance which mandated special regulations for pit bulls. 98 The

Peters, 534 So. 2d 760, 765 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1988); Hearn v. City of Overland Park,
772 P.2d 758, 766 (Kan. 1989); Garcia v. Vill. of Tijeras, 767 P.2d 355, 362 (N.M. Ct. App.
1988); State v. Anderson, 566 N.E.2d 1224, 1226 (Ohio 1991); State v. Robinson, 541 N.E.2d
1092, 1094 (Ohio Ct. App. 1989); Am. Dog Owners Ass'n v. City of Yakima, 777 P.2d 1046,
1048 (Wash. 1989).
92. See discussion infra Part I1.
93. See discussion infra Part III.C.1-5.
94. See, e.g., Am. Dog Owners Ass'n v. City of Lynn, 533 N.E.2d 642 (Mass. 1989)
(holding that ordinance which banned pit bulls was unconstitutionally vague because of
difficulty in determining if a dog was a "pit bull"). The court, referring to the trial judge,
stated:
The judge found that there is no scientific means, by blood, enzyme, or otherwise, to
determine if a dog is a particular breed or any mixture thereof; that the dog officers of
the city of Lynn used conflicting, subjective standards for ascertaining what animals
are to be defined as "Pit Bulls" under all of the ordinances in question; and that the
ordinances failed to provide law enforcement officials with ascertainable standards by
which to enforce the ordinance. Based on these findings, his ruling that the third
ordinance-listing three types of dogs, (American Staffordshire, Staffordshire Pit Bull
Terrier or Bull Terrier), two of "dubious existence," and one ("any mixture thereof')
impossible to ascertain-was void for vagueness, was clearly correct.
Id. at 646.
95. See cases cited supra note 91.
96. See discussion infra Parts III.C.1-5.
97. 534 So. 2d 760 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1988).
98. Id. at 764. The ordinance provides:
WHEREAS, dogs commonly referred to as 'Pit Bulls' were for centuries developed and
selectively bred for the express purpose of attacking other dogs or other animals such
as bulls, bears, or wild hogs; and
WHEREAS, in developing a dog for this purpose, certain traits were selected and
maximized by controlled breeding, including extremely powerful jaws, a high sensitivity to pain, extreme aggressiveness towards other animals, and a natural tendency to
refuse to terminate an attack once it has begun; and
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ordinance in question required owners to take special precautions in order to
keep a pit bull. 99
1.

Vagueness

The owners in Peters claimed that the ordinance violated their
constitutional rights on several grounds. The first was that the definition of
pit bull used by the ordinance was unconstitutionally vague because it
included "alternative and sometimes inconsistent definitions of 'pit bull.""'
They also claimed that according to the ordinance, a dog could technically
not conform to the definitions yet still be considered a pit bull. 0 1 While the
WHEREAS, in addition to statistical evidence that Pit Bull Dogs have a greater propensity to bite humans than all other breeds, there exists overwhelming evidence in the
form of individual experiences, that the Pit Bull is infinitely more dangerous once it
does attack; and
WHEREAS, the Pit Bull's massive canine jaws can crush a victim with up to two
thousand (2,000) pounds of pressure per square inch - three times that of a German
Shepherd or Doberman Pinscher, making the Pit Bull's jaws the strongest of any
animal, per pound; and
WHEREAS, after consideration of the facts, this Council has determined that the
following Ordinance is reasonable and necessary for the protection of the public health,
safety and welfare.

Id.
99.

Id. at 762. The court noted that:

[The ordinance] regulates the ownership of pit bulls by requiring their owners to carry
insurance, post a surety bond, or furnish other evidence of financial responsibility in
the amount of $300,000 to cover any bodily injury, death or property damage that may
be caused by the dog. The ordinance also requires that owners register their pit bulls
with the City and confine the dogs indoors or in a locked pen. The ordinance defines
pit bulls by reference to characteristics of the breed established by the American
Kennel Club (AKC) and the United Kennel Club (UKC).
Id. at 762.

100. Peters, 534 So.2d at 762. The ordinance provides:
(a) The term 'Pit Bull Dog' as used within this Article shall refer to any dog which
exhibits those distinguishing characteristics which:
(1)
Substantially conform to the standards established by the American
Kennel Club for American Staffordshire Terriers or Staffordshire Bull Terriers;

or
(2)
Substantially conform to the standards established by the United Kennel
Club for American Pit Bull Terriers.

Id. at 762.
101. Id. "Technical deficiencies in the dogs [sic] conformance to the standards in
paragraph (b) shall not be construed to indicate that the subject dog is not a 'Pit Bull Dog'
under this ordinance." Id. (alteration in original).
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court admitted that the definitions of "pit bull" in the ordinance lacked
"mathematical certainty," it stated that absolute certainty was not necessary
for constitutionality. 10 2 The court noted that the main concern with vague
ordinances is that people would not have proper notice of what conduct is
prohibited. 103 However, the court determined that pit bull owners had a
sufficient understanding of the ordinance terms to determine if their dogs
were included in it.' 4 They further determined that the issue of "whether a
dog is covered by the ...ordinance is a matter of evidence, not...
constitutional law."' 0 5 In this case, they found that the weight of evidence
showed that the dogs in question were under the realm of the city ordinance. 106
Courts have commonly upheld ordinances against vagueness challenges. 1°7 Central to the upholding of these ordinances is the notion that pit
bulls are an easily identifiable breed.'0 8 However, this notion has been
widely criticized.
There are two definitions of dogs that the American
Kennel Club (AKC) recognizes as pit bulls, and one under the United
Kennel Club's (UKC) definition." 0 Municipalities have acknowledged that
they need to include all three, sometimes conflicting, definitions in order to
include each breed commonly known as a pit bull."'
102. Id. at 767.
103. Peters, 534 So. 2d at 767.
104. Id. at 768.
105. Id.
106. Id.
107. See, e.g., Hearn v. City of Overland Park, 772 P.2d 758, 763 (Kan. 1989); Garcia
v. Viii. of Tijeras, 767 P.2d 355, 357-58 (N.M. Ct. App. 1988); State v. Robinson, 541
N.E.2d 1092, 1095 (Ohio Ct. App. 1989).
108. See, e.g., Garcia, 767 P.2d at 357 (stating "[t]he trial court found that the
American Pit Bull Terrier is a recognized breed of dog readily identifiable by laymen. We
understand the trial court's finding to have been that the breed can be identified by persons
who are not qualified to be dog show judges.").
109. See discussion infra Part V.A.
110. Compare AMERICAN KENNEL CLUB, AMERICAN STAFFORDSHIRE TERRIER
DESCRIPTION, at http://www.akc.org/breeds/recbreeds/amstaff.cfm (last visited June 27, 2002),
and AMERICAN KENNEL CLUB, STAFFORDSHIRE BULL TERRIER DESCRIPTION, at
http://www.akc.org/breeds/recbreeds/stbult.cfm (last visited June 27, 2002), with UNITED
KENNEL

CLUB,

STAFFORDSHIRE

BULL

TERRIER

DESCRIPTION,

at

http://www.ukcdogs.com/Terriers/StaffordshireBuliTerrier.std.htm (last visited June 27,
2002), and UNITED KENNEL CLUB, AMERICAN PIT BULL TERRIER DESCRIPTION, at
http://www.ukcdogs.com/Terriers/AmericanPitBullTerrier.std.htm (last visited June 27, 2002).
111. See, e.g., State v. Peters, 534 So. 2d 760, 762 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1998)
(noting that the challenged ordinance included the AKC and UKC definitions for the three
types of pit bull).
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Municipalities often attempt to include any dog that has any mix of "pit
bull" in them within their ordinance's definition of pit bull.' 12 It is
sometimes apparent that a dog is, by definition, one of the breeds commonly
known as a pit bull. 1 3 However, the evidentiary method for determining
114
when a dog is a pit bull or pit bull mix can be confusing and difficult.
2.

Equal Protection

The owners also challenged the ordinance on the grounds that it
"violate[d] the equal protection clauses of both the federal and state
constitutions. ' 5 They claimed that "it irrationally differentiates between
owners of pit bulls and owners of other.., dogs."" They also claimed that
the definition of pit bull used in the ordinance did not "include within the pit
bull definition half-breed pit bulls.., which may be as vicious as purebred
pit bulls.""' 7 The court responded by explaining that "the constitutional
guarantee of equal protection of the laws does not guarantee that all dog
owners will be treated alike; at most, the only guarantee is that all owners of
defined pit bulls will be treated alike.""' 8 The court also stated that "a law is
not constitutionally defective simply because it contains classifications
112. See, e.g., Vanater v. Vill. of S. Point, 717 F. Supp. 1236, 1239 (S.D. Ohio 1989).
The ordinance in question included
any Staffordshire Bull Terrier or American Staffordshire Terrier breed of dog, or any
mixed breed of dog which contains, as an element of its breeding the breed of Staffordshire Bull Terrier or American Staffordshire Terrier as to be identifiable as partially of
the breed of Staffordshire Bull Terrier or American Staffordshire Terrier by a qualified
veterinarian.
Id.
113. See Am. Dog Owners Ass'n, Inc. v. City of Lynn, 533 N.E.2d 642, 646 (Mass.
1989).
114. Id.at 647.
Unlike an ordinance which generally prohibits the keeping of a "vicious dog". . . the
Lynn Pit Bull ban ordinance depends for enforcement on the subjective understanding
of dog officers of the appearance of an ill-defined "breed," leaves dog owners to guess
at what conduct ...is prohibited, and requires "proof" of a dog's "type" which, unless
the dog is registered, may be impossible to furnish. Such a law gives unleashed
discretion to the dog officers charged with its enforcement, and clearly relies on their
subjective speculation whether a dog's physical characteristics make it what is "commonly understood" to be a "Pit Bull."
Id.
115. Peters, 534 So. 2d at 763.
116. Id.
117. Id.
118. Id.
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which are underinclusive."' 9 Courts in other jurisdictions have addressed
other equal protection challenges. 120
A common one has been that
ordinances banning pit bulls are overinclusive because they include dogs that
have never shown any signs of being vicious; however, these challenges
were each summarily dismissed. 121
3.

Due Process

The third theory that the owners in Peters relied upon was that the
ordinance violated their due process. 122 The owners claimed, and the trial
court agreed, "that the insurance requirement was 'unconstitutionally
oppressive' in that it required pit bull owners to buy insurance even though
the evidence presented showed that no insurance company would write ' 23a
policy covering the harms which might be wrought by pit bulls."'
However, the appellate court cited Sentell and noted that even if the
requirement was oppressive, it was not unconstitutional. 124 It also noted that
since municipalities likely had
the power to completely ban pit bulls, they
125
could at least regulate them.
4.

Police Power

Although the owners in State v. Peters did not raise the issue of whether
a municipality had the power to regulate a specific breed, several other
courts decided that question in the affirmative. 126 For example, the court in
Vanater v. Village of South Point'27 noted that it is within the police power
of a local government to regulate dogs. 128 It also held that so long as there
was a rational relationship between the government's action and the health
119. Id.
120. See Vanater, 717 F. Supp. at 1236; Colorado Dog Fanciers, Inc. v. Denver, 820
P.2d 644 (Colo. 1991); Hearn v. City of Overland Park, 772 P.2d 758 (Kan. 1989); Garcia v.
Vill. of Tijeras, 767 P.2d 355 (N.M. Ct. App. 1988).
121. Id.
122. Peters, 534 So. 2d at 765.
123. Id.
124. Id.
125. Id.
126. See, e.g., Hearn, 772 P.2d at 765; State. v. Anderson, 566 N.E.2d 1224, 1225
(Ohio 1991); State v. Robinson, 541 N.E.2d 1092, 1094 (Ohio Ct. App. 1989) (holding that
breed-specific regulation of dogs is a valid exercise of police power).
127. 717 F. Supp. 1236 (S.D. Ohio 1989).
128. Id. at 1241.
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and safety of the general public, an ordinance regulating dogs would be
upheld.129 Moreover, the court stated that municipalities could enact
ordinances as long as they did not conflict with the provisions of any state

statutes. 130

5.

Overbroad and Overinclusive

Florida courts have not yet dealt with the issue of whether or not a
breed specific ordinance or regulation is overbroad or overinclusive.13 1 This
is probably due to the above stated Florida statute that bans any regulation or
ordinance that is breed-specific.' 32 However, since the Statute does not
apply to local ordinances enacted prior to October 1, 1990, there are still
ordinances, enacted before this date, which do ban pit bulls.1 33 Therefore,
considering the publicity surrounding breed-specific legislation, an
overbroad or over inclusive attack in Florida is not unlikely in the near
future.
Although Florida has not ruled on this specific issue, numerous
jurisdictions have upheld breed-specific legislation against challenges that
they are over inclusive or overbroad.134 The contention is that a total ban on
a specific breed includes "more dogs than is necessary to accomplish the
goal of protecting the public." 1 35 Furthermore, regulations or ordinances that
ban specific breeds, such as pit bulls, treat them all as inherently dangerous

129. Id.
As this Ordinance [banning pit bulls] does not affect any fundamental rights such as
voting or the freedom of speech and does not make a "suspect classification" such as a
law based on race or nationality, the test to determine its constitutionality is whether it
has a rational relationship to a legitimate state interest.
Id. at 1242. See also Hearn, 772 P.2d at 766; Anderson, 566 N.E.2d at 1225; Holt v. City of
Maumelle, 817 S.W.2d 208, 210 (Ark. 1991).
130. See, e.g., Vanater, 717 F. Supp. at 1241.
131. In Peters, the court did not address whether the ordinance in question was
overinclusive or overbroad. Peters, 534 So. 2d at 760.
132. See FLA. STAT. § 767.14 (2001).
133. See, e.g., MIAMI-DADE COUNTY, FLA., CODE § 5-17 (1999).
134. "An ordinance is 'overbroad' only if it is possible that under its terms conduct
which is protected by the First Amendment may be affected." 3299 N. Fed. Highway, Inc. v.
Bd. of County Comm'rs of Broward County, 646 So.2d 215, 225 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App.
1994) (citing Operation Rescue v. Women's Health Ctr., Inc., 626 So. 2d 664, 674-75 (Fla.
1993)).
135. Sallyanne K. Sullivan, Banning The Pit Bull: Why Breed-Specific Legislation Is
Constitutional,13 U. DAYTON L. REV. 279, 289 (1988).
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and are therefore overbroad or overinclusive.136 However, jurisdictions that
have dealt with this attack have concluded, "the overbreadth doctrine applies
only if the legislation is applicable to conduct protected by the First
37
Amendment, which category does not include the ownership of dogs."'
Additionally, in Colorado Dog Fanciers, Inc. v. Denver,138 the court said
that an overbreadth challenge could not be used to attack the statute, as it
was not guaranteed by the First Amendment.'1 39 Thus, relying on what other
jurisdictions have concluded, an attack that a breed specific ordinance is
over inclusive or overbroad would not have a good chance of surviving in
Florida.
IV, PIT BULLS AS A BREED

A. Characteristics
There are actually two breeds classified by the AKC, and one by the
UKC, that are known as pit bulls. It is a common conception that pit bulls
have very strong jaws that can exert almost 2000 pounds of pressure in one
bite. 14 They are also known for their determination in not releasing their
jaws once they bite. 141 It is also
alleged that pit bulls are unpredictable and

136. See Colo. Dog Fanciers, Inc. v. City and County of Denver, 820 P.2d 644, 645
(Colo. 1991). The Court held "[tihe dog owners.. . assert[ion] that the city ordinance treats
all pit bulls and substantially similar dogs as inherently dangerous and is, therefore,
unconstitutionally overbroad ....is without merit." Id. at 650. See also State v. Robinson,
541 N.E.2d 1092, 1097 (Ohio Ct. App. 1989) (holding that "[t]he statutes [regulating pit
bulls] are neither vague nor overbroad and do not violate appellant's constitutional due
process protections"); Am. Dog Owners Ass'n v. City of Yakima, 777 P.2d 1046, 1048 (Wash.
1989) (holding that a local "ordinance [was] constitutional even though some inoffensive pit
bulls might be banned"); and Vanater v. Vill. of S. Point, 717 F.Supp. 1236, 1246 (S.D. Ohio
1989) (holding that a local "[o]rdinance [was] not overbroad as drawn").
137. Russell G. Donaldson, Validity and Construction of Statute, Ordinance, or
Regulation Applying to Specific Dog Breeds, Such as "Pit Bulls" or "Bull Terriers," 80
A.L.R.4th 70, 90 (1990).
138. 820 P.2d 644, 650 (Colo. 1991).
139. Id. at 650.
140. Graham, supra note 9 (stating "[a] 55-pound pit bull bites with the force of 1,800
pounds per square inch-twice the force of a German shepherd or Doberman. Its jaws and
teeth are designed so that the dog can clamp onto an object with its front incisors while
chewing with its back molars.").
141. See, e.g., Sullivan, supra note 135, at 283.
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inherently vicious. 142 It has been said that "Pit Bull Dogs have a greater
propensity to bite humans than all other breeds... [and] that the Pit Bull is
infinitely more dangerous once it does attack.' ' 143 Because of their strength
and determination, pit bulls have been exploited by drug dealers and others
who use them as guard dogs.' 44
However, despite their maligned reputation, pit bull advocates insist
that the conceptions about pit bulls are false. The American Kennel Club,
for example, believes that American Staffordshire Terriers are good pets for
The AKC similarly encourages ownership of Staffordshire Bull
children.
Terriers, maintaining that they have a good temperament. 146 The American
Temperament Test Society, an organization that tests the temperament of
different breeds of dogs, 147 has rated pit bulls as having a better temperance
than many other breeds of dogs. 148
142. Compare MIAMI-DADE

COUNTY, FLA., CODE

§ 5-17 (1999) (stating that pit bulls

have an "inbred propensity to attack other animals"), with Price, supra note 7 (quoting
Stephanie Shain, director of outreach for the Washington, D.C.-based Humane Society of the
United States: "'the breed is not an accurate indicator if a dog is going to be aggressive or
not"').
143. Peters, 534 So.2d at 764.
144. See, e.g., Graham, supra note 9.
[Pit bulls] have become the dog of choice among drug dealers and other street criminals. The dogs are the latest weapon to protect drug caches and crackhouses.
Last November, Capt. Tom Thompson of the Palm Beach County Sheriffs led
members of the sheriffs Organized Crime Bureau through the wooden gate of a suburban West Palm Beach home during a drug bust. In addition to three pounds of marijuana and records documenting drug transactions, the officers also found 40 pit bulls
guarding the house. In the past year, according to a Los Angeles survey, more than 60
percent of the drug houses raided in that area used pit bulls as [guard dogs].
Id.
145. "Over the past 50 years, careful breeding has produced today's American
Staffordshire Terrier who is affectionate, reliable, and an especially good dog for children. The
American Staffordshire Terrier is a happy, outgoing, stable, and confident dog who makes a
wonderful family pet." AMERICAN KENNEL CLUB, AMERICAN STAFFORDSHIRE TERRIER
DESCRIPTION, at http://www.akc.org/breeds/recbreeds/amstaff.cfm (last visited June 27, 2002).
146. AMERICAN KENNEL CLUB, STAFFORDSHIRE BULL TERRIER DESCRIPTION, at
http://www.akc.org/breeds/recbreeds/stbult.cfm (last visited June 27, 2002). "Staffordshire
Bull Terriers are gentle, affectionate, trustworthy, and loyal." Id. "From the past history of
the Staffordshire Bull Terrier, the modem dog draws its character of indomitable courage,
high intelligence, and tenacity. This, coupled with affection for its friends, and children in
particular, its off-duty quietness and trustworthy stability, makes it a foremost all-purpose
dog." Id. "The Staffordshire Bull Terrier has great affection for people." Id.
147. "The American Temperament Test Society, Inc. (ATTS) is a national not-forprofit organization.., for the promotion of uniform temperament evaluation of purebred and
spayed/neutered mixed-breed dogs." AMERICAN TEMPERAMENT TEST SOCIETY, INC., GENERAL
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B. Illegal Dogfighting
One reason that some pit bulls may be considered vicious is that they
are commonly used in illegal dogfights. 49 Illegal dogfighting involves
people gathering together and pitting dogs against each other to fight. 50 The
dogs fight until only one is left standing.' 5 1 It is a brutal, but widespread
phenomenon and a popular underground ritual. 15 People bet money on the
153
fights and raise dogs specifically for the purpose of winning these fights.
The breeders encourage and train these dogs to be vicious, often forcing
them to run on treadmills and feeding them small dogs so that they learn to
like the taste of blood.' 54 These dogs usually suffer severe abuse.
Owners
can make a significant amount of money by having dogs that are as
menacing as possible, therefore they encourage these negative characteristics
in their dogs. 156 A man currently serving time in the Leon County jail for
INFORMATION ABOUT THE

AT'S, at http://www.atts.org/about.html (last visited June 27, 2002)

[hereinafter About ATTS]. It administers uniform tests to dogs around the country and
evaluates the pass rate per breed. Id. The average pass rate for all breeds is 80%. Id.
148. Currently, the American Pit Bull Terrier has a passing rate of 82.7%; the
Staffordshire Bull Terrier passes at 81.6%, and the American Staffordshire Terrier passes at
82.2%. On average, pit bulls are rated as having a better temperance than the Miniature
Poodle, which passes at 76.7% and the Shih Tzu, which passes at 76.5%. See AMERICAN
TEMPERAMENT
TEST
SOCIETY,
INC.,
ATTS
BREED
STATISTICS,
at
http://www.atts.org/statsl.html (last visited June 27, 2002).
149. See Tony Bridges, Criminals Get Kicks From Blood and Fur: Clues Pointing to
Dogfighting Rings, TALLAHASSEE DEMOCRAT, June 2, 2002 at 1 (stating "[d]ogfighting has
been popular in the southern United States since the practice first arrived from 19th-century
England. However, what was considered a 'sport of gentlemen' for more than 100 years has
now become a form of street entertainment found in nearly every urban center in America.");
see also Ethel Yari, Woman's Best Friend: Animal Control Officer Rescues Injured Pit Bull,
SUN-SENTINEL (Fort Lauderdale, Fla.), May 5, 2002, at 1.

150. Bridges, supra note 149.
151. Id.
152. Id.
153. Id.
154. Id.
155. See Yari, supra note 149, at 1. Bones (a mixed pit bull who had been stolen from
his owner and used for dogfights) had "his ear bitten off, one eye permanently damaged, and
his face transformed into a road map of crisscrossed stitches and scars from years of
competitive dogfighting ...He had open lacerations all over his body and face and couldn't
walk because he was bitten on one leg joint." Id.
156. Bridges, supra note 149 (stating "[slome ...[keep] detailed records of fighting
pedigrees and training their dogs like welterweight boxers. They plan matches down to the
last detail, are extremely careful to avoid police and bet serious money on the fights.").

Published by NSUWorks, 2003

25

Nova Law Review, Vol. 27, Iss. 3 [2003], Art. 1

Nova Law Review

[Vol. 27:415

animal cruelty said, "[s]ome people do it for the money, because there is a
lot of money to be made."' 157 His partner, who was also involved in
dogfighting said, "I've heard of some people making as much as $40,000 to
$50,000 on one fight."' 158 Although this underground practice is widespread,
it is often difficult for police to break up dogfighting rings. 159
A secondary problem that dogfighting has caused is the theft of pit
bulls. 16 Pit bulls are often stolen and the male dogs trained to fight, while
' 62
6
the females are used for breeding.' 1 Other stolen dogs are used for "bait."'
This also creates an atmosphere where the genetic lines become tainted by
the encouragement of vicious propensities.163 Even if these dogs are rescued
from their cruel conditions, they have already been trained for fighting and
may come from bloodlines where viciousness was encouraged. Sadly
enough, animal control officials and the Humane Society will put these dogs
to sleep instead of allowing them to be adopted because they may pose a
danger to people.'64
Even if pit bulls are banned, individuals who participate in dogfighting
will likely not turn their backs on this lucrative pastime. Other dogs can be
trained to be vicious or to be used for fighting. Further, the people who are
already engaged in criminal behavior will not likely adhere to the provisions
of a ban and will continue to illegally keep pit bulls.
There are currently animal cruelty laws that punish people who engage
166
in dogfighting. 65 However, the problem lies with enforcing these laws.
Also, the penalties have to be significant enough to deter these participants
away from this lucrative practice. If the penalty is not significant enough, or
the enforcement is lax, there is not enough incentive to end this practice.

157. Id.
158. Id.
159. Id.
160. See id.; see also Kathleen Chapman, Spate of Pit Bull Thefts Leads to Arrest of
Suspect, PALM BEACH POST, May 16, 2002, at 2B.
161. Bridges, supra note 149.
162. Id.
163. Id.
164. See Two Seized Pit Bulls to Be Euthanized, supra note 4 ("[tlhe [seized pit bull]
dogs cannot be adopted because of the violent training they received as puppies").
165. See FLA. STAT. § 828.12 (2001) (providing guidelines for punishing people found
guilty of animal cruelty).
166. See Bridges, supra note 149 (noting that "dogfighters are insular, and rarely open
their groups to strangers"). Also, the fights occur in places that authorities may not suspect,
such as in the woods or in someone's home. Id.
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V. THE PROBLEM WITH BANNING PARTICULAR BREEDS

A.

No ClearDefinition of 'PitBull'

Although many courts have upheld ordinances against vagueness
challenges, there is still a valid argument that definitions of "pit bull" can be
confusing and hard to apply. 167 When called to testify in a hearing to
determine the constitutionality of the Dade County Ordinance, even the
President of the AKC said "that based on looks alone he could not identify
Lassie as a Collie."'' 68 He said that "he would have to examine the dog's
certificate of pedigree."' 169 Both he and the UKC President indicated that it
was difficult to say with certainty that a certain dog is a pit bull. 70 This
leads to a situation where people whose dogs are not registered, or who do
not know exactly what type of dog they have, are not on adequate notice of
what behavior (or in this case breed) is proscribed. 17'
Given the difficulty in visually distinguishing what breed a dog is, one
might think that testing a dog's DNA will give a definitive answer. However
this is not the case. Even scientists who study canine genetics note that there

167. See Am. Dog Owners Ass'n, Inc. v. Lynn, 533 N.E.2d 642, 646 (Mass. 1989).
The court stated:
[Tlhere may, indeed, be some dogs which, because of registration, known percentage
or close conformance in appearance to commonly accepted standards representative of
"Pit Bull," would be "commonly understood" to be "Pit Bulls."
The evidence... indicated, however, that some dogs might appear to be "Pit Bulls" yet belong
to a breed "commonly understood" not to be "Pit Bulls," and that some dogs, "commonly understood" by the owner or dog registry to be a breed "known as Pit Bull"
might not appear to be "Pit Bulls," and so escape the notice and enforcement efforts of
the Lynn dog officers.

Id. at 646.
168. See Derr, supra note 21, at 51.
169. Id.
170. "They both testified that they could not name a dog's breed by comparing the
animal with an official standard." Id.
171. Id.
Although the Dade County ordinance was upheld, the New York regulation was
suspended by the state supreme court after being challenged by the AKC and other
groups ....
Ironically, nearly everyone involved with dogs recognizes these breedspecific bans as bad legislation, passed in response to hysterical media reports of fatal
attacks by "pit bulls."
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is very little difference genetically between breeds. 172 In light of the
difficulty involved in concluding that a dog is a particular breed, ordinances
that ban particular breeds are inherently vague.
B.

Other Breeds Will Be Bred for Fighting

As some municipalities banned pit bulls, Rottweilers, who have several
of the same characteristics as pit bulls, became more popular. 73 If one type
of dog is banned, people who look for those characteristics will just
encourage them in a similar type of dog. 174 In a study of breeds of dogs that
caused human deaths, researchers found that as pit bull-related deaths
decreased in the 1990s, deaths caused by Rottweilers increased.175 Presently,
Rottweilers top the list of dogs that cause the most fatalities. 176 Despite an
initial drop in total number of dog bite-related fatalities, the number of
casualties actually seems to be steadily increasing after more pit bull bans
were enacted. 7 7 This phenomena seems to support the theory that people
who are determined to have a vicious dog will raise a vicious dog, regardless
of whether or not pit bulls are banned.'
Therefore, instead of focusing on
banning a particular breed, it wouldbe more effective to focus on regulating
the behavior of dog owners.'79
172. See Derr, supra note 21, at 52 (stating "in a comparison of two American
Staffordshire terriers with a whippet, one terrier appeared more closely related to the whippet
than to the other terrier").
173. See Jeffrey J. Sacks et al., Special Report: Breeds of Dogs Involved in Fatal
Human Attacks in the United States Between 1979 and 1998, 217 J. AM. VETERINARY MED.
ASS'N 836, 838-39 (2000).
174. Christopher Sherman, Rottweiler Owners Hope Show Helps Repair Image,
ORLANDO SENTINEL,

Mar. 31, 2002, at 1.

175. See Sacks, supra note 173, at 839; see also Sherman, supra note 174 (stating
"[b]etween 1981 and 1990, pit bulls were involved in 43 dog bite-related fatalities while
Rottweilers had only six. However, between 1991 and 1998, Rottweiler cases jumped to 33
while pit-bull killings dropped to 21.").
176. Sacks, supra note 173, at 837.
177. Id.
178. See Sherman, supra note 174 (noting "Dr. Randall Lockwood, canine behavior
specialist and vice president for research and educational outreach for the Humane Society in
Washington, D.C., said... the new fighting dog of choice could be the Presa Canario-the
dogs that killed Diane Whipple in January 2001 in San Francisco.").
179. See AMERICAN KENNEL CLUB, BREED-SPECIFIC LEGISLATION IN MILWAUKEE (Jan.
24, 2002), at http://www.akc.org/love/dipllegislat/Milwaukee.cfm. "The American Kennel
Club believes that dog owners should be responsible for their dogs and that laws should
impose appropriate penalties on irresponsible owners. In order to be effective, such
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Excludes Dogs That May Be Dangerousand Includes Dogs That Are

Not

Municipalities seem to ban pit bulls because they believe that they are
the primary source of dog attacks. However, the ineffectiveness of the bans
may leave citizens with a false sense of security. 180 For example, the dogs
that attacked and killed Diane Whipple in January 2001 were Presa
Canarios. 8' These dogs are not even on several lists of "dangerous dogs"
that insurance companies have formulated. 82 Experts agree that there are 83
a
not.
or
vicious
be
will
dog
a
whether
to
contribute
that
factors
of
number
Furthermore, pit bull owners often insist that their dogs are not vicious. 184
Special precautions should be taken for dogs that pose a threat to
humans or other animals. However, the criteria for determining that a dog is
85
"dangerous" should be, as provided for in Florida Statute section 767.12,1
based on whether a dog, regardless of breed, has ever attacked or bitten a
person or other animal. Owners who properly train their dogs should not be
punished because of those who abuse their pets.
D.

Not an Effective Means of Solving Dog Bite Problem

It should be noted that most courts that decided that bans are constitutional did so before there was significant time to analyze the effects of such
bans. Therefore, they deferred to the judgment of the respective govern-

legislation should not single out specific breeds or phenotypic classes of dogs. Deeds, not
breeds, should be addressed." Id.
180. See, e.g., Graham, supra note 9 (stating "Dennis Moore, Director of the Palm
Beach County Animal Regulation Division... said targeting pit bulls with the county's
proposed vicious animal ordinance would have been a 'serious mistake' because other breeds
can be equally threatening.").
181. See Sherman, supra note 174.
182. See Price, supra note 7; Shanklin, supra note 7.
183. See Sacks, supra note 173, at 839 (discussing several factors that contribute to
whether a dog will be likely to bite "including heredity, sex, early experience, socialization
and training, health (medical and behavioral), reproductive status, quality of ownership and
supervision, and victim behavior"); Price, supra note 7 (stating "[tihe Veterinary Medical
Association said a dog's tendency to bite depends on at least five factors: heredity, early
experience, later socialization and training, health and victim behavior").
184. See Elena Cabral, Pit Bull Attack Spurs Push for Dog Law, MIAMI HERALD, Mar.
12, 2000 at 1WB (noting that owner of pit bull that bit a dog said that his dog would never
hurt a person).
185. FLA. STAT. § 767.12 (2001).
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ments involved and accepted their findings as sound. However, in the years
after breed-bans were first enacted, data shows that the number of dog bites
have actually increased.186 Furthermore, there is no scientific evidence to
prove that breed-specific bans are effective.' 87 On the contrary, the number
of dog bite-related deaths have increased since bans were first enacted,
which indicates that they are not effective.'" Therefore, if the bans are not
effective, they are not a rational means for achieving a governmental
interest, and subsequently are not constitutional.
E.

Opens Pandora'sBox

The pit bull is not the only type of dog that has been the target of bans.
As their popularity increased, Rottweiler bites became more prevalent and
therefore may also be targeted.189 If Rottweilers can be banned, then
German Shepherds, Great Danes, or Golden Retrievers might be next. There
is nothing to stop a municipality that bans one breed from continuing to ban
different breeds. Furthermore, the banning of one breed makes it likely that
another will be banned, as irresponsible owners choose another dog to use
for fighting or otherwise encourage vicious tendencies.
Also, the
likelihood that specific breeds will attack and others will not is negated by
the fact that even unlikely dogs might bite or kill. In 2000, a Pomeranian,' 9 1
which is generally considered to be a harmless dog, killed a baby.19 Since
local governments are given significant leeway to regulate dogs, under the
provisions of House Bill 839, municipalities could conceivably ban any dog.

186. Sacks, supra note 173, at 837.
187. Id. at 839-40.
188. See discussion infra note 173.
189. See Sacks, supra note 173, at 837.
190. See discussion infra Part IV.B.
191. See
AMERICAN
KENNEL
CLUB,
POMERANIAN
DESCRIPTION,
at
http://www.akc.org/breeds/recbreeds/pomer.cfm (last visited June 27, 2002). The Pomeranian
is described as:
[A] compact, short-backed, active toy dog. He has a soft, dense undercoat with a
profuse harsh-textured outer coat. His heavily plumed tail is set high and lies flat on
his back. He is alert in character, exhibits intelligence in expression, buoyant in deportment, and is inquisitive by nature. The Pomeranian is cocky, commanding, and
animated as he gaits. He is sound in composition and action.
Id. Further, the average Pomeranian weighs in at a mere three to seven pounds, much less
than the average pit bull. See id.
192. See Lacitis, supra note 14.
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This gives too much power to local governments to ban whatever breed is
popularly deemed the most dangerous at a given point in time.
VI. ALTERNATIVES TO BREED-SPECIFIC LEGISLATION

Although these recent attempts to ban specific breeds have failed, they
continue to be an issue. Given that breed-specific legislation is not effective
and raises constitutional concerns, more effective alternatives need to be
explored. There are several other things that legislators and municipalities
can do to minimize the number of dog bites that occur.
A. Training
Pit bulls are strong dogs that have the ability to cause damage if they
However, the likelihood that they will bite is significantly lessened if
they have proper training. 194 Even a dog that has been treated improperly
can be trained to be a well-adjusted dog. 195 For example, animal trainer
Vicky Hearne rescued a pit bull that was to be destroyed by animal
control. 196 Authorities had given up on him, but Hearne trained him so that
he eventually scored high on a temperance test.' 97 Hearne insists that pit
bulls are not inherently bad dogs and that with proper training, they can
make good pets. 198
There are currently no regulations that require dog owners to take their
dogs to obedience school. People often do not know how to relate to and
properly treat their dog.' 99 Even if a dog owner does not have malicious
intentions, they may lose control over the dog or inadvertently condone
errant behavior in the dog. 200 It is imperative for owners to understand how
201
to properly handle their dog.
bite. 193

193. See discussion infra note 173.
194. See Sacks, supra note 173, at 839-40.
195. See generally, Foote, supra note 2, at 63-66 (discussing how animal trainer Vicky
Hearne rescued and successfully rehabilitated a pit bull who was to be euthanized).
196. Id.
197. Id.
198. Id.
199. Id.
200. Foote, supra note 2 (discussing animal trainer Vicky Hearne's theories on
effective and ineffective methods for training dogs).
201. See Price, supra note 7.
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Educating dog owners can benefit both dog owners and insurance
companies. For example, once State Farm instituted an education program
for its policyholders, their dog claims significantly decreased.' °2 If other
insurance companies follow this example, they might reduce the number of
bites caused by all breeds, including pit bulls.
B.

Crackdown on Dogfighting

One way to counter the negative characteristics often attributed to pit
bulls is to more severely punish those that participate in dogfighting.
Presently, there is not enough incentive for those who participate in this
practice to cease doing so. Currently in Florida, the penalties for animal
203
cruelty are codified in section 828.12 of the Florida Statutes. However,
this does not adequately punish those who are involved in this practice.
Gambling, theft and animal cruelty are all involved in dogfights but
prosecuting these criminals has proved difficult. 2°4 First, both local and state
government need to recognize that there is a problem. Second, the Florida
Legislature needs to enact stiffer penalties for people who engage in
dogfighting. Municipalities should also allocate sufficient resources to
eliminate this practice. While pit bulls appear to be the dog of choice
amongst proponents of dogfighting, if pit bulls are eliminated, another breed
can just as easily be trained to fight. By punishing the people who abuse pit

The Insurance Information Institute said the responsibility for a dog becoming either a
menace or a well-behaved pet rests with the owner and offers these tips to help keep
dogs from biting:
*
Have a dog spayed or neutered. Studies show dogs are three times more likely to
bite if they are not fixed.
*
Socialize your dog so the dog will know how to act with people and animals.
*
Discourage children from disturbing a dog that is eating or sleeping.
*
Play non-aggressive games with your dog such as "fetch." Playing aggressive
games like "tug of war" can encourage aggressive behavior.
*
Avoid exposing your dog to situations in which you are unsure of the dog's
response.
*
Never approach a strange dog, and avoid eye contact with a dog that appears
threatening.

Id.
202. See Shanklin, supra note 7 (noting that dog claims went from costing $76.2
million in 1997 to $73.5 million in 1999).
203. FLA. STAT. § 828.12 (2001).

204. § 775.082(4)(a). Pursuant to section 775.082(4)(a), a person convicted of animal
cruelty can serve up to one year in prison. Id.
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bulls, we can help cleanse the pit bull bloodlines of vicious tendencies and at
the same time prosecute the people who can easily exploit any other breed.2 °5
C.

Regulate Breeders
206

Dogs can be predisposed to certain traits because of their breeding.
Because anyone with a dog can be a breeder, not all breeders are even
registered or regulated. Breeders often inbreed dogs to try to promote "pure"
lines, but in doing so they often encourage defective traits. 207 However, even
though it is against breed-specific legislation, 208 the American Kennel Club
has been criticized for its role in the perpetuation of irresponsible breeding
209
practices.. It indirectly condones inbreeding by concentrating on a dog's
appearance, 210 "fail[ing] to take a stand against the puppy mills and pet
stores that exploit purebred dogs,"21' and "defin[ing] purity in a breed
according to an outmoded notion that is destructive of the health of the

205. See Derr, supra note 21 (noting "[t]he perpetrators are both mixed breeds and
non-registered purebred animals made vicious by people. Those who illegally fight dogs
today do so with animals whose bloodlines they jealously guard and maintain." Id. at 52.
206. See id. at 52.
207. See Derr, supra note 21.
208.

See generally AMERICAN

KENNEL

CLUB,

BREED-SPECIFIC

LEGISLATION

IN

MILWAUKEE, at http://www.akc.org/love/dip/legislat/Milwaukee.cfm (last visited Mar. 22,
2003).
209. See Derr, supra note 21 (criticizing the AKC's encouragement of aesthetic
characteristics in dogs; arguing that inbreeding has weakened breed bloodlines and caused
dogs' health to suffer).
210. Id. at 50.
[T]he AKC defines quality in a dog primarily on the basis of appearance, paying scant
heed to such other canine characteristics as health, temperament, and habits of work.
Over the years this policy has led to destructive forms of inbreeding that have created
dogs capable only of conforming to human standards of beauty. Many can no longer
perform their traditional tasks - herding, tracking, hunting - while more than a few
cannot live outside a human-controlled environment.

Id.
211. Id.
[The AKC] will neither refuse to register those animals - although many dogs, produced and sold under inhumane conditions, are of questionable pedigree and genetic
fitness-nor cooperate with authorities seeking to regulate them. The result has been a
decline, which even the AKC recognizes, in the quality of the animals that nearly
500,000 Americans buy from retailers each year.
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dogs.", 2 The AKC should educate breeders and cooperate with authorities
to identify and report people who engage in detrimental breeding practices.
D. Owner Liability
Under the common law, dog owners faced liability only if they had
knowledge that their dog was likely to bite. 213 Today in Florida, dog owners
face civil liability for any injuries caused by their dogs.2 14 Section 767.13 of
the Florida Statutes provides guidelines for the penalties that an owner
might incur as a result of their dog's behavior. 2 ' 5 For example, "[i]f a dog
that has previously been declared dangerous attacks or bites a person or a
domestic animal without provocation, the owner is guilty of a misdemeanor
of the first degree, ' '1 6 which is punishable for up to one year in prison.21 7
However, if a dog's owner knew that his dog was vicious but did not take
212. Id.
213. 2 DAN B. DOBBS, THELAW OF TORTS § 344 (1st ed. 2001).
Under the common law rules, the keepers of a dog were not strictly liable for harms
caused by the dog unless they knew of the animal's abnormal propensity to cause
harm. But statutes and ordinances often contribute to much larger liabilities for dog
owners or keepers. Some statutes, for example, provide expressly or by implication
that the owner of a dog is liable for a bite regardless of whether the dog was vicious or
known to be vicious, so long as the plaintiff was in a public place where she could
lawfully be. Ordinances and leash laws potentially imposing liability are also common.
...
Although the statutes usually leave room for defenses based upon provocation or
trespass by the plaintiff, the effect is that in many instances, an unconditional strict
liability is imposed for dog bite injuries.
Id. (internal citations omitted).
214. FLA. STAT. § 767.04 (2001). This section provides:
The owner of any dog that bites any person while such person is on or in a public
place, or lawfully on or in a private place, including the property of the owner of the
dog, is liable for damages suffered by persons bitten, regardless of the former viciousness of the dog or the owners' knowledge of such viciousness. However, any negligence on the part of the person bitten that is a proximate cause of the biting incident
reduces the liability of the owner of the dog by the percentage that the bitten person's
negligence contributed to the biting incident .... However, the owner is not liable,
except as to a person under the age of 6, or unless the damage are proximately caused
by the negligent act or omission of the owner, if at the time of any such injury the
owner had displayed in a prominent place on his or her premises a sign easily readable
including the words "Bad Dog." The remedy provided by this section is in addition to
and cumulative with any other remedy provided by statute or common law.

Id.
215. § 767.13.
216. Id.
217. § 775.082(4)(a).
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reasonable precautions, that owner could be "guilty of a misdemeanor of the
second degree, ' ' 2 18 and is punishable for up to sixty days in prison. 2 19 Lastly,
"[i]f a dog that has previously been declared dangerous attacks and causes
severe injury to or death of any human, the owner is guilty of a felony of the
third degree," 220 and can face up to five years in prison. 221 Pursuant to these
sections, an owner is responsible for paying the fees incurred by their dog
while it is confined by animal control.2 2
VIII. CONCLUSION

Dog bites may be a serious problem in the United States, but banning
specific breeds is not an effective method for controlling the problem. Due
process requires that government restrictions be rationally related to a
legitimate governmental objective.
Protecting citizens is a legitimate
governmental objective, and restrictions on dogs can be rationally related to
that legitimate objective. However, the ineffectiveness of banning particular
breeds negates the theory that it is a rational means of resolving the problem.
Therefore, with its use, there is a gap between the government's objective
and the means to achieve it.
Since courts defer to the findings of a
legislature, these findings must be reexamined if they are purported to
support breed bans. Given the ineffectiveness of breed-specific bans, courts
should not consider them to be rational.
Although there is case law to the contrary, the definitions used by
ordinances that ban pit bulls are inherently vague. Given the difficulty in
determining what breed a dog is, the ordinances often do not give owners
adequate notice of whether or not their dog is covered. When a veterinarian
or animal control worker is called upon to determine whether or not a dog is
a pit bull, it leaves dogs at the mercy of a subjective, unreliable method.
Furthermore, statutes banning a particular breed are both overinclusive and
underinclusive. Statutes pertaining to all dangerous dogs are a more
effective and fair method of dealing with potentially vicious dogs.
Given the inherent problems with breed-specific legislation, alternatives
to its use, both legislative and non-legislative, should be explored and
implemented. In order to curb the negative effects of illegal dogfighting,
there should be harsher penalties in place for offending participants.
218. § 767.13(2).

219. § 775.082(4)(b).
220. § 767.13(3).
221. § 775.082(3)(d).
222. § 767.13(1)-(3).
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Municipalities should also be more proactive in eliminating this practice.
While the legislature and cities can both be effective in mitigating the dog
bite problem, it is ultimately the responsibility of dog owners to take
necessary precautions to make sure that their dog, regardless of breed, is a
safe and happy member of the community.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Recently, funeral and cemetery related scandals in Georgia, Florida,

Tennessee, and California have caught the attention of the media, the
Federal Government, and the American public.2

This attention has led to

1.
The AARP defines the "deathcare industry" as "the array of providers of funeral
and burial goods and services, such as funeral directors, cemeterians, and third-party sellers."
SHARON HERMANSON, AARP PUBLIC POLICY INSTITUTE, THE DEATHCARE INDUSTRY 1 (2000),

availableat http://research.aarp.org/consume/ib44_deathcare.pdf.
*
J.D. candidate for May 2004 at Nova Southeastern University, Shepard Broad
Law Center. The author extends a special thanks to his loving wife Mary Hunt, his family for
their overwhelming support, and Nova Law Review staff for their work on this article.
2.
Mary Deibel, Senate Hears Corpse Issues Role in Funeral Industry Studied,
AUGUSTA CHRON., Apr. 27, 2002, at D5.
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investigations into the expansive funeral industry. It is estimated that nearly
2.5 million Americans died in 2001, leaving the daily toll at approximately
6,849. 45 In the State of Florida alone, roughly 160,000 people die each year.'
Even though death is a natural part of life, and it happens so often around us,
it is still a difficult subject for many people to talk about.6 4tThose who have
never had to arrange for a funeral frequently shy away from its implications
.... Those who have acquired personal and painful knowledge of the

subject would often rather forget about it."'7 Because of this taboo, many
Americans are probably unaware that the business of death has risen to a $25
billion industry.8 Although arguably, most Americans and small independent funeral homes have not entertained thoughts of making huge sums of
money from another man's death, a few large corporations have. 9 Corporate
chains, predominately "the Big Three," Loewen Group, Service Corporation
International, and Stewart,' ° have now become the owners of one-fifth of
America's 22,000 funeral homes, and at least a quarter of the 880 funeral

- Georgia officials brought 266 criminal charges against Brent Marsh in connection
with the discovery of 339 corpses at his
Tri-State Crematory in Noble.
- California prosecutors charged Riverside crematory operator Michael Francis Brown
with 156 counts for unauthorized sale of body parts for medical research through
another Brown-owned business, Bio-Tech Anatomical.
- Tennessee authorities investigated complaints that bone fragments and casket parts
were found at a fresh grave at Mount Carmel-Hollywood Cemetery in Memphis.
- Florida Authorities probed charges that mortuary students at Lynn University in Boca
Raton embalmed people in violation of family preferences and religious practices.
- Reports of bodies buried in the wrong graves and scattered in nearby woods at two
Menorah Gardens & Funeral Cemeteries in Florida brought in state investigators atop
class-action suits against cemetery owner Service Corp. International.

Id.
3.
4.

Id.
Births, Marriages,Divorces, and Deaths: ProvisionalDatafor October2001, 50
NAT'L
VITAL
STAT.
REP.
11
(June
26,
2002),
at
http://www.cdc.gov/nchsldata/nvsr/nvsr50nvsr5O_l 1.pdf.
5.
FLA. DEP'T HEALTH, PUBLIC HEALTH DATA INDICATOR SYSTEM, TOTAL DEATHS
FROM ALL CAUSES (2000), at http://hpeapps.doh.state.fl.us/phids/Phidsl .asp. (statistics from

1998-2000)
6.

JESSICA MITFORD, THE AMERICAN WAY OF DEATH REVISITED 17 (1998).

7.
Id.
8.
Mirian Horn, The DeathcareBusiness: The Goliaths of the FuneralIndustry Are
Making Lots of Money Off Your Grief U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., Mar. 23, 1998.
9.
Id.
10. Id.
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homes in the State of Florida." These corporate chains have gained this
share by craftily purchasing many of the family owned "mom and pop"
funeral homes around the country, often paying up to thirteen times what
they are worth, and retaining customers by deceptively continuing to operate
under the previous owner's name.12 One would think that since consolidation allows many funeral homes owned by the same corporation to share
hearses, share staff, and embalm bodies at a central processing unit, that the
savings would be passed on to the consumer in the form of cheaper prices for
funerals and funeral goods. 13 Nevertheless, this has not been the case. 4 Due
to increased pressures by management, prices have been on the incline.'
In the last three years alone, funeral costs have risen three times faster
than the rate of inflation.15 Taking a back seat only to a house and a car, a
funeral will most likely be the third largest purchase made by most
Americans,' 6 with an average cost of $5,000.17 However, if this purchase is
made from one of the "big national chains" rather than a small independent
funeral home, the price is likely to be over two thousand dollars more.18
When confronted, one large corporation justified the large discrepancy in
prices by analogizing the sale of funerals to that of an automobile stating,
"'It's like the difference between a Cadillac and a Ford."'" 19
The rising cost of funerals and the increased pressures to sell funeral
services and goods has led to creative ways to increase profits. 20 Just as any
other business that offers shares of stock to the public, there are always
pressures to increase revenues and keep investors happy. 2' These pressures

11. John Tuohy, Dying in Florida: Independents vs. Chains, FLA. TODAY, Apr. 30,
2002, at 1. Service Corporation International currently has the biggest share of the market
with 4000 plus facilities. Id. The Loewen Group of British Columbia is the second largest,
owning 920 funeral homes. Id. Stewart Enterprises is the smallest of the three with only 674
funeral homes. Id.
12. Mary McLachlin, The Big Business of Death, PALM BEACH POST, Feb. 24, 2002,
at LA [hereinafter McLachlin I].
13. Horn, supra note 8.
14. Id.
15. Id.
16. Funeral Industry Practices, 47 Fed. Reg. 42,260 (Sept. 24, 1982) (to be codified at
16 C.F.R. pt. 453).
17. FinalArrangements,CONSUMER REP., May 2001, at 28.
18. Id.
19. Horn, supra note 8.
20. See Final Arrangements, supra note 17, at 33.
21. See Dianne Curry, Death Industry Needs Policing,TAMPA TRIB., Mar. 2, 2002, at
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have also brought about a change in the way business is done. 22 Some of the
large corporations now require that the staff working in their funeral homes
meet sales quotas. 23 Those who meet these quotas are often given special
awards to recognize their accomplishments. 24 For those not so fortunate,
there may be termination. 25 To fulfill these goals, funeral salesmen often
26
turn to fraudulent and deceptive sales practices. These practices have had a
spiraling effect on the industry, presenting independent funeral homes with
the classic "sink or swim" scenario and putting pressure on them to follow
these tactics in order to compete. 21
This article examines the current state of Florida regulations that are
designed to protect consumers in the "death care" industry, and proposes
solutions to those areas in which protection is lacking. Part II of this article
briefly overviews the recently emerging concept of preneed funerals, and
distinguishes prepaying for a funeral from preplanning a funeral by listing
the benefits and dangers of both. Part lII of this article overviews the current
federal and state regulations that serve to protect Florida's consumers from
fraudulent and misleading practices involved in the sale of funeral goods and
services.
Part IV investigates three areas which are currently under
regulated, and proposes changes that will better serve to protect Florida's
consumers. Part V of this article is a summary and conclusion.

22. See
HERMANSON,
supra
note
1,
at
5,
available
at
http://research.aarp.org/consume/ib44_deathcare.pdf.
23. McLachlin I, supra note 12. The Service Corporation International manual states,
"[n]ew salespeople are expected to average at least $1 in pre-need sale for every 'at-need'
dollar ... after six months, the minimum goes up to $1.50 for every $1." Id.
24. See Final Arrangements, supra note 17, at 28; McLachlin I, supra note 12. "A
former [Florida Service Corporation International Manager] said the company rewarded its
top sellers, members of the 'Million Dollar Club,' with banquets, prizes and trips to Hawaii,
Jamaica and the Bahamas." Id.
25. McLachlin 1, supra note 12. The Service Corporation International sales manual
states that, "'[flailure to sell a required amount of pre-need sales may result in the termination
of a family service counselor, regardless of his/her at-need volume."' Id.
26. See Horn, supra note 8. Some fraudulent and deceptive sales tactics used include
borrowing guest books to obtain contact information about people who have the topic of death
fresh in their minds, pursuing sales while loved ones are visiting a friend or family member's
grave, showing the deceased's body in a cardboard box to persuade the family to buy a more
expensive casket, giving expensive gifts to Intensive Care Unit nurses to entice them to
contact their funeral home when a patient passes away, and paying priests money and
providing them with benefits in return for the Priest's recommendation of their funeral home's
services upon the death of a church member. Id.
27. Id.
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11.

PREPLAN V. PREPAY

The purchase of a funeral after a loved one's death is a unique
transaction. 28 It places a grieving consumer in a position "to make several
important and potentially costly decisions under tight time constraints. 2 9
Consumers can ease the burden of having to plan a funeral under the above
circumstances through the use of a preneed funeral plan or a preneed funeral
contract. 3 A preneed funeral plan has been described as "any method a
consumer uses to prearrange and prepay for the costs of a funeral."'" A
preneed funeral contract is one form of a preneed funeral plan, it presents a
32
classic "pay now-die later" scenario.
The consumer meets with the
funeral provider to evaluate and arrange the specific type of service and
goods he or she desires and pays for these services prior to his or her death,
which may be many years in advance. 33 Prepaid funerals are not a new
concept, having been around since the 1940s, but they did not become
heavily marketed or sold until the 1980s when three large chains emerged in
the industry.34 It is now common for many funeral industry associations and
consumer protection groups to encourage families to arrange their funerals in
advance.
Nevertheless, consumers thinking about purchasing a funeral in advance
should proceed with great caution. The preneed funeral market has become
a booming business. The volume of money that is currently being held in
preneed trusts alone exceeds $25 billion, with unknown amounts of
additional money held by other funding mechanisms. Further, many of the
large corporations have employees who specialize in selling preneed funerals

28.
29.

See Funeral Industry Practices, 47 Fed. Reg. at 42,260.
Id.

30.

Judith A. Frank, Preneed Funeral Plans: The Casefor Uniformity, 4 ELDER L.J.

1, 5 (1996) (citing Pre-PayingYour Funeral?,2 AARP PRODUCT REP. 1 (1992)).
31.

Id.

32. Id. (citations omitted).
33. Id.
34. FinalArrangements,supra note 17, at 32.
35. NAT'L FUNERAL DIRS. ASS'N, FACTS ABOUT NFDA STATE PRENEED GUIDELINES,
available at http://www.nfda.org/resources/preneedguidelines.pdf (last visited July 25, 2000)
[hereinafter NFDA].
36. See Lisa Carlson, Consumer Fraud Affecting the Elderly, ATLA ANN.
CONVENTION REFERENCE MATERIALS, (July 2000).

37. See
HERMANSON,
supra
note
http://research.aarp.org/consumer/ib44_deathcare.pdf.
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and work on commission. 38 A recent survey revealed that "two in five
persons age 50 and older had been contacted about the advance purchase of
funerals (43%) or burial goods and services (39%) .39 One advantage to
prepaying for a funeral is that it is a way to provide "peace of mind" for
loved ones, by removing the stress and decisions that are involved with
planning a funeral.40 Another major motivator for purchasing a preneed
funeral is the possibility of potential savings that may result due to
increasing prices for goods and services or inflation.4 ' Medicaid applicants
may benefit by prepaying for funeral arrangements because money spent on
prepaid funeral arrangements is not used as a factor to determine Medicaid
eligibility.
However, there is also a downside to paying for a funeral in advance.43
Financially, prepaid funerals are considered to be a lousy investment.44
Further, there is always a chance that the purchaser may move away or get
divorced.45 The funeral home could be sold before the purchaser's death.46
In the early years one funeral and memorial society promoted preplanning of
a funeral, yet warned against prepaying for them on their bulletin stating: "It
always pays to plan ahead. It rarely pays to pay ahead."
III. CURRENT REGULATIONS OF THE FLORIDA "DEATH CARE" INDUSTRY

To gain a better understanding of the need for change in the Florida
"death care" industry, it is important to discuss the current consumer
oriented regulations and laws that have an effect on it. Making a funeral
purchase immediately after a loved one's death subjects consumers to
vulnerability due to the expense and emotionally charged atmosphere

38. Carlson, supra note 36.
HERMANSON,
39. See
supra
note
1,
at
5,
available
at
http://research.aarp.org/consumer/ib44_deathcare.pdf.
40. Jeff Harrington, PrepaidPeace of Mind?, ST. PETERSBURG TIMES (Fla.), Oct. 28,
2001, at IH; Carlson, supra note 36.
41. Carlson, supra note 36.
42. Michael W. Porter, Florida Medicaid Eligibility Requirements, Jan. 2003,
availableat, http://michaelporter.lawoffice.com/article8.htm.
43. Harrington, supra note 40.
44. Id.
45. Id.
46. See Carlson, supra note 36.
47. MITFORD, supra note 6, at 256.
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involved. 48 Due to this increased vulnerability, both the federal and the state
government regulate the industry.49
A.

Federal Trade Commission FuneralRule

In 1982, a plan was envisioned to "lower existing barriers to price
competition in the funeral market and to facilitate informed consumer
choice., 50 Two years later this vision became a reality when the Federal
Trade Commission (FTC), in an effort to better protect consumers,
promulgated the Funeral Rule.5 Being careful to minimize the intrusion on
the industry's day-to-day operations, the commission set out to eliminate
many of the deceptive practices in the funeral industry. 52 Given the "force
and effect of law, ' 53 the rule establishes preventative requirements that
combat unfair or deceptive acts or practices that may be used by funeral
providers while selling funeral goods or services. 4 For the purposes of this
article, these requirements have been categorized into two groups: 1)
mandatory disclosures, and 2) misrepresentations made to consumers about
funeral goods or services.

48. OFF. OF PROGRAM POLICY ANALYSIS & Gov'T ACCOUNTABILITY & THE AUDITOR
GEN., FLORIDA'S REGULATION OF THE DEATH CARE INDUSTRY HAS MANY WEAKNESSES, Rep.
No. 02-21 1, 2 (Mar. 2002) availableat http://www.oppaga.state.fl.us/reports/pdf/0221rpt.pdf
[hereinafter DEATH CARE INDUSTRY ANALYSIS].
49. Id.
50. Funeral Industry Practices, 47 Fed. Reg. at 42,260.
51. Fred S. McChesney, Consumer Ignorance and Consumer Protection Law:
EmpiricalEvidence from the FTC FuneralRule, 7 J. L. & POL. 1, 4 (1990).
52. Funeral Industry Practices, 47 Fed. Reg. at 42,261.
53. Funerals and Burials: Protecting Consumers from Bad Practices: Hearing on
FTC Funeral Rule Before S. Spec. Comm. on Aging, 106th Cong. 106-27, 119 (2000)
(statement of Eileen Harrington, Assoc. Dir. for Mktg. Practices, FTC's Bureau of Consumer
Prot.).
54. 16 C.F.R. § 453.8 (2002). The Funeral Rule defines a funeral provider as "any
person, partnership or corporation that sells or offers to sell funeral goods and funeral services
to the public." § 453.1(i). The Funeral Rule defines funeral goods as "the goods which are
sold or offered for sale directly to the public for use in connection with funeral services." §
453.1(h). The Funeral Rule also defines funeral services as "any services which may be used
to: (1) Care for and prepare deceased human bodies for burial, cremation or other final
disposition; and (2) arrange, supervise or conduct the funeral ceremony or the final disposition
of deceased human bodies." § 453.1(j).
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1. Mandatory Price Disclosures
The Funeral Rule provides that consumers receive accurate prices on
products they are inquiring about before any discussion can begin about the
actual purchase of the funeral goods or services. 55 The funeral provider must
furnish a price list reflecting the accurate retail prices of the particular items
being inquired about, or they must supply a general price list of the goods
and services that are offered. 56 Even if the conversation regarding the prices
of goods or services takes place over the telephone, the funeral provider is
still obligated to disclose the accurate prices. 57 Additionally, the Funeral
Rule requires that before the embalming of a body, funeral providers inform
58
and receive approval from the family before the body may be embalmed;
this prevents consumers from having the bodies of loved ones embalmed
against their will.59 Also, if the consumer purchases cash advance items,
funeral providers cannot charge them more than what was actually paid for
these items without revealing this to the consumer.60
2. Misrepresentations
The Funeral Rule also prohibits funeral providers from participating in
many of the deceptive practices that have become associated with the
industry over the years. Funeral providers may no longer deceptively
represent that goods or services will delay decomposition for an indefinite
period of time, or that the protective features included with a casket will
protect the deceased's body if such is not the case. 6 Further, funeral
providers may not create an illegal tying agreement by placing a consumer's
ability to purchase one good or service on the purchase of another when it is
not necessary to do so, but rather, funeral providers must disclose to

55. § 453.2(a).
56. § 453.2(b)(2)(i) (requiring a casket price list); § 453.2(3)(i) (requiring an outer
burial container price list); § 453.2(b)(4)(i)(A) (requiring a general price list.).
57. § 453.2(b)(1).
58. § 453.3(b)(2).
59. Funeral Industry Practices, 47 Fed. Reg. at 42,283.
60. § 453.3(f)(1). The Funeral Rule defines a cash advance item as "any item obtained from a third party and paid for by the funeral provider on the purchaser's behalf."
§ 453.1(b).
61.
§ 453.3(e)(1) (requiring funeral providers not to represent that goods or services
will delay decomposition indefinitely); § 453.3(e)(2) (requiring funeral providers not to
represent that caskets have protective features when such is not the case).
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consumers that they can choose only the items they desire. 62 In the past,
funeral providers may have forced consumers to pay the expense of
embalming by erroneously informing them the law requires it, when it does
not. Under the Funeral Rule, funeral providers are obligated to notify the
consumer if the law does not require embalming.6 3 If a direct cremation is to
be performed, containers other than caskets must be presented as an option
for consumers. 64 Furthermore, a funeral provider may not portray that outer
burial containers are required when they are not.65 If the law does not
require outer
66 burial containers, this information must be disclosed to the
consumer.
Not only must the funeral provider disclose that the law does
not require embalming or an outer burial container, they must not67 inform
customers that the law requires any good or service when it does not.
B.

The FuneralRule and FloridaLaw

Under the Funeral Rule all state laws affording consumer protection, at
least equal to or greater than the protection offered by the FTC Funeral Rule,
take precedence over the Funeral Rule if they are properly administered and
enforced. 6 ' Though the Funeral Rule has heightened the protection of
consumers through the increase in regulations on the funeral industry,
eighteen states across the country, including Florida, have taken it upon
themselves to tighten these protections even further. 69
Two chapters of the Florida Statutes, Chapter 470 and Chapter 497,
comprise to regulate the "death care" industry.
The principal focus of
Chapter 470 is to create a requisite level of qualification for all embalmers,
funeral directors, and direct disposers, and to "provide for swift and effective
62. § 453.4(b)(1)(i) (requiring funeral providers not to create illegal tying agreements); § 453.4(b)(2)(i)(A) (requiring funeral providers to disclose that customers may choose
only those items they want).
63. § 453.3(a)(1)(ii).
64. § 453.3(b)(2).
65. § 453.3(c)(1)(i).
66. § 453.3(c)(1)(ii).
67. § 453.3(d)(1).
68. § 453.9(b).
69. HERMANSON,
supra
note
1,at
7-8,
available
at
http://research.aarp.org/consumer/ib44_deathcare.pdf. Other states that have adopted the FTC
Rules in whole or in part are Arizona, Georgia, Maine, Minnesota, Nevada, New Jersey, North
Dakota, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, South Carolina, Tennessee, Texas, Utah,
Vermont, Virginia, and Wisconsin. Id.
70. FLA. STAT. chs. 470, 497 (2001).
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discipline for those practitioners who violate the law. 71 Chapter 497, more
72
commonly known as the "Florida Funeral and Cemetery Services Act,,
pertains to cemetery companies73 and sellers of preneed funeral services and
goods.74 It was created with the understanding that consumers of preneed
funeral services or merchandise "may suffer serious economic harm if
purchase money is not set aside for future use as intended by the purchaser
and that the failure to maintain cemetery grounds properly may cause
significant emotional stress. 75
Though these chapters focus primarily on different aspects of the
industry, the common theme found throughout each is strong regulation
aimed toward protecting Florida's consumers. All of the same requirements
that were established to protect consumers under the Funeral Rule are
76
similarly required within Chapters 470 and 497 of the Florida Statutes.
However, the Florida Legislature has gone beyond the scope of these
minimum standards and adopted stricter requirements for those members of
the "death care" industry who conduct business in the State of Florida.77 To
assist in the enforcement of these requirements and to monitor the industry's
day to day operations, both Chapter 470 and Chapter 497 also call for the
creation of regulatory boards. 78 Chapter 470 created the Board of Funeral
Directors and Embalmers, and Chapter 497 created the Board of Funeral and
Cemetery Services.7 9
1. Mandatory Disclosures
One of the areas in which the Florida Legislature has chosen to adopt
stricter requirements for those members of the "death care" industry who
operate in the State of Florida is in the amount of information that is
required to be disclosed. In addition to the mandatory requirements under
the Funeral Rule, Florida law requires sellers to disclose all other merchan71. § 470.001.
72. § 497.001.
73. § 497.005(11). A cemetery company is defined as "any legal entity that owns or
controls cemetery lands or property." Id.
74. § 497.002.
75. § 497.002(1).
76.

See

HERMANSON,

supra

note

1,

at

7,

available

at

http://research.aarp.org/consumer/ib44_deathcare.pdf.
77. FLA. STAT. chs. 470, 497 (2001).
78. § 470.003 (creating the Board of Funeral Directors and Embalmers); § 497.101
(creating the Board of Funeral and Cemetery Services).
79. Id.
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dise and services that are available before a casket is selected. 80 Similarly, if
a consumer inquires about alternatives to traditional funeral services, such as
graveside service, direct disposition, or body donation without a service, the
sellers are required to disclose this information to them.8' Prior to the
purchase of funeral merchandise or services, a "good faith" estimate of all
fees and costs that a buyer may incur must be disclosed. 82 When making a
purchase, all purchasers are to receive the seller's policy on cancellation and
refunds. 83 The signature pages of all contracts for the purchase of
merchandise or services are required to disclose information about how
much money is required to be placed into trust, the amount of money a
customer will receive if a refund is requested, the department's toll free
hotline number, and a statement informing the customer of a thirty-day
window, beginning when the contract was signed and initiated, to cancel the
contract and still retain a full refund.84
2. Misrepresentations
Another area where the standards adopted by Florida have surpassed
those that are required by the Funeral Rule is in the prevention of deceptive
sales tactics. Under Florida law, all caskets on display are required to be
displayed in the same manner regardless of price.
Similarly, all caskets
displayed must clearly include the price on the casket itself, or if presented
in a photo album or brochure, directly on the picture in which it is
presented. 86 All representations that goods or services are for sale must be
"bona fide" offers. 8 Discouraging a consumer's selection of a funeral good
or service in order to entice them to purchase a more expensive good or
service is prohibited. 88 Sellers may not fraudulently mislead consumers that
a particular item is unavailable or that there will be a delay in obtaining it
when such is not the case. 89 Making a consumer feel that it is "improper" or
"inappropriate" to worry about the expense of a loved one's funeral is
80. § 470.034(2).
81. § 470.034(4)(a)-(c).
82. § 497.333(4).
83. § 497.333(7).
84. § 497.333(8)(a)-(f).
85. § 470.033(1).
86. § 470.033(4).
87. § 470.033(2).
88. § 470.033(3).
89. Id.
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prohibited. 90 All costs that a customer may incur must be given and, if
estimated, must be good faith estimates. 9I Solicitations made after a loved
one has already passed away are prohibited. 92 The purchase of a monument
may not be tied to the purchase of a grave space.93 Consumers may not be
misled about the terms or advantages of a preneed contract. 94 Sellers of
preneed contracts may not engage in misleading or deceptive advertising.95
All visits by lot owners that the company requires to be made must be
necessary and not for the purpose of soliciting business. 96 Any method of
solicitation that is overreaching or takes advantage of a customer's ignorance
or vulnerable state is prohibited.97
3. Regulatory Boards
The Board of Funeral Directors and Embalmers, created pursuant to
Chapter 470 of the Florida Statutes, is a regulatory agency within the
Department of Business and Professional Regulation.98 This seven member
board whose members serve a term of four years is comprised of funeral
directors and Florida residents that are appointed by the Governor. 99 Five of
the members serving on the board must be funeral directors that are licensed
in Florida. 10 0 No greater than two of those five funeral directors may be in
any way associated with a cemetery company.
The other two members are
Florida residents who have never been funeral directors and are in no way
connected with any aspect of the "death care" industry.' °2 One of the two
consumer members of the board must be at least sixty years of age. 10 3 The
board's members are charged with "adopt[ing] rules which establish
90. Id.
91. § 497.515(3) (requiring the disclosure of all costs and fees attached to the purchase of burial rights or merchandise); § 497.333(4) (requiring that estimations must be given
in good faith).
92. § 497.321(5).
93. § 497.325(1).
94. § 497.445(1)(a).
95. § 497.445(2).
96. § 497.515(1).
97. § 497.515(2).
98. § 470.003(1).
99. § 470.003(1)-(3).
100. § 470.003(2).

101. Id.
102. Id.
103. Id.
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requirements for inspection of direct disposal establishments, funeral
establishments, and incinerator facilities and the records directly relating to
the regulated activities of the licensee to ensure compliance with the
provisions of [chapter 470]." 104
The other regulatory agency that oversees the Florida "death care"
industry is the Board of Funeral and Cemetery Services, which was created
under the Florida Funeral and Cemetery Services Act.10 5 Though the
members of this board also serve a term of four years and are appointed by
the Governor, its composition is different from that of the Board of Funeral
Directors and Embalmers. ° 6 Two of the board members must be funeral
directors who are licensed in Florida. °7 Two members must be owners or
operators of a cemetery that is licensed in Florida. 0 8 The remaining three
members must be residents in the State of Florida who have never been
licensed funeral directors, and are in no way connected to the "death care"
industry. 1°9 One consumer member of the board must be at least sixty years
of age." 0 The board is charged with establishing requirements for the
inspection of cemeteries, the adopting and enforcing of the rules, which must
be published and distributed, and examining the finances of cemetery
companies and preneed contract certificate holders.ll
IV. PROBLEMS AND PROPOSED CHANGES

In many ways, Florida's regulation of the "death care" industry
provides consumers with valuable protection. However, there are still
several ways in which funeral consumers are left defenseless. This section
of the article explores a few of those areas that remain under regulated, and
proposes solutions that will allow consumers to play on a level playing field
with funeral providers.

104. § 470.005(3).
105.
106.
107.
108.
109.
110.
111.

§ 497.101(1).
§ 497.101(1)-(3).
§ 497.101(2).
Id.
Id.
Id.
§ 497.103(2)-(4).
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Is the State of Florida "Too Trusting?"

As discussed earlier, sales of preneed funerals have seen a significant
increase in growth over the last twenty years.' t 2 This section discusses
Florida's current regulations of preneed funeral contract trust funds, the most
common way that the increased sales have been funded." 3 Recognizing
"that purchasers of preneed burial rights, funeral or burial merchandise, or
funeral or burial services may suffer serious economic harm if purchase
money is not set aside for future use as intended by the purchaser," the
Florida Legislature found it necessary to implement regulations for money
received on preneed contracts." 4 Current regulations for the state of Florida
require sellers of preneed funerals to deposit in the service trust fund: 70%
of the money received for all services they are to provide and facilities they
have agreed to rent; 100% of the money received on all cash advance items
sold; and the greater amount of 30% of the purchase
5 price, or 110% of the
sold."
merchandise
of
retailer,
the
to
cost
wholesale
To many people, a requirement that money received on all preneed
funeral contracts be placed into a trust fund may appear as a safe and
efficient way to prearrange a funeral. This was probably the understanding
of the over 80,000 purchasers of preneed funerals who in recent years
learned that their money had, in reality, been removed from the merchandise
trust fund that was set up to ensure the payment of their funeral."' In
September of 2000, two of the largest funeral providers in Florida, Service
Corporation International and Stewart International, encountered serious
financial problems.' They petitioned the Florida Board of Funeral and
Cemetery Services for permission to remove preneed merchandise trust
money that had been placed into merchandise trust funds by their compa-

112. FinalArrangements,supra note 17, at 32.
113. Frank, supra note 30, at 7.
114. § 497.002(1).
115. § 497.417(1).
116. FuneralFirms to Tap Prepaid Cash the State Ok'd Two Major Companies' Using
$84 Million Heldfor 80,000 Floridians,to be Replaced by Surety Bonds, ORLANDO SENTINEL,
Sept. 26, 2000, at C1 [hereinafter Funeral Surety Bonds].
117. SCI and Stewart Raise Florida Cash by Raiding Consumers' Preneed Trusts,
FUNERAL MONITOR, Oct. 9, 2000, at 1 [hereinafter SCI and Stewart Preneed Trusts]. Service
Corporation International had a debt of 3.8 billion dollars and was given a negative outlook by
Moody's. Id. Similarly, Stewart had a debt of 963 million dollars. Id. Prime Succession had
withdrawn nine million dollars and went on to file for chapter eleven bankruptcy. Id. at 3.
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nies.1 8 By a board vote of five to two,' 9 this request was granted and the
companies withdrew eighty-four million dollars that had been set aside to
cover the costs for merchandise in over thirty funeral homes and cemeteries
across the state.' 20 The only condition on withdrawing the money was that
the providers purchase surety bonds, which in the event the funeral providers
were unable 12to fulfill their obligations, would cover the cost of the
merchandise. 1
As fraudulent as paying off debts with money that consumers believe is
being held in a trust may seem, at the time these actions were taken, they
were perfectly legal. 22 This statute has since been amended, but loopholes
to withdraw money from preneed trust funds still remain. 123
For those sellers of preneed funeral goods or services who qualify,
Florida law provides alternatives to establishing a trust fund under section
497.417 of the Florida Statutes.12 4 These include performance bonds and
payment bonds. 25 All certificate holders may annually file a written request
to the Board of Funeral and Cemetery Services to purchase a performance
bond from a surety company as an alternative to a trust fund. 1 6 The bond
must be "conditioned in such a manner to secure the faithful performance of
all conditions of any preneed contracts for which the certificateholder was
required to have covered by the amount of the bond."1 27 In essence, the bond28
guarantees that all contracts entered into by the seller will be performed.1

118. Funeral Surety Bonds, supra note 116; SCI and Stewart Preneed Trusts, supra
note 117 at 2; Shelby Oppel, FuneralHome Giants Seek Cash, ST. PETERSBURG TIMES (Fla.),
Sept. 23, 2000, at LB.
119. See FuneralSurety Bonds, supra note 116.
120. SCI and Stewart Preneed Trusts, supra note 117, at 1; Funeral Surety Bonds,
supra note 116; Oppel, supra note 118 (states that the number of funeral homes was thirty).
121. SCI and Stewart Preneed Trusts, supra note 117, at 1; Funeral Surety Bonds,
supra note 116; Oppel, supra note 118.
122. FLA. STAT. § 497.425 (2000) (amended 2001).
123. FLA. STAT. § 497.417(5)(a)-(c) (2001).
124. Id.
125. § 497.423 (allowing certificate holders to file performance bonds); § 497.425
(allowing certificate holders to file payment bonds); Fla. S. Comm. on Banking & Ins., CS for
SB 1610 (2001) Staff Analysis (April 16, 2001) (on file with comm.) [hereinafter S. Comm.
SB 1610 Staff Analysis].
126. § 497.423(1)-(2).
127. § 497.423(5).
128. S. Comm. SB 1610 Staff Analysis, supra note 125.
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Performance bonds are very difficult to acquire, and would most likely only
29
be given to guarantee the performance on tangible goods like mausoleums. 1
Another option that is available for some large companies to remove
money from trusts created pursuant to section 497.417 of the Florida
Statutes is a modified version of the same mechanisms both Service
Corporation International and Loewen utilized in 2000. All certificate
holders who have as of July 1, 2001 a total bonded liability of greater than
$100 million may file a written request to the Board of Funeral and
Cemetery Services to purchase a "payment bond" from a surety company as
an alternative to trust funds for all contracts written prior to December 31,
2004.130 The payment bond must be "in an amount not less than the
aggregate value of outstanding liabilities on" all goods or services that have
been contracted for, but not delivered.13 ' Payment bonds are easier to obtain
than performance bonds because the company issuing them is only held
financially responsible for any goods or services contracted on, but do not
have to guarantee that the funeral service is actually carried out. 131
Florida's current regulatory standard, which allows for the surety bond
option rather than 100% trust protection, has been argued as being bad
policy. 133 The Florida Legislature "'must give thought to the unthinkable."",134 With the recent corporate scandals like Enron and WorldCom, it is
becoming apparent that corporations can manipulate a balance sheet to
mislead others.1 35 Without 100% trust protection, the only guaranteed
source that Florida consumers currently have, which offers some form of
protection to purchasers of preneed funerals' is the Preneed Funeral Contract
Consumer Protection Trust Fund. 136 Regulated and administered by the
Board of Funeral and Cemetery Services, this fund is maintained by
predetermined deposits of money that are required to be paid on each
preneed contract sold. 137 Money that accrues in the fund may be used to
129. Interview with Bill Stephenson, Licensed Funeral Director, in Leesburg, Fla.,
(July 1, 2002).
130. § 497.425(1)(a).
131. Id.
132. Interview with Bill Stephenson, supra note 129.
133. See FuneralSurely Bonds, supra note 116.
134. Id.
135. See generally Eric Hanson & Mary Flood, Ex-Enron Exec Found Shot Dead,
Houston Chron., Jan. 26, 2002, at 1; Jared Sandberg et al., Inside WorldCom's Unearthingof
a Vast Accounting Scandal, WALL ST. J., June 27, 2002, at Al (deceptive accounting
principles of large telecommunications company led to the companies banktruptcy).
136. § 497.413.
137. § 497.413(1)-(2).
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provide restitution to any preneed contract purchaser or owner whose
preneed contract was breached.' 38 However, this fund currently only has
between six and eight million dollars in it. 139 If another withdrawal the
magnitude of Service Corporation International's and Loewen's were to take
place, and those companies and the companies backing them were unable to
perform on their promises, these funds would not be enough to cover the
losses.' 40 Florida should follow the lead of the states in this country that
require 100% of the money received on a preneed contract to be placed into
trust and remain there until the contract is performed.' 4' The only guarantee
consumers have for protecting their full investment in preneed contracts is to
require 100% trust protection without removal until contract performance.
B.

Disclosureof Ownership: Never Judge a Book by its Cover

In a time when it has become customary for "the Big Three"' 142 to
acquire funeral homes and cemeteries across the country, very few
consumers are actually aware when a change of ownership has occurred
between the trusted local family and the large corporation. 143 Properties are
138. § 497.413(6)-(7).
139. Telephone Interview with Funeral and Cemetery Hotline, Florida Comptrollers
Office (July 5, 2002).
140. See SCI and Stewart Preneed Trusts, supra note 117 at 3.
141. Frank, supra note 30, at 26 (noting statutes from states that have chosen to require
100% trust protection include: ALASKA STAT. § 45.50.471(b)(24) (Michie 2000); ARK. CODE
ANN. § 23-40-114(a) (Michie 2000 & Supp. 2001); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 32-1391.05(A)
(West 2001); CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 7735 (West 1995 & Supp. 2002); CONN. GEN. STAT.
ANN. § 42-202(a) (West 2000); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 5, § 302(a) (1993); IND. CODE ANN. § 302-9-1(a) (Michie 2000); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 16-301

(1995); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. §

367.934(1) (Michie 2001); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 861(A)(1)(a) (West 2000); ME. REV. STAT.
ANN. tit. 32 § 1401(I)(A) (West 1999 & Supp. 2001); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 149A.97(2) (West
1998 & Supp. 2002); MONT. CODE ANN. § 37-19-828(1)(a) (2001); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §
325:45 (1995 & Supp. 2001); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:102-13 (West 1985 & Supp. 2002); N.M.
STAT. ANN. § 59A-49-6(A) (Michie 2000); N.Y. GEN. Bus. LAW § 453(1)(a) (McKinney 1996
& Supp. 2002); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 111.19(B) (Anderson 1996 & Supp. 2001); R.I.
GEN. LAWS § 5-33.1-4(a) (1999); S.C. CODE ANN. § 32-7-20(A)(1) (Law. Co-op. 1991 &
Supp. 2001); TENN. CODE ANN. § 62-5-401 (1997); UTAH CODE ANN. § 58-58-9(2) (1998);
WIS. STAT. ANN. § 445.125(1)(a)1 (West 1998 & Supp. 2001)). Id. at n. 143. Statutes
updated by author to reflect current law.
142. Horn, supra note 8.
143. John McKinnon, Consolidation in Death Care Seen as Costly, FLA. J., Oct. 28,
1998, at Fl. Sen. Donald Sullivan thinks there is a need for legislation regarding disclosure of
ownership, because "some of the facilities are deliberately disguising their ownership, so that
consumers will think funeral homes or cemeteries are still family-owned and operated." Id.
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purchased silently and physical appFearances are rarely changed, particularly
the local family name on the sign. " Most often, the new corporate owner
follows standard
operating
specifically to avoid drawing the
•
• procedures
14
5
attention of the community.
The corporate goal of course is internal
changes that will overwhelmingly affect the local consumer. 146 Currently, it
is perfectly legal in Florida for funeral home owners to operate under the
previous family-owned name without having to disclose actual ownership. 147
One way consumers may be able to distinguish a change in ownership is by
examining the operational structure of each facility.148 Large corporations
often operate under a profit driven price structure, resulting in prices much
higher than most "mom-and-pop" businesses. 49 In a survey conducted by
one town's local newspaper, corporations often charged up to sixty two
percent more than many of the independent homes. 150
Why are the corporately owned facilities so fixated on nondisclosure of
true identity? In the 1990s when many corporations began to go on buying
sprees purchasing properties all over the country, they were sometimes
paying up to thirteen times the amount of actual worth.' 5' Many funeral
businesses in operation for several generations struggled with lack of enough
capital to compete and no young family member to carry on tradition.15' The
corporate financial offers were too lucrative to decline. 153 In defending the
failure to disclose, corporate owners argued that much of the premium price
they paid for the business was calculated by factoring in the cost of the local
name and goodwill that had been established over the years. 54 Further, if
144. David Corder, Death Industry Consolidates, TAMPA BAY BUS. J., Aug. 7, 1998, at
P1.
145. See id.
146. See id.
147. Id.
148. See FinalArrangements, supra note 17, at 31.
149. Id.
150. Robin Fields & Mitch Lipka, Death Inc.: In Surprising Numbers, Chains are
Buying up Funeral Homes but Keeping the Names, SUN SENTINEL (Ft. Lauderdale, Fla.) Mar.
21, 1999, at IA. Collecting price lists throughout Broward and Palm Beach counties, the Sun
Sentinel found on average that Loewen and Service Corporation International charge sixtytwo percent more than independent homes. Id. "[Clremation typically costs $400 more at a
Loewen home and about $600 more at a SCI home than at an independent. The most basic
burial averages $1,251 at an independent [home], vs. $2,026 at a Loewen mortuary and
$1,800 at an SCI mortuary." Id.
151. McLachlin I, supra note 12.
152. Id.
153. Id.
154. Corder, supra note 144.
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they were forced to disclose the corporate ownership, the consideration paid
for this name and goodwill would be seriously devalued. 55 Another justifycation given by the corporate owners is that if disclosure were required, both
the corporations and many of the independent homes would suffer by being
"robbed" of their respective values.
The independents would lose the
value of all the goodwill that in some cases has been passed down from
generation to generation, and the corporations would in turn lose this same
value of goodwill. 57 To combat the lack of disclosure by these corporate
funeral homes, some local funeral providers have actually taken matters into
their own hands by placing advertisements in the local paper to inform the
community of properties sold and now owned by a corporation rather than a
local family. 158
In 1999, the Florida Senate Committee on Regulated Industries
introduced a bill to resolve the issue of disclosureship.' 59 In the interest of
better protecting consumers, the bill proposed to require sellers of funeral
goods and services, including publicly owned corporations, to clearly
disclose their ownership.16 If passed, all advertisements, sales to prospective purchasers, and contracts entered into would have to disclose the actual
owners of the business. 16 1 Further, any contract entered into without the
proper disclosures would be deemed voidable, with the seller having the
burden of proof.162 Though the Florida Legislature did not pass this
legislation, several other states across the country, including Connecticut,
163
Maine, Michigan, and Minnesota, have passed similar legislation.
Connecticut made it a requirement that persons or corporations who own
10% or more of the company disclose this information by visibly displaying
it on a sign inside the business and including it on all contracts.
Similarly, Maine required that ownership information be disclosed on all
contracts and agreements. 165 Additionally, to protect their consumers,
155. Id.
156. McKinnon, supra note 143.
157. Id.
158. Corder, supra note 144.
159. Fla. CS for SB 196 (1999) (amending FLA. STAT. §470.034).
160. Id. at §1(5)-(7).
161. Id.
162. Id. at §4(7).
163. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 20-222(b) (West 1999); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 32 §
1407(1) (West 1999 & Supp. 2001); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 339.1809(1) (West 1992);
MINN. STAT. ANN. § 149A.70(8) (West 1998 & Supp. 2002).
164. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 20-222b (West 2002).
165. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 32 § 1407(1) (West 1999 & Supp. 2001).
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Michigan requires the owner's name to be displayed at the entrance of the
funeral home, 166 and consumers in Minnesota are provided the name of the
owner on "all business literature, correspondence, and contracts." ' 16 7 The
State of Florida should follow suit and address these same issues with strong
consumer protection laws.
Consumers have a right to know with whom personal business is
transacted. Family members who are "in a daze, often pick []a particular
home because it ...has a familiar name or once buried some other member
of the family.' 68 Regulations such as the federal rules governing the
Funeral 169 and FloridaStatutes Chapters 470 and 49717 provide purchasers
of funeral goods with the opportunity to compare prices with different
sellers, but if they are unaware of the identity of the legal owner, comparing
prices may serve no purpose. For example, a person living in South Florida
desiring to purchase funeral goods or services can compare prices of all of
the funeral homes in his or her county.' 71 What this person probably does
not realize is that the same corporation could own several or all of these
funeral homes.172 By not disclosing ownership, these corporations, in a very
cruel and inconsiderate gesture, allow this person, who has just lost a loved
one, to spend time and energy traveling to many of the same corporately
owned facilities in the area comparing duplicated pricing structures and
Furthermore, many other factors consumers
operating procedures. 73
consider when deciding where to have funeral services may be irrelevant if
funeral homes fail to disclose their ownership. Though the reasons behind
making certain individual choices may vary, "[m]ost people choose funeral
and cemetery services based on a religious, ethnic, communal or geographic

166. MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 339.1809(1) (West 1992).
167. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 149A.70(8) (West 1998 & Supp. 2002).
168. Erik Larson, Fight to the Death, TIME, Dec. 9, 1996.
169. 16 C.F.R. § 453 (2002).
170. FLA. STAT. chs. 470, 497 (2002).
171. Fields & Liptka, supra note 150.
172. Id. In the State of Florida, many of Broward and Palm Beach Counties' funeral
Id. "Loewen has
homes that were previously owned by families have been purchased.
swallowed up all seven Kraeer homes, the five Levitt-Weinsteins and Fred Hunter's sevenhome Broward empire." Id. Service Corporation International "picked off Babione's three
Palm Beach County sites, as well as four Riverside homes, four Menorahs and three BairdCases." Id.
173. Fields & Liptka, supra note 150.
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affinity."'' 74 This could present problems in areas that have a large
concentration of a certain religious or ethnic groups. Many religions and
ethnic groups have certain procedures and formalities that are to be followed
after death.175 Consumers in areas where funeral homes have historically
catered to certain religions or were owned by a member of that faith have no
way of learning that ownership has changed hands. Since purchasing a
funeral is a one shot deal, any lack of knowledge or expertise by a funeral
director could have serious repercussions.
C.

Inefficiencies and Consolidation

The poor enforcement of regulations by the Board of Funeral and
Cemetery Services, which operates under the Department of Banking and
Finance, is another problem area.176 The inadequacies of this board have
been exposed through the media frenzied allegations brought against
Menorah Gardens and Funeral Chapels. 177 Some of the allegations brought
against the cemetery include burial of decedents in incorrect plots, errors
within the burial records, and disinterring remains before receiving
approval. 78 The Menorah Gardens case represents a perfect example of the
deficiencies in the regulating powers of the Board of Funeral and Cemetery
Services.179 The board performed examinations at Menorah Gardens and
found, in 1996 and 1998, that burial records contained errors, 80 and that
descendants were buried in wrong burial plots.
After the first inspection,
in 1996, the board sent a copy of the report to the company, but failed to
make sure corrective actions were taken.
In 1998, the board only sent a
174. Funeral and Cemetery Regulation, S. Comm. on Reg. Industries, Interim Project
Report
98-39
(Oct.
1998)
available
at
http://199.44.254.194/datalPublications/1998/Senate/reports/interim-reports/pdf/98-39ri.pdf.
175. See generally JEWISH FUNERAL PRACTICES COMM1rTEE OF GREATER WASHINGTON,
JEWISH FUNERALS, BURIAL AND MOURNING:
JEWISH APPROACH, at http://www.jewishfunerals.org/approach.htm (last visited July 31, 2002).
176. DEATH CARE INDUSTRY ANALYSIS, supra note 48, at 4, available at
http://www.oppaga.state.fl.us/reports/pdf/0221 rpt.pdf.
177. Id. at 1.
178. Id.
179. Marian Dozier, Audit Cites Regulators in Burial Woes, SUN

SENTINEL

(Ft.

Lauderdale, FL) Mar. 7, 2002, at lB.
180. DEATH CARE INDUSTRY ANALYSIS, supra note 48, at 4-6, available at
http://www.oppaga.state.fl.us/reports/pdf/022 lrpt.pdf.
181. Id. at 1.
182. Id. at 6.

Published by NSUWorks, 2003

57

Nova Law Review, Vol. 27, Iss. 3 [2003], Art. 1

Nova Law Review

[Vol. 27:449

letter informing them that they violated Florida law, but again no action was
taken to discipline the company for their irresponsible actions. 183 Menorah
Gardens did not get their license suspended
or revoked and did not even
184
misconduct.
their
for
fine
a
receive
A majority of the faults with the Board of Funeral and Cemeter
Services involves the need for improvement in the examination process.
"[E]xaminations of entities licensed under [Chapter] 497, Florida Statutes,
[should] be conducted at least once every three years and that licensed
cemeteries [should] be inspected each year."'' 86 Often the examinations and
inspections of cemeteries are not done on a timely basis,187 they are not
complete, and they do not check the accuracy and comprehensiveness of
burial records. 118 Also, once the examinations are performed and the
noncompliance
of an entity is uncovered, there is often inadequate follow189
up.
The board frequently relies on mere letters warning the entity or
accepts promises made by the entity to address the issues, rather than
disciplinary actions for violations.' 90 Without timely follow-up by the
department and no punishment for breaking regulations, there is absolutely
no assurance for consumers that noncompliance or errors will ever be
corrected. 191
In addition to the problems the Board of Funeral and Cemetery Services
has with its examination process, it is also lacking sufficient legal requirements for the disclosure of information to the department and consumers.'92
Currently there are minimal requirements for entities to survey the burial
grounds and provide maps to identify each plot. 193 Cemetery companies are
only required to provide a description of the cemetery, including acreage,

183. Id.
184. Id.
185. DEATH CARE INDUSTRY ANALYSIS, supra note 48, at 5-6, available at
http://www.oppaga.state.fl.us/reports/pdf/022 lrpt.pdf.
186. Id.
187. Id.
188. Id.
189. Id.
190. Joel Englehardt, Cemetery Violations Treated with Kid Gloves, PALM BEACH
POST,

Mar. 6, 2002, at LA.
191. DEATH CARE

INDUSTRY

ANALYSIS,

supra note 48,

at 6-7, available at

http://www.oppaga.state.fl.us/reports/pdf/0221 rpt.pdf.

192.

DEATH CARE INDUSTRY ANALYSIS,

supra note 48, at 11-12, available at

http://www.oppaga.state.fl.us/reports/pdf/022 lrpt.pdf.
193. Id.
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and a map showing where the cemetery is located. 94 Without a correct
survey of the land and the development of detailed maps, there is no means
to properly identify plots. Decedants may possibly be buried in the wrong
plot, and the same plot may be sold to two different consumers. 195 With the
unrelenting marketing of prepayment for burial plots and the lack of
disclosure of cemetery maps, consumers are vulnerable and could possibly
have purchased a plot already owned by someone or one that does not
exist."'
Florida State Senator Ken Pruitt requested an audit of the funeral
industry to help answer questions regarding the increasing discoveries of
misconduct by some of Florida's cemeteries, 97 and to provide support for
his proposal that the regulation of the death care industry should be under
one central agency rather than the two boards that currently oversee the
industry.' 98 Once the audit was released, Ken Pruitt stated, "'[w]e've been
treating this as historically a mom-and-pop industry. What the report tells
me is we're dealing with a bunch of sophisticated operators and we have to
be as sophisticated as they are." ' 99 Over the years, practitioners in the death
care industry have seen major changes in its structure.' °° In the past, the
industry had a pretty distinct separation between the two S•201
areas of business,
which included family-owned funeral homes and cemeteries.
Today with
the expansion of big corporations, the ownership and control of the funeral
202
homes and cemeteries usually falls under one corporate entity.
Now that
one owner typically controls the two business areas of the industry, the
203
regulation should be under one governing body and board.
Currently the
death care industry is overseen by two state agencies, the Department of
Business and Professional Regulation and the Department of Banking and
Finance. 204 Since the main purpose for regulating the death care industry is

194. Id.
195. Englehardt, supra note 190.
196. Mary McLachlin, Cemeteries Operate with Little Oversight, PALM BEACH POST,
Jan. 6, 2002, at IA. [hereinafter McLachlin fl].
197. Dozier, supra note 179.
198. Id.
199. Englehardt, supra note 190.
200. Interview with Bill Stephenson, supra note 129.
201. Id.
202. Id.
203. Id.
204. DEATH CARE INDUSTRY ANALYSIS, supra note 48, at 2, available at
http://www.oppaga.state.fl.us/reports/pdf/022 Irpt.pdf.
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"to protect [the] consumer[] from economic harm and/or emotional distress,"
20 5
and it currently is not fulfilling that need, some reforms need to be made.
The current regulatory structure is the source of numerous inefficiencies, including both a encies having similar "licensing, support, and
management systems. 20 Also, "the dual regulations result in multiple visits
to licensees and their businesses by state inspectors. 20 7 In addition,
businesses and consumers must contend with two separate agencies "for
resolution of licensing, complaint, and enforcement issues. 20 8 Many states
including California, Minnesota, and Oregon have created one agency to
regulate the death care industry and have managed to avoid the ineffective209
ness of having two separate agencies.
Although both agencies have expertise in different areas of regulation,
the two existing boards that operate under the two agencies should be
combined to form one unified, effective regulating body. 21 The Department
of Business and Professional Regulation would be the superior agency under
which the consolidation should take place. 211 Its expertise in the area of
regulation would provide the perfect foundation for the consolidation, while
simply transferring employees could easily shift the expertise of auditing by
the Department of Banking and Finance to the new consolidated board."?'
V. CONCLUSION

There is one common absolute; every human being will experience
death. No matter what a person accomplishes in life, or how much money or
power he acquires, death will always win in the end. Traditionally, in this
country, the care of the dead was delivered by the local, small, family-owned
business. Genuine care, concern, and compassion were ministered to loved
205. Id. at 1.
206. Id. at 12.
207. Id.
208. Id.
209. DEATH CARE INDUSTRY ANALYSIS, supra note 48, at 12, available at
http://www.oppaga.state.fl.us/reports/pdf/0221rpt.pdf.; CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 7601
(West 1995 & Supp. 2002) (creating the State Board of Funeral Directors and Embalmers
within the Department of Consumer Affairs); OR. REV. STAT. § 692.300 (2001) (creating the
State Mortuary and Cemetery Board); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 149.A.02 Subd. 37a (West Supp.
2002-2003) (naming the commissioner of health the regulator of funeral providers).
210. DEATH CARE INDUSTRY ANALYSIS, supra note 48, at 12, available at
http://www.oppaga.state.fl.us/reports/pdf/0221rpt.pdf.
211. Id.
212. Id.
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ones from family to family. Never was the business of death care managed
in the same manner as purchasing an automobile or any other American
product. This "slippery slope" shift of mindset began several decades ago
with the greedy realization that death care, as a product, would be an
inevitable goldmine. The invasive deception of the "bigger is better and
cheaper" corporate mantra has positioned American death care where it is
today. Just as the configuration of the "death care industry has changed, so
too must the rules that regulate this industry. The State of Florida, with its
high death rate and many frail citizens, should take a leadership role in the
investigation, evaluation, and ultimate solutions related to the laws and
governing bodies that will protect its vulnerable consumers.
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I. INTRODUCTION

In response to the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001, the United
States Government has passed many new laws and regulations to strengthen
national security in an effort to better prepare for a new era in which
terrorists acting on American soil have become a constant threat.' On
October 30, 2001, the United States Attorney General, John Ashcroft,
The Author is a J.D. candidate for May 2004 at Nova Southeastern University,
Shepard Broad Law Center. The Author extends a thank you to his articles editor, Jennifer
Drown, and the Nova Law Review Junior Staff members.
1.
E.g., USA Patriot Act, H.R. 3162. 107th Cong. (2001); 31 C.F.R. Part 103
(2002).
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authorized a Justice Department rule that permits the Director of the Bureau
of Prisons and other components of the Justice Department to monitor
traditional confidential communications between specified federal inmates
and their attorneys when senior intelligence and law enforcement officials
determine that the information could endanger national security or could
lead to other acts of violence and terrorism.2
On April 11, 2002, Lynne Stewart, a criminal defense attorney, was
arrested for providing material support and resources to a terrorist
organization. The Government's case developed from an investigation,
which included the monitoring of her communications with her client,
convicted terrorist Sheik Omar Abdel Rahman. 3 The Sheik, as he is
commonly known, was convicted in 1995 of the World Trade Center
bombing in 1993 and for conspiring to blow up other New York City
landmarks. It is likely nobody would argue that The Sheik presents an
obvious security threat to the United States, therefore, it may appear that the
monitoring of his conversations with his lawyer were reasonable to prevent
future acts of terrorism. But, what are the implications of this rule on other
people in federal custody, others that may not appear as such obvious
threats? Does this new regulation unnecessarily abridge the rights of these
people to have confidential communications with their attorney in order to
be effectively represented?
The attorney-client privilege under federal law "is the oldest of the
privileges for confidential communications known to the common law. ' 4 It
is very likely that the constitutionality of this rule will be challenged in the
near future. As a result, this article will explore the constitutional arguments
that could be raised to challenge this regulation, and will examine the legal
context through the existing line of cases that have already placed limitations
on the attorney-client privilege. This article will begin by first examining
the federal regulations prior to September 11th that permitted the Bureau of
Prisons to place special administrative measures on inmates in federal
custody in order to prevent future acts of violence or terrorism. Second, it
will look at the new federal regulation that was implemented by the Attorney
General after September 11th that permits the government to monitor the
communications between inmates and their attorneys under special
administrative measures. Third, this article will examine how the procedures
2.
3.
(S.D.N.Y.
4.
EVIDENCE

28 C.F.R. §§ 500-01 (2001).
United States v. Stewart, No. 02 CR. 396 JGK, 2002 WL 1300059, at *2
June 11, 2002).
Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 389 (1981) (citing 8 J. WIGMORE,
§ 2290 (McNaughton rev. 1961)).
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of the federal regulation attempt to preserve the attorney-client privilege.
Fourth, it will examine the limited scope of protection the attorney-client
privilege receives under the Fourth and Sixth Amendments of the United
States Constitution. Fifth, this article will look into the crime-fraud
exception, under which communications between a client and an attorney are
not privileged if they are used to further an act of fraud or a crime. Sixth,
since this regulation affects inmates in federal custody, it will examine how
inmate rights are weighed against the governmental interest in maintaining
security at prisons through a limitation of constitutional rights and federal
wiretapping regulations. Seventh, this article will examine whether such an
intrusion into the attorney-client privilege will cause irreparable harm to
effective legal representation. Finally, this article will conclude that this
new federal regulation is a reasonable response to a real security threat, and,
if fairly applied, will adequately protect the rights of the inmate while
serving the legitimate governmental interest of preventing potential acts of
violence and terrorism.
II.
A.

NEW FEDERAL RULE

Regulations Priorto September 11, 2001

The threat imposed by terrorist acts on American soil was a prime
concern for the government even before September 11, 2001. One response
to the growing awareness of these potential attacks was from the Bureau of
Prisons. On June 20, 1997, the Bureau had finalized its interim regulations
of inmates in federal custody in order to maintain security at prison facilities
and to prevent future acts of violence and terrorism.5 Terrorism is defined in
the Code of Federal Regulations as any acts dangerous to human life that
violates the criminal laws of the United States and intends to intimidate or
coerce a civilian population or conduct and policy of a government. 6 These
rules were instituted to manage inmates who could possibly disclose
information that could harm national security or could lead to acts of
violence or terrorism.7 These regulations give the Director of the Bureau of
Prisons, upon direction of the Attorney General, authorization to implement
the special administrative measures.8 The Bureau of Prisons has complete
5.
Prevention of Acts of Violence and Terrorism, 62 Fed. Reg. 33,7301, 33,732
(June 20,1997) (to be codified at 28 C.F.R. § 501.2).
6.
18 U.S.C. § 2331 (2002).
7.
Prevention of Acts of Violence and Terrorism, 28 C.F.R. § 501.2-.3 (2002).
8.
§ 501.3(a).
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discretionary power to determine what restrictions are implemented and
whom they are placed upon.9
Under the special administrative measures, an inmate can be housed in
segregated administrative detention as well as have certain other privileges
limited, including the use of a telephone, correspondence, visitation, and
interviews with the media.' 0 These restrictive measures reduce the risk that
an inmate, who has been shown to be a serious security risk, is able to cause
or facilitate a future act of violence or terrorism through their communications or contact with persons outside the prison. 1 For example, if a
suspected terrorist were arrested before they were able to carry out an attack,
the Bureau of Prisons would want to prevent the chance that they could
communicate with other members involved in the conspiracy or to pass
along the location of money or explosives that could be used to plan another
terrorist attack. This is not as far fetched as it might sound. Ramzi Yousef
was convicted for his participation in the World Trade Center bombing in
1993 and for conspiracy to blow up American-owned airplanes.12 Because
of Mr. Yousef's terrorist activities, the then Attorney General, Janet Reno,
authorized the Bureau of Prisons to place Mr. Yousef under special
administrative measures.'Before these restrictive measures are imposed, an inmate is given
written notification of the restrictions and reasons for its imposition. The
reasons why they have been imposed, however, may be limited for security
reasons or to prevent violence or terrorism. 15 These restrictive measures
may be imposed for up to 120 days or for up to one year with approval of the
Attorney General. 16 The Director of the Bureau of Prisons can also renew
the restrictions for up to one-year increments upon the written notification
by the Attorney General.' 7 These measures cannot be renewed automatically. 18 A fresh risk assessment must be done at the end of every period.'19

9.
Yousef v. Reno, 254 F.3d 1214, 1220-21 (10th Cir. 2001).
10. § 501.3(a).
11. Id.
12. Yousef, 254 F.3d at 1216.
13. Id.
14. 28 C.F.R. § 501.3(b).
15. Id.
16. § 501.3(c).
17. Id.
18. Yousef, 254 F.3d at 1219 (citing United States v. Johnson, 223 F.3d 665, 672 (7th
Cir. 2000)).
19. Id.
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New Regulation Post September 11, 2001

In response to the growing fear of additional terrorist attacks after
September 11 th, Attorney General John Ashcroft instituted a new restriction
on inmates already under special administrative measures to include the
monitoring of attorney-client communications. 2 0 This new restriction closed
a loophole that allowed an inmate to communicate freely with his attorney.
Before the Bureau of Prisons is allowed to monitor attorney-client
communications under this new regulation, the Attorney General must first
receive information from the head of a federal law enforcement or
intelligence agency that "reasonable suspicion exists to believe that a
particular inmate may use communications with attorneys or their agents to
further or facilitate acts of terrorism. ' 21 Upon such a finding, the Attorney
General may then instruct the Director of the Bureau of Prisons to begin the
appropriate procedures for the monitoring or review of the communications
between the inmates and their attorneys. 22 Such procedures include a written
notification to both the inmate and the inmate's attorney prior to the start of
the monitoring or review. 23 This written notification, however, need not be
given where a court order directing that no notice be made is obtained. 24
C.

Preservationof the Attorney-Client Privilege Under This Regulation

Although all communications between an inmate and his or her attorney
are subject to monitoring and review under this new regulation, 25 the
communications are still, for the most part, covered by the attorney-client
privilege. 26 The only communications that lose the attorney-client protection
are those that could "facilitate criminal acts or a conspiracy to commit
criminal acts," or are not related to legal advice or strategy. 27 The latter
category is, of course, communication that does not fall within the definition
of attorney-client privilege under any evidentiary rule or state statute. 28 The
20.
21.
22.

66 Fed. Reg. 55,065 (Oct. 31, 2001).
Prevention of Acts of Violence and Terrorism, 28 C.F.R. § 501.3(d) (2001).
Id.

23.

§ 501.3(d).

24.
25.
26.
27.

§ 501.3(2).
§ 501.3(i).
See 28 C.F.R. § 501.3(ii).
Id.
28. FED. R. EvID. 501.
Except as otherwise required by the Constitution of the United States or provided by
Act of Congress or in rules prescribed by the Supreme Court pursuant to statutory

https://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol27/iss3/1

66

: Nova Law Review 27, 3

Nova Law Review

(Vol. 27:475

former category is also a well-recognized exception to the attorney-client
privilege, which provides that an attorney cannot assist his client in
committing a crime. 29
Given that any conversation being monitored can contain both
privileged and non-privileged information, the regulation sets forth
procedures for the review of this information to determine whether it is
privileged and confidential, or whether it should be disclosed to the
investigating body. 3 These procedures include the establishment of a
"privilege team," which consists of independent individuals that are not
involved in the investigation. 3 This team follows monitoring procedures
that minimize the intrusion of the team into the privileged communications
between the inmate and the attorney. 32 The regulation, however, is not
exactly specific as to what these procedures are, but it does state that the
team does not retain any communications that are found to be privileged.
Once the team makes a decision that this information is not protected and
should be disclosed, it still must obtain a court order to release the
information: The team leader, however, can make a unilateral decision to
disclose the information to the investigating body, prior to receiving a court
order when the privilege team leader determines that potential act of
violence or terrorism is imminent.3 5
An inmate who feels the restrictions are too severe or unwarranted does
have legal recourse. Section 501.3 provides that affected inmates have a
right to seek a review of the restrictions that have been imposed through the
Administrative Remedy Program. 36 In Yousef v. Reno, 37 the plaintiff-inmate
challenged the special administrative measures that were imposed on him
after his conviction, arguing that the measures imposed violated his rights

authority, the privilege of a witness, person, government, State, or political subdivision
thereof shall be governed by the principles of the common law as they may be interpreted by the courts of the United States in the light of reason and experience.

Id.
29. Clark v. United States, 289 U.S. 1, 16 (1933) (holding the communication
intended to further an act of fraud or crime is not protected by the attorney-client privilege).
30. 28 C.F.R. § 501.3(3).
31. Id.
32. Id.
33. Id.
34. Id.
35. 28 C.F.R. § 501.3(d)(3).
36. Prevention of Acts of Violence and Terrorism, 28 C.F.R. § 501.3(e) (2001).
37. 254 F.3d 1214 (10th Cir. 2001).
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38
under the First, Sixth, and Eighth Amendments. The Tenth Circuit Court
of Appeals, however, dismissed Mr. Yousef's claims because he failed to
exhaust all his administrative remedies. 39 Thus, the court seemed to leave
the door open to these claims once all remedies were exhausted.

I.

A.

THE LIMITED SCOPE OF THE ATTORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGE

Sixth Amendment Protectionof the Attorney-Client Privilege

Despite the long history behind the attorney-client privilege, no such
explicit privilege exists in the United States Constitution. The Sixth
Amendment does, however, afford an individual the right to counsel in all
criminal prosecutions.4 0 The issue that often arises is whether an intrusion
into the attorney-client privilege damages the effectiveness of an attorney's
representation of his client and thus violates the Sixth Amendment. 4 1 An
example of this is discussed in Massiah v. United States.42 In that case,
Massiah, a merchant seaman, was arrested for smuggling cocaine into the
United States aboard a ship he was working on.43 While he was out on bail,
a federal agent, who was investigating the case, succeeded in getting another
man involved in the smuggling operation to cooperate with the government
by helping to gather more information on Massiah. 44 So, without Massiah's
knowledge, a listening device was placed in the informant's car and a few
days later a lengthy conversation was recorded between Massiah and the
informant. 45 This recording included several incriminating statements that
Massiah made which were later used at his trial, and ultimately led to his

38.
39.
40.

Yousef v. Reno, 254 F.3d 1214, 1216-17 (10th Cir. 2001).
Id. at 1222.
U.S. CONST. amend. VI. This amendment states that:

In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public
trial, by and impartial jury of the State and district wherein the crime shall have been
committed, which district shall have been previously ascertained by law, and to be
informed of the nature and cause of the accusation; to be confronted with the witnesses
against him; to have compulsory process for obtaining Witness in his favor, and to
have the Assistance of Counsel for his defense.

U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
41. See, e.g., Massiah v. United States, 377 U.S. 201 (1964).
42. 377 U.S. 201 (1964).
43. Id.
44. Id. at 202.
45. Id. at 202-03.
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conviction.46 On appeal, Massiah argued that his Sixth Amendment rights
were violated because the government agents sought to gain incriminating
evidence against him after he was indicted and without the presence of his
attorney. 47 The Court held that the incriminating evidence gained without
the presence of his lawyer violated his Sixth Amendment right to counsel. 48
Further, the Court noted:
[A] Constitution which guarantees a defendant the aid of counsel at
such a trial could surely vouchsafe no less to an indicted defendant
under interrogation by the police in a completely extrajudicial proceeding. Anything less, it was said, might deny a defendant "effective representation by counsel
at the only stage when legal aid and
49
advice would help him.",
In Massiah, the prosecution's use of the incriminating evidence led to the
defendant's conviction and thus clearly caused injury to the defendant. But
what happens when a violation of a defendant's Sixth Amendment rights
does not injure or prejudice the defendant?
A further example of the damage or injury needed is illustrated by the
case of Weatherford v. Bursey.5 ° In that case, the plaintiff, along with the
defendant, who was an undercover agent, were arrested for a state criminal
offense. 5' The defendant went through the charade of the arrest in order to
maintain his undercover status. 52 Although the defendant retained his own
counsel, he attended two pretrial meetings with the plaintiff and his
attorney.53 The plaintiff's attorney requested the defendant's presence in
order to obtain additional information or advice for the trial.54 At no time
did the defendant discuss the content of the meetings with his superiors or
with the prosecution team. 55 After the defendant had been seen in the
company of police officers, which compromised his cover, he was called as a

46.

Id.

47. Massiah, 377 U.S at 204.
48. Id. at 207.
49. Id. at 204 (citing Spano v. New York, 360 U.S. 315, 326 (1959) (Douglas, J.,
concurring)).
50. 429 U.S. 545 (1977).
51. Id. at 547.

52.
53.

Id.
Id.

54.
55.

Id. at 548.
Weatherford, 429 U.S. at 548.
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witness for the prosecution. 56 After the plaintiff's conviction, he brought
suit against the defendant claiming the defendant's participation in the two
pretrial meetings compromised the effectiveness of his counsel and thus
violated his rights under the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments.5 7 The
district court found in favor of the defendant, but the Fourth Circuit Court of
Appeals reversed, holding that "'whenever the prosecution knowingly
arranges or permits intrusion into the attorney-client relationship, the right
to
''5
counsel is sufficiently endangered to require reversal and a new trial.
The United States Supreme Court, however, disagreed with the Fourth
Circuit Court of Appeals, holding that this per se rule was incorrect.5 9 In
reaching its decision, the Court distinguished three of its earlier opinions
relied upon by the Fourth Circuit. 60 Specifically, those decisions were the
Supreme Court's opinions in Black
v. United States,6' O'Brien v. United
6
62
1
States.
States, and Hoffa v. United
In Black, the defendant was charged with evading federal income
taxes. 64 In a matter unrelated to his tax situation, the Federal Bureau of
Investigation ("FBI") placed a listening device in Black's hotel suite in
Washington D.C. 65 Over a three-month period, the FBI recorded conversations that included conversations Black had with his attorney concerning the
federal income tax charges. 66 The FBI stated that they destroyed the
recorded tapes but that notes were kept which summarized and quoted these
conversations. 67 When the government attorneys prosecuting the tax case
began trial preparation, they received information and transcripts from the
FBI, including the summaries of the conversations Black had with his
attorney. 68 It was not until after the trial began that the government attorney
realized that the information from the FBI included conversations between
Black and his attorney. 69 The Solicitor General argued that since the tax
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.

Id.at 549.
Id.
Id. (quoting Weatherford v. Bursey, 528 F.2d 483, 486 (4th Cir. 1975)).
Id. at 551.
Weatherford v. Bursey, 429 U.S. 545, 550-53 (1977).
385 U.S. 26 (1966).
386 U.S. 345 (1967).
385 U.S. 293 (1966).
See Black, 385 U.S. at 27-29.
Id.at 27.
Id.
Id. at 27-28.
Id. at 28.
Black, 385 U.S. at 28.
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division attorneys did not find anything relevant in the transcripts from the
FBI, a new trial should not be granted, rather the judgment should be vacated
to the district court to determine if the materials were irrelevant and the
conviction should stand. 70 The Supreme Court did not agree and it held that
"[i]n view of these facts it appears that justice requires that a new trial be
himself from the
held so as to afford the petitioner an opportunity to protect
7
'
inadmissible."
otherwise
be
might
that
use of evidence
The other case the Fourth Circuit relied upon in its decision was
O'Brien v. United States.72 In this case, which is very similar to Black,
Charles O'Brien was convicted on several counts of stealing merchandise
from a United States Customs Service facility. 73 The FBI placed a listening
device in a commercial establishment owned by O'Brien's friend.74 During
the surveillance, the FBI recorded conversations O'Brien had with his
attorney concerning his upcoming trial over the theft from the customs
service facility.75 The conversations between O'Brien and his attorney were
then summarized in the FBI's logs, but were never mentioned in any report
and were in no way communicated to the attorneys for the Department of
76
Justice, which was prosecuting O'Brien's case. In a per curiam decision,
the United States Supreme Court vacated the judgment and remanded it back
to the district court for a new trial if the government desired to retry the
case.77 In his dissent, Justice Harlan argued that the order to vacate for a
new trial was premature. 78 Justice Harlan agreed that O'Brien was entitled
to a hearing to determine how much, if any, of the recorded material was
possibly used at trial, 79 but stated that "'a new trial is not an appropriate
vehicle for sorting out the eavesdropping issue because, until it is determined
that such occurrence vitiated the original conviction, no 80basis for a retrial
exists. The Court's action puts the cart before the horse."
The decision in Hoffa was more in line with Justice Harlan's view. In
that case, a government informant sat in on Hoffa's conversations with his
70.
71.

Id.
Id. at 28-29.

72.

386 U.S. at 345.

73.
74.

Id.
Id. at 346.

75.

Id.

76. Id.
77. O'Brien, 386 U.S. at 345.
dissenting).
78. Id. at 346-47 (Harlan, J.,
dissenting).
79. Id. at 346 (Harlan, J.,
80. Id. at 347 (Harlan, J., dissenting) (quoting Black, 385 U.S. at 31 (Harlan, J.,
dissenting)).
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lawyers and other people during his trial of a Taft-Hartly Act violation.8'
Although that trial ended in a hung jury, there were allegations of jury
tampering on the part of Mr. Hoffa and new charges were brought against
him. 82 At the second trial, the government informant testified to conversations that he had overheard between Hoffa and other third parties, but this
did not include any conversations that Hoffa had with his lawyers.83 Hoffa
was convicted of jury tampering and he subsequently challenged his
conviction on the grounds that the government informant violated his Sixth
Amendment right to counsel. 84 The Supreme Court held that Hoffa's Sixth
Amendment right was not violated, however, because the testimony by the
informant did not deal with conversations that Hoffa had with his lawyers. 85
Yet, the Court noted that, had Hoffa been convicted in his first case, it would
have been reversed because the informant had listened to conversations
between Hoffa and his lawyers and reported at least some of this information
back to the authorities.8 6
To distinguish these cases, the Supreme Court's opinion in Weatherford
notes that the only inference that can be made from Black, O'Brien, and
Hoffa, is that when conversations between clients and their attorneys are
overheard, a Sixth Amendment violation depends upon whether the
communications led to evidence, either direct or indirect, at trial.87 The
Court also held that a Sixth Amendment violation might occur if the
privileged conversations between a client and his or her counsel, was the
subject of testimony at trial, was the origination of evidence used later at
trial, or was "used in any other way to the substantial detriment of the
client., 88 Therefore, as long as information obtained from the meetings is
not communicated, there is no substantial threat to a defendant's Sixth
89
Amendment rights.

81.
(1966)).
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.
(1966)).
87.
88.
89.

Weatherford, 429 U.S. at 552-53 (citing Hoffa v. United States, 385 U.S. 293
Id. at 553 (citing Hoffa v. United States, 385 U.S. 293, 294 (1966)).
Id. (citing Hoffa v. United States, 385 U.S. 293, 307-08 (1966)).
Id. (citing Hoffa v. United States, 385 U.S. 293, 295 (1966)).
Id. at 553-54 (citing Hoffa v. United States, 385 U.S. 293, 307-08 (1966)).
Weatherford, 429 U.S. at 553 (citing Hoffa v. United States, 385 U.S. 293
Id. at 552.
Id. at 554.
Id. at 558.
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Thus, in order to prove a Sixth Amendment violation, there must be at
least a showing of prejudice to the defendant or a benefit to the State. 90 A
two-part test is used to determine if there is sufficient prejudice.
[A] prejudice analysis is employed at two levels in the Sixth
Amendment context. First, some amount of prejudice is required
in order to establish the existence of a Sixth Amendment violation,
but the prejudice need not be "outcome determinative." Second,
once a violation is established the level of prejudice will determine
the remedy, if any, which is required. 9'
A court will not dismiss an indictment as a sanction for government
intrusion into the attorney-client relationship unless the required amount of
prejudice to the defendant is shown.92
In order for an inmate to show that his Sixth Amendment right to
counsel is violated under section 501.3 of the United States Code, some
amount of prejudice will have to be established. The only way that this
could happen is if the privilege team, who is monitoring the communications
between the inmate and his attorney, saves the recording or creates a
summary of the conversations, and provides it to the prosecution team if the
inmate has not already been convicted. The prosecution team would also
have to use this information in the trial in order to get the heaviest sanction
of having the indictment dismissed.
B.

FourthAmendment Protectionof the Attorney-Client Protection

Section 501.3 provides procedures whereby the prosecution, if
applicable, is walled off from the "privilege team" that monitors potentially
privileged attorney-client communications to prevent its disclosure.93 These
procedures prevent a Sixth Amendment violation from occurring, but an
individual's Fourth Amendment rights might be still be violated.94 Because
90. United States v. Noriega, 764 F. Supp. 1480, 1488 (S.D. Fla. 1991) (citing
Weatherford, 429 U.S. at 558)).
91. Id. at 1490 n.8 (quoting United States v. Kelly, 790 F.2d 130, 138 n.6 (D.C. Cir.
1986)).
92. Id. at 1489-90 (citing United States v. Morrison, 449 U.S. 361 (1981)).
93. Prevention of Acts of Violence and Terrorism, 28 C.F.R. § 501.3 (2001).
94. Akhil R. Amar & Vikram D. Amar, The New Regulations Allowing Federal
Agents to Monitor Attorney-Client Conversations: Why it Threatens Fourth Amendment
Values, Findlaw, (Nov. 16, 2001), at http://writ.news.findlaw.com/amar/20011116.htm. The
Fourth Amendment provides:
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the Sixth Amendment protects the attorney-client privilege only in the
context of a criminal prosecution, the Fourth Amendment may offer more
protection because its privacy protection is broader. 95 A Fourth Amendment
challenge to section 501.3 is likely because
[it] should be read to protect this entire range of communication.
To begin, surely an inmate in federal detention whose every
movement is tracked by the government has been "seized" with the
meaning of the Amendment; and eavesdropping on conversations
has long, 96 been held to be a Fourth-Amendment protected
"search.
A Fourth Amendment challenge to monitored communications was
raised in United States v. Noriega. In that case, Manuel Noreiga, the
former dictator of Panama, was being held at the Metropolitan Correctional
Center ("MCC") in Miami awaiting trial on drug trafficking charges.98 The
security procedures at MCC provided that all calls made by inmates on its
phones were automatically and randomly monitored by a central recording
system. 99 Under MCC's regulations, if an inmate wanted to make an
unmonitored call, a specific request had to be made to a guard and explicitly
request that the call be unmonitored or that he "wishe[d] to engage in a
'privileged' attorney-client communication."'0° The phone which Noriega
had access to also had a sticker on it which stated "that all calls made on that
phone, with the exception of 'properly placed' calls to an attorney, were
subject to monitoring and recording by the Bureau of Prisons. ' ' During a
period of nine months, "Noriega made over 1,400 telephone calls, including
some to his attorneys, from that phone."' 2 "The government served
[several] subpoenas [to] MCC for production of Noriega's tape-recorded
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects,
against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall
issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly
describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.
U.S. CONST. amend. IV.

95.
96.
97.
98.
99.
100.
101.
102.

Amar & Amar, supra note 94.
Id.
764 F. Supp. 1480, 1482 (S.D. Fla. 1991).

Id.
Id.
Id. at 1485.
Id. at 1483.
Noriega, 764 F. Supp. at 1483.
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conversations."'' 0 3 In order to shield itself from privileged attorney-client
conversations, the trial team had the calls screened by a Spanish-speaking
DEA agent to remove all privileged communications from the tapes that
would be turned over to the trial team.'4 Despite the screening process,
some of Noriega's privileged communications accidentally reached the trial
team through summaries of the tapes.105 Upon learning of this intrusion into
the attorney-client privilege, Noriega moved to have the charges against him
dropped on the06grounds that it violated his rights under the Sixth and Fourth
Amendments. 1
Noriega's Sixth Amendment argument was dismissed by the district
court because he failed to show the prejudice or injury required to prove a
Sixth Amendment violation. 10 7 The court also rejected Noriega's Fourth
Amendment claim holding that this Amendment "protects only those
08
subjects or areas in which there is a legitimate expectation of privacy.'
There is also no expectation of privacy when information is passed
voluntarily to third parties.' ° The court held that there was no evidence to
suggest that Noriega had an expectation of privacy when he made the
calls." 0 Noriega was given adequate notice that his calls were subject to
being monitored and he had no subjective expectation of privacy because he
often warned the people to whom he was talking to be careful about what
they discussed as well as using cryptic language during the conversations. '''
Thus, a Fourth Amendment violation will not be found when there is no
expectation of privacy. Since section 501.3 is applicable to inmates who are
given notice that they are under special administrative measures and that
their conversations with their attorneys may be monitored, there is no
realistic expectation of privacy for these inmates. Therefore, it is likely that
an inmate's Fourth Amendment challenge to section 501.3 would fail if its
provisions are carried out properly.

103.
104.
105.
106.
107.
108.
109.
110.
111.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 1484.
Id.
Noriega, 764 F. Supp. at 1488.
Id. at 1492 (citing Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 743-44 (1979)).
Id.
Id.
Id.
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IV. CRIME-FRAUD EXCEPTION

One of the principle legal foundations of section 501.3's intrusion into
the attorney-client privilege is the crime-fraud exception. This rule exempts
communication used to further a future criminal act from the traditional
protections afforded by the attorney-client privilege. 2 One of the earliest
Supreme Court cases that discussed the limitations of privileged communications is Clark v. United States.1 13 In that case, a juror was convicted of
criminal contempt for knowingly giving false and misleading testimony
during voir dire in order to remain of the jury and thereby thwart the
prosecution of her former employer." 14 The petitioner challenged the
admissibility of the testimony of her conduct during jury deliberations
because the arguments and votes1 5 of jurors are privileged and cannot be
disclosed unless they are waived.
In discussing the origin and policy reasons supporting the privilege, the
Court noted that the social
• •,. policy
•
116 behind the privilege might conflict with
other competing social policies.
The free and independent debate of the
jury room may be chilled if the juror's comments and votes were made
publicly available.' 17 The Court noted that "the function of the court to
weigh these competing policies is more essential when there is little
guidance in either case law or treaties that precisely limit the privilege in
question.",118 The Court then held that this privilege is "not applicable when
the circumstances giving rise to the privilege were fraudulently begun or
continued."11 9 In support of its decision, the Court looked to analogies in
other privileges for precedent, specifically citing an early case that held that
the attorney-client privilege did not protect a client who consults with an
attorney in order to help him commit a fraud. 12 The Court noted that
although many early cases required only an unsubstantiated charge of
illegality to remove this privilege, 121 later rulings held that specific evidence
of illegality must be shown before such privilege is destroyed. 12 The Court
112.
113.
114.
115.
116.
117.
118.
119.
120.
121.
122.

United States v.Zolin, 491 U.S. 554, 556 (1989).
Clark, 289 U.S. at 1.
Id. at 6-7.
Id.at 12.
Id.at 13.
Id.
Clark, 289 U.S. at 13.
Id.at 14.
Id. at 15.
Id. (citations omitted).

Id.
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further stated that the confidences of a client and his or her attorney are
protected only until abuse has been adequately demonstrated to the
satisfaction of the judge. 123
In United States v. Gordon-Nikkar,124 the Fifth Circuit denied a
petitioner's appeal from a cocaine trafficking and possession conviction
because of the testimony of a government witness regarding two meetings
the petitioner had with her attorney. 25 At one of the meetings, which
included several other co-defendants including the government witness, the
petitioner and the other people present agreed to give false testimony to hide
their crime.126 The court held that it was not a confidential communication
because some of the participants at the meeting were not clients of the
attorney. 127 Yet, the court further opined that, even if it was considered
confidential, the testimony of the government witness was admissible
because the attorney-client privilege does not include communications
regarding the intent to commit a crime. 128 "The policy underlying the
attorney-client privilege is to promote the administration of justice. It would
be a perversion of the privilege to extend it so as to protect communication
frustrate justice by committing other crimes to conceal past
designed to
' 129
misdeeds."
The rules and procedures that a court uses in determining whether the
crime-fraud exception is applicable in a given situation, greatly impact the
strength of the attorney-client privilege. The issues facing the application of
the crime-fraud exception were examined in the United States Supreme
Court's opinion in United States v. Zolin. 130 In that case, the Internal
Revenue Service ("IRS") issued a summons that demanded the production of
certain materials involving an investigation into the tax returns of L. Ron
Hubbard, the founder of the Church of Scientology. 13 These materials
included some tapes that the church claimed were protected by the attorneyclient privilege. 32 "The IRS filed a petition to enforce its summons with the
United States District Court for the Central District of California. 133 The IRS
Clark, 289 U.S. at 16.
518 F.2d 972, 974 (5th Cir. 1975).
Id. at 974.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 975.
Gordon-Nikkar, 518 F.2d at 975.
130. Zolin, 491 U.S. at 556.

123.
124.
125.
126.
127.
128.
129.

131. Id.
132. Id. at 557.
133. Id. at 558.
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argued that the tapes were not privileged communications as the respondents
claimed, but rather, fell within the crime-fraud exception.' 34 In support of
its request to have the court listen to the tapes, the IRS offered partial
transcripts of the tapes that it had lawfully obtained. 35 The district court
ruled that while the transcripts showed some evidence of
past crimes, there
36
was nothing to indicate that future crimes were planned.
The respondents appealed to the Ninth Circuit on other grounds and the
IRS cross-appealed claiming, in part, that the district court incorrectly ruled
on the crime-fraud exception without listening to the tapes in camera. 37 The
Ninth Circuit held that in order for the crime-fraud exception to apply to
privileged communication, the party opposing the privilege must base its
assertion on "sources independent of the attorney-client communications
recorded on the tapes."' 38 The Ninth Circuit held that the IRS's "independent evidence" did not support a finding of the crime-fraud exception.1 39 This
case was then granted certiorari to the United States Supreme Court. 40
The Supreme Court stated that many questions can arise when a crimefraud exception claim is made. 14' The three principle questions raised in
Zolin were: 1) whether a district court can review privileged communications in order to determine if the crime-fraud exception applies; 2) what
minimum amount of evidence must be shown before a court can undertake a
review; and 3) if there is an evidentiary threshold requirement needed before
an opposing party claims a crime-fraud exception, whether the privileged
142
material itself can be used to satisfy it.
The Court first looked at the
Federal Rules of Evidence to determine if it bars an in camera review of
privileged communications. 143 It noted that two rules, specifically Rule
104(a) and Rule 1101(c), of the Federal Rules of Evidence, stand out when
first examining these questions. 44 When taken together, these rules can be
134. Id.
135. Zolin, 491 U.S. at 558.
136. Id. at 559.
137. Id. at 560.
138. Id. at 561 (quoting United States v. Zolin, 809 F.2d 1411, 1418 (9th Cir. 1987),
overruledon other grounds by United States v. Jose, 131 F.3d 1325 (9th Cir. 1999)).
139. Zolin, 809 F.2d at 1418-19.
140. Zolin, 491 U.S. at 560.
141. Id. at 563.
142. Id. at 564-65.
143. Id. at 565.
144. Id. at 565-66. Rule 104(a) states:
Preliminary questions concerning the qualification of a person to be a witness, the
existence of a privilege, or the admissibility of evidence shall be determined by the
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read to conclude that a court cannot review the privileged communication to
determine the crime-fraud exception.1 45 But this interpretation leads to a
result that, once a court finds that the communication is privileged, it would
be almost impossible to ever prove a crime-fraud exemption.
Thus, the
Court rejected this interpretation and stated that the plain language of Rule
104 does not explicitly exclude "all materials" from a court's consideration
of an exception.
Therefore, the Court held that the district
court in Zolin
48
was permitted to conduct an in camera review of the tapes.1
In its decision, the Supreme Court held that, while a blanket rule
allowing an in camera review in every circumstance would jeopardize the
policy reasons behind the attorney-client privilege, "the costs of imposing an
absolute bar to consideration of the communications in camera
for purpose
149
high."'
intolerably
are
exception
crime-fraud
the
establishing
of
[W]e conclude that evidence that is not "independent" of the contents of allegedly privileged communications-like the partial transcripts in this case-may be used not only in the pursuit of in camera review, but also may provide the evidentiary basis for the ultimate showing that the crime-fraud exception applies. We see little
to distinguish these two uses: in both circumstances, if the evidence has not itself been determined to be privileged, its exclusion
does 50
not serve the policies which underlie the attorney-client privilege.1
The Court further held that since an in camera review of privileged
communication is a lesser intrusion on the attorney-client privilege than a
public disclosure, a lower evidentiary threshold is required than would be to
overcome the privilege itself.''
But, a party claiming a crime-fraud
exception "must present evidence sufficient to support a reasonable belief
court, subject to the provisions of subdivision (b). In making its determination it is not
bound by the rules of evidence except those with respect to privileges.
FED. R. EVID. 104(a). Rule 1101(c) states: "The rule with respect to privileges applies at all
stages of all actions, cases, and proceedings." Id.
145. Zolin, 491 U.S. at 566.
146. Id. at 567.
147. Id. at 566.

148. Id. at 568.
149. Id. at 569.
150. Zolin, 491 U.S. at 574 n.12.
151. Id. at 572 (quoting David J. Fried, Too High a Pricefor Truth: The Exception to
the Attorney-Client Privilegefor Contemplated Crimes and Frauds,64 N.C. L. REV. 443, 467

(1986)).
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that an in camera review may yield evidence that establishes the exception's
applicability. ' ' 1 This requirement may be met by using any lawfully
53
obtained evidence that the court has not adjudicated to be privileged. 1
If under section 501.3 the "privilege team" monitors conversations that
are used to further acts of terrorism, it is permitted to release it to the proper
authorities. 154 This is what occurred in the case of the Sheik when he was
using his conversations with his lawyer to direct the terrorist activities of his
followers. 155 This obviously falls within the crime-fraud exception and is
precisely the type of information section 501.3 was designed to prevent. 56
V. LIMITATIONS ON INMATE RIGHTS
A.

ConstitutionalLimitations of Inmate Rights

Since section 501.3 is applicable to inmates under the supervision of the
Bureau of Prisons, as well as other people in federal custody, it is important
to examine how the rights of inmates are limited under existing law and how
the courts balance the constitutional rights of inmates and the government's
legitimate interest in protecting society. One of the leading cases in this area
is Pell v. Procunier.157 In that case, three professional journalists and four
inmates brought suit against various California Department of Corrections
officials, claiming that a corrections department rule, which prohibited faceto-face media interviews with specific inmates, violated their rights of free
speech under the First and Fourteenth Amendments.
This rule prohibited
media and press interviews with specific inmates,
but still permitted
59
interviews with a random selection of inmates.1
The United States Supreme Court began its decision with the
proposition that "[1]awful incarceration brings about the necessary
withdrawal or limitations of many privileges and rights, a retraction justified
by the considerations underlying our penal system."' 160 "In the First
Amendment context a corollary of this principle is that a prison inmate
152. Id. at 574-75.
153. Id. at 575.
154. Prevention of Acts of Violence and Terrorism, 28 C.F.R. § 501.3 (2002).
155. Harriet Chiang, Colleagues Call Lawyer's Arrest Harmful, THE S.F. CHRONICLE,
April 11, 2002, at A3.
156. Prevention of Acts of Violence and Terrorism, 28 C.F.R. § 501.3(d)(2)(i) (2002).

157. 417 U.S. 817 (1973).
158. Id. at 819.
159. Id.
160. Id. at 822 (quoting Price v. Johnson, 334 U.S. 266, 285 (1948)).
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retains those First Amendment rights that are not inconsistent with his status
as a prisoner or with the legitimate penological objectives of the corrections
system."' 6 Thus, any constitutional challenges to prison regulations must be
weighed against the legitimate policies and goals of a correctional system,
which is principally to deter crime by separating convicted criminals from
society and hopefully to rehabilitate them for their return to society. 162
In its decision, the Court stated that the alternative means of communication available to the inmates should be a relevant factor when weighing the
inmates' First Amendment rights against any legitimate governmental
interests.163 Because the inmates in California still had other reasonable and
effective means of communication available to them and the regulations
were uniformly applied, the regulations did not violate the inmate's rights
under the First and Fourteenth Amendments.1 64 The Court further noted that
"[tihe nature of a place, the pattern of its normal activities, dictate the kinds
of regulations of time, place, and manner are reasonable." 65 In a prison
environment, in which security concerns are of great importance, the
restrictions of people allowed
to enter the prison and interview inmates are
66
considered reasonable. 1

B.

Inmate Exemptions from Federal Wiretapping Statutes

The governmental interest in maintaining security in prisons also
restricts an inmate's ability to make unmonitored phone calls while in
custody. Title Il of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act,
"forbids the willful interception of wire communications, including
telephone conversations, without prior judicial authorization."' 167 However,
this limitation of governmental power does not fully apply to inmates. There
are two exceptions to this statute that allow prison officials to tape the
conversations of inmates.168 Prison officials can intercept communications
through wiretaps if: 1) it falls within their routine duties; or 2) one of the
parties to the communication gives their consent to the interceptions. 169
161. Id.
162. Pell, 417 U.S at 822-23.
163. Id. at 824 (citing Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753, 765 (1972).
164. Id. at 826.
165. Id. (quoting Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 115 (1972) (internal
quotation marks omitted)).
166. Id. at 827.
167. United States v. Noriega, 764 F. Supp. 1480, 1490 (S.D. Fla. 1991).
168. Id.

169. 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510(5)(a)(ii), 2511(2)(c) (2002).
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The first exception, section 2510(5)(a)(ii), states that a law enforcement
officer, which includes prison officials, are permitted to use wiretaps to
intercept inmate calls when it is done "in the ordinary course of his
duties."' 70 In United States v. Sababu,171 the Seventh Circuit held that taping
of inmate phone calls is permitted when it is done according to prison
regulations and within the normal routine.1 72 The routine use of phone taps
is authorized by 28 C.F.R. section 540.100. This regulation states that
"[i]nmate telephone use is subject to limitations and restrictions which the
Warden determines are necessary to insure the security, good order, and
discipline of the institution and to protect the public. The Warden shall
establish procedures and facilities for inmate telephone use.' 73
The interception of communications is also authorized when "one of the
parties to the communication has given prior consent to such interception. ' 74 A violation of this statute was raised in the prison context in
Noriega.'75 The district court rejected Noriega's claim because Noriega's
conversations were recorded under the normal routine of the prison and were
based on legitimate security concerns.176 Noriega's claim was also rejected
because his consent to be monitored could be inferred from the ample
warnings he received through
the stickers on the phone, orientation manual,
177
and other consent forms.
How the courts interpret Title III may be useful in understanding how
the courts might view challenges to the intrusion into the attorney-client
privilege in section 501.3. First of all, before any inmate can be subject to
having his conversations between himself and his attorney monitored, they
must first be placed under "special administrative measures."' 178 The inmates
are given written notification of the restrictions that will be imposed as well
as the reasons why they are having the restrictions placed on them. 79 If the
security risks are severe enough, the inmate may have the additional measure
of monitoring his or her attorney-client communications placed on him or
her by the Attorney General, once he is notified by law enforcement or
170.
171.
172.
173.
174.
175.
176.
177.
178.
179.

18 U.S.C. § 2510 (2002).
891 F.2d 1308 (7th Cir. 1989).
Sababu, 891 F.2d at 1329.
Id. at 1329 n.7 (quoting 28 C.F.R. § 540.100).
18 U.S.C. § 2511(2)(c).
Noriega, 764 F. Supp. at 1490.
Id. at 1491.
Id.
Prevention of Acts of Violence and Terrorism, 28 C.F.R. § 501.3(a) (2002).
§ 501.3(b).
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intelligence officials of the heightened security risk.' 8° The selected inmate
also receives an additional notice of this extra security measure, unless a
court gives its authorization not to provide the additional warning. '8
Since under most circumstances section 501.3 provides the inmate with
sufficient notice of the extra security measures that are being imposed, it
would be hard to establish that there is any expectation of privacy. The
rights enjoyed by regular inmates are initially limited by the fact that they
are in custody. The security concerns of maintaining a prison naturally
reduce the rights and privileges enjoyed by inmates. Add to this the security
concerns needed to apply "special administrative measures" and finally, the
highest level of a security threat needed to impose the monitoring of
attorney-client communications, and any expectation of privacy by the
inmate is minimal.
VI. IRREPARABLE HARM TO EFFECTIVE LEGAL REPRESENTATION?

The courts and the public at large have accepted the reduced rights and
privileges of inmates, but the issue of monitoring attorney-client communications has caused substantial unease among the legal community.' 82 Many
lawyers and civil rights activists are concerned that monitoring the
communications of people who qualify under section 501.3, including
suspected terrorists, will have a chilling effect on the lawyers who represent
them.183 But, is this an irreparable harm to effective legal representation?
There is no doubt that the knowledge that the government is taping the
communications between someone who is in federal custody and his or her
lawyer would cause them both to closely guard their words. The client
would be very apprehensive about giving details that might be potentially
incriminating to him. This would, in turn, hurt the ability of the attorney to
know as much as possible about the client's case and thus, limit the
effectiveness of the attorney's representation. In fact, the courts recognize
that the purpose of the attorney-client 1privilege
is to "encourage clients to
84
make full disclosure to their attorneys.'

180.
181.
182.
183.
184.
States, 425

§ 501.3(d).
§ 501.3(d)(2).
Chiang, supra note 155.
Id.
Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 389 (1981) (quoting Fisher v United
U.S. 391, 403 (1976)).
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[The attorney-client privilege's] purpose is to encourage full and
frank communication between attorneys and, their clients and
thereby promote broader public interests in the observance of law
and administration of justice. The privilege recognizes that sound
legal advice or advocacy serves public ends and that such sound
legal advice or advocacy depends on a lawyer being fully informed. 85
1
There is no denying that this regulation will have a detrimental effect on the
inmate's legal representation, but it is not irreparable. The inmates that are
subject to having their conversations with their attorneys monitored are not
the typical inmates in federal custody. These inmates have been determined
by the Attorney General or by other intelligence and law enforcement
officials to pose a serious threat of continued acts of violence and terrorism.
It is unlikely that these inmates have a great deal of trust for any government
or prison officials. It seems reasonable that they would be reluctant to speak
open and candidly about any act of violence or terrorism that they committed
in the past, regardless of whether their conversations with their attorneys
were being recorded. 186
In addition, the inmates could be reassured by the fact that, as long as
their attorney-client communications do not fall within the crime-fraud
exception, they will remain privileged. If the privilege team fails to follow
its proper procedures and transfers privileged communications to the
prosecution team, there is legal recourse. If the privileged materials were
intentionally disclosed to the prosecution by the privilege team, and if the
prejudice caused to the inmate was substantial, the court could order a new
trial.187
VII. CONCLUSION
This new regulation was implemented in a response to real and
substantial threats faced by the United States. Its purpose was to prevent a
limited group of people in federal custody from abusing the attorney-client
privilege to cause future acts of violence and terrorism. Any time a privilege
is chipped away, even for just a very select group of people, it can be a
185. Upjohn, 449 U.S. at 389.
186. See, e.g., Noriega, 764 F. Supp. 1480, 1492 (S.D. Fla. 1991) (noting that Manual
Noriega frequently warned the people he was talking on the phone with not to discuss
sensitive matters and repeatedly used coded and cryptic language).
187. See Black v. United States, 385 U.S. 26 (1966).
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But, the
dangerous step toward limiting the privilege for everyone.
The
measure.
unprecedented
warrant
this
case
particular
in
this
conditions
regulation is carefully drawn to protect privileged communication that is
monitored and gives redress procedures to inmates who feel that this
measure is unwarranted. In addition, this regulation is extremely limited in
scope. At the moment, only about sixteen prisoners in federal88 custody
qualify to have their conversations with their attorneys monitored. 1
Although some people feel that this regulation is too intrusive and that
the threat of terrorism is overstated, the regulation is necessary. As
mentioned in the introduction, this regulation enabled the Department of
Justice to arrest a lawyer who has been accused of helping her client, the
man responsible for the planning of the World Trade Center bombing in
1993, to pass messages to his followers in order to direct terrorist activities
from his jail cell. 189 In another example, Isabelle Coutant Peyre, the fiancde
and lawyer of the notorious terrorist Carlos "The Jackal", offered to
represent Zacarias Moussaoui, who is under indictment for his role in the
September 11, 2001 destruction of the World Trade Center.' 90 It is
understandable that allowing her to have private conversations with
Moussaoui could possibly impose an unreasonable security risk.
This regulation can be effective, but will it be able to withstand a legal
challenge? It is the opinion of the author that the courts will find that the
regulation does not violate the Constitution. As detailed above, the attorneyclient privilege is not absolute and courts have acknowledged that there are
exceptions to it. An attempt to abuse this privilege to further an act of fraud
or further a crime is not protected. Second, if privileged attorney-client
communications are monitored by the government, but are not used to
prejudice the defendant or to benefit the government, there is no violation of
the privilege. Third, this article has shown that, when the rights of inmates
are weighed against the governmental interest in maintaining peace and
security in the prisons as well as the country at large, the governmental
interest prevails.
Finally, this article recognizes that this regulation could possibly harm
the legal representation of the inmates who are subject to having their
188. DOJ Oversight: Preserving Our Freedoms While Defending Against Terrorism;

Hearing Before Senate Judiciary Committee, 107th Cong. (2001) (statement of Assistant
Attorney General Michael Chertoff), available at http://judiciary.senate.gov/print-testimony.
cfm?id=125&witid=66.
189. See infra part I.
190. Hugh Doughterty, I Enter No Plea Says Defiant Hijack Suspect, BIRMINGHAM
POST, Jan. 3, 2002, at 3, available at 2002 WL 4388879.
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attorney-client communications monitored. This harm, however, is not
irreparable and there are legal recourses available to ensure that privileged
communication stays protected. The courts of this country shape the
contours of a privilege "in the light of reason and experience."'
When the
costs imposed on an affected inmate's rights are weighed against the
legitimate governmental interest and benefit in preventing acts of violence
and terrorism, this regulation will likely be deemed reasonable.

191.

FED.

R. EvID. 501.
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I. INTRODUCTION

Charles Andrew Bates, the Defendant in State v. Bates,' listened to his
friends and former neighbors give testimony about his character, as he sat at
J.D. candidate 2004, Nova Southeastern University Shepard Broad Law Center;
B.A., University of South Florida. I would like to acknowledge and thank my loving wife,
Liz, for her unwavering support, Professor Michael Dale for his role as advisor and mentor,
and members of the Nova Law Review junior staff for their tireless efforts.
1.
Fictional case. Bates' story is designed to give the reader an understanding of
how a sentencing hearing progresses.
*
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a table in a hot Florida courtroom. Bates' defense attorney called these
character witnesses in a final effort to save his client's life. The jury has
already returned a guilty verdict on one count of first-degree murder;
therefore, Bates is facing either life imprisonment or death. The Defendant
is in danger of the jury recommending death to the judge if his attorney is
unable to present mitigating circumstances that equalize or outweigh the
several aggravating circumstances presented by the prosecutor.
Prior to the defense attorney's attempt at presenting mitigating
circumstances, the prosecutor presented evidence to demonstrate aggravating circumstances. During the prosecutor's argument, she presented several
pieces of evidence, which could have been classified as aggravating factors.
The prosecutor demonstrated, as she had done to establish guilt at trial, that
the Defendant stabbed his seventy-two year-old victim twenty-six times.
After killing the victim, the Defendant looted the victim's apartment,
stealing precious family heirlooms and a modest savings of cash. The
prosecutor also demonstrated that the Defendant kept the victim bound and
gagged in a dark bathroom for two days, providing limited food and water
before killing her. The prosecutor closed her argument by stating that
according to the state statute, three aggravating factors were present. First,
the Defendant killed the victim in an especially heinous and cruel manner. 3
Second, the victim was an elderly woman, whom he physically and mentally
abused, and killed.4 Finally, the Defendant committed this murder for
pecuniary gain. 5
2.
This sentencing hearing is similar to a sentencing hearing in Alabama, Delaware,
or Florida. ALA. CODE § 13A-5-45 (1994); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 4209 (1995); FLA.
STAT. § 921.141 (2001). In any of these three states, the following will occur. After a guilty
verdict has been rendered in a capital case, the jury listens to all of the evidence presented by
both sides in a separate sentencing hearing. Upon completion of the arguments by both
attorneys, the jurors weigh the aggravating and mitigating circumstances. However, if the
aggravating circumstances outweigh the mitigating circumstances, then the jury may
recommend death. If the mitigating circumstances outweigh or equal the aggravating
circumstances, then the jury must recommend life imprisonment. Regardless of the jury's
recommendation, the judge makes the final decision. The judge weighs the evidence as the
jury did, and he or she can impose death or life imprisonment as a penalty. ALA. CODE
§ 13A-5-45 (1994); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 4209 (1995); FLA. STAT. § 921.141 (2001).

3.
In Florida, committing a capital felony in an "especially heinous, atrocious, or
cruel" manner is considered an aggravating factor. Fla. Stat. § 921.141(5)(h) (2001).
4.
In Florida, committing a capital felony against an "elderly person. . . resulting in
great bodily harm" is considered an aggravating factor. § 921.141(5)(d).
5.
In Florida, committing a capital felony for "pecuniary gain" can be considered an
aggravating factor. § 921.141(5)(f).
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Bates' attorney focused on the Defendant's age, mental state at the time
of the crime, and limited criminal history to mitigate the aggravating factors
presented by the prosecutor. First, the defense attorney explained to the jury
that while the defendant is currently nineteen, he was only eighteen at the
time of the murder.6 Thus, while the law sees the Defendant as an adult, his
young age should be considered when analyzing his decisions. Second, the
defense attorney attempted to reason the Defendant's actions based upon his
mental state at the time of the murder.7 To do this, the Defendant's friends
testified that they had taken illegal drugs with the Defendant only one day
prior to the Defendant's felonious act, causing the Defendant to react
aggressively. Finally, the defense attorney presented the Defendant's limited
criminal history. 8 Bates had only been arrested one time prior, for a
misdemeanor.
Upon completion of the arguments, the judge gave the jury brief
instructions, and allowed them to deliberate so they might form a recommendation of either life imprisonment or death. The jury returned after two
short hours. The jury informed the judge that they had reached a decision.
By a vote of twelve to zero, they found that the Defendant's age, limited
criminal history, and mental state at the time of the murder were sufficient
mitigating circumstances to offset the aggravating factors presented by the
prosecution. Thus, the jury recommended that the judge impose a sentence
of life imprisonment.
One week later, the court reconvened for the judge's decision. The
judge explained that while he gives great weight to the jury's recommendation, he is not bound by it, and he must rule appropriately. Moreover, the
judge explained that while the jury is often swayed by the emotion of
witnesses at a sentencing trial, his experience and understanding of the
procedure allows him to see things more objectively than juries might.
Therefore, the judge explained that he was ready to make his ruling. As all
ears in the courtroom listened attentively, the judge sentenced Charles
Andrew Bates to death by the electric chair. 9 The judge stated that he was
6.
In Florida, the "age of the defendant at the time of the crime" can be considered a
mitigating factor. § 921.141(6)(g).
7.
In Florida, the aggravating factors may be mitigated if "[t]he capital felony was
committed while the defendant was under the influence of extreme mental or emotional
disturbance." § 921.141(6)(b).
8.
In Florida, lack of a significant criminal history can be a mitigating factor.
§ 921.141(6)(a).
9.
Florida continues to use the electric chair for executions. DEATH PENALTY INFO.
CTR., FLORIDA, at http://wwwdeathpenaltyinfo.org/article.php?did=497&scid=l 1 (last visited
Apr. 10, 2003).
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not persuaded by the argument that the Defendant's age was a mitigating
circumstance. When the judge weighed the three aggravating circumstances
against the two remaining mitigating circumstances, he felt death was the
appropriate punishment.
Although the sentencing hearing previously described is fictional, the
possibility of its likeness becoming a reality is true, due to the current
process required by death penalty statutes in eight states.' 0 In those eight
states, either: 1) a judge makes the decision alone;' 1 2) a panel of judges
makes the decision together;12 or 3) a judge makes the decision with a
recommendation from the jury, 13 as was the case in the Bates' trial. As of
April 1, 2001, a total of 3701 inmates resided on death row. 14 Of those 3701
inmates, 758 were sentenced to death by one of the three previously
mentioned processes.15
This article will deal directly with the 758 inmates who were sentenced
to death by a judge or panel of judges. Initially, this article will briefly
analyze the effects of Furman v. Georgia.16 In the analysis of Furman, the
article will discuss the Court's holding, as well as Furman's effects on the
death penalty in 1972. Finally, this section will discuss the implementation
of aggravating and mitigating factors into state death penalty statutes, as a
direct result of Furman.
In Part II, this article will survey the various ways states have formed
their death penalty statutes. In this section, the article will first discuss those
state statutes where a judge, or panel of judges makes the sentencing
determination, independent of a jury. Next, the article will discuss state
10. Alabama, Arizona, Colorado, Delaware, Florida, Idaho, Montana, and Nebraska.
See ALA. CODE § 13A-5-45 (1994); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-703 (West 2001 & Supp.
2001); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 16-11-103 (West 2001); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 4209
(1995); FLA. STAT. § 921.141 (2001); IDAHO CODE § 19-2515 (Michie 1997 & Supp. 2002);
MONT. CODE ANN. § 46-18-301 (2001); NEB. REV. STAT. § 29-2520 (1995).
11. Adam Liptak, Fewer Death Sentences Likely if Juries Make Ultimate Decision,
Experts Say, N.Y. TIMES, June 25, 2002, at A19. See also ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-703
(West 2001 & Supp. 2001); IDAHO CODE § 19-2515 (Michie 1997 & Supp. 2002); MONT.
CODE ANN. § 46-18-301 (2001).
12. Liptak, supra note 11. See also COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 16-11-103 (West
2001); NEB. REV. STAT. § 29-2520 (1995).
13. Liptak, supra note 11. See also ALA. CODE § 13A-5-45 (1994); DEL. CODE ANN.
tit. 11, § 4209 (1995); FLA. STAT. § 921.141 (2001).
14. DEATH PENALTY INFO. CTR., DEATH Row INMATES BY STATE, at
http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/DRowlnfo.html (Apr. 1, 2001). At the time of the writing of
this article, this was the most current information.
15. See id.
16. 408 U.S. 238 (1972) (per curiam).
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statutes that require a judge to determine the sentence, after receiving a
recommendation from the jury. Finally, this section will analyze a state
statute that requires the jury to make the final sentencing determination, and
does not allow the judge to overrule the jury's decision, as he can in other
states. 17

In Part IV, this article will begin to look at landmark United States
Supreme Court cases that set the stage for Ring v. Arizona.18 In this section,
it becomes apparent that the Court is conflicted over the appropriate level of
involvement by the judge in the sentencing process. The first case analyzed
to demonstrate this point is Walton v. Arizona.19 In Walton, a 1990 case, the
Court upheld the Arizona death penalty statute, finding that it did not violate
the Sixth Amendment. The article then shifts forward to the year 2000 and
discusses Apprendi v. New Jersey,2 1 another significant United States
Supreme Court case. In the discussion of Apprendi, the paper will show how
a conflict between Apprendi and Walton existed, even though the Court
stated in Apprendi that Walton remained good law. 22 Also at this juncture,
the article will discuss Justice O'Connor's dissenting opinion in Apprendi,
23
which predicted that appeals, such as Ring, would be quickly forthcoming.
In Part V, this article will analyze Ring. In the analysis of Ring, the
paper will show that Apprendi and Walton could not coexist, and how the
Court chose not to tip-toe the line any longer. Also in this section, the article
will revisit Justice O'Connor in another dissenting opinion, as she opines
that the majority sided with the wrong case, Apprendi, and instead should
have chosen Walton.24
Finally, in Part VI, this article will discuss the legal ramifications of the
Ring decision. There are both long and short-term effects of Ring, and in
this section, the article will examine both. In the short-term, will those
currently on death row, who were sentenced by a judge, have their sentences
commuted, as was done after Furman; or will they only receive new
sentencing trials? In the long-term, what will this mean for current death
penalty statutes, or for the administration of the death penalty? Will Ring
17. Liptak, supra note 11. See also ALA. CODE § 13A-5-45 (1994); DEL. CODE ANN.
tit. 11, § 4209 (1995); FLA. STAT. § 921.141 (2001).
18. 122 S. Ct. 2428 (2002).
19. 497 U.S. 639 (1990).

20.
21.
22.

Id. at 639.
530 U.S. 466 (2000).
Id. at 496.

23.
24.

Id. at 551 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
Ring, 122 S. Ct. at 2449 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
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only be a speed bump, slowing down executions until state legislatures can
cleverly create new death penalty statutes that comply with the Ring ruling,
or will this decision result in a permanent slowing of executions in this
country?
II.

FURMAN V. GEORGIA

The United States Supreme Court's decision in Furman v. Georgia25 is
the most significant reason death penalty statutes exist in their current form.
Prior to Furman, the Court did not interpret punishment by death as cruel,
"unless the manner of execution [could] be said to be inhuman and
barbarous. 26 However, as Justice Douglas pointed out in his concurring
opinion, "the Eighth Amendment 'must draw its meaning from the evolving
standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing society.",,27 Thus,
to measure the death penalty against the existing
the Furman Court sought
"standards of decency., 28
A.

The Court's Opinion

In Furman, three convicted felons, two from Georgia and one from
Texas, were sentenced to death by juries in their respective states. 29 Furman,
from Georgia, was sentenced to death for murder, 30 while Jackson, the other
petitioner from Georgia, and Branch, the petitioner from Texas, were
sentenced to death for rape. 3' All three petitioners were black, and none had
32
an education exceeding high school, as was the case for a large number of
As a result, the petitioners'
defendants sentenced to death at that time.
attorney argued that the death penalty was imposed arbitrarily because a

25. 408 U.S. 238 (1972).
26. Id. at 241 (citing In re Kemmler, 136 U.S. 436, 447 (1890)). The Eighth
Amendment states that "[e]xcessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed,
nor cruel and unusualpunishments inflicted." U.S. CONST. amend. VIII (emphasis added).
27. Furman, 408 U.S. at 242 (quoting Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958)).
28. See id.
29. Id. at 239.
30. Id. at 252.
31.
Id. at 252-53.
32. Furman, 408 U.S. at 252-53.
33. Id. at 249-50.
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large majority of deathrow inmates were minorities with limited education, 34
thus, the capital punishment statutes were a violation of the Eighth and
Fourteenth Amendments.
The sole issue addressed in Furman was whether the "imposition and
carrying out of the death penalty in [these cases] constitute cruel and unusual
punishment in violation of the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments?, 36 The
decision of the Court in Furman was five to four, with the five justices
making up the majority filing separate opinions.37 The majority held that
"the imposition and carrying out of the death penalty in these cases
constituted cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth and
Fourteenth Amendments, 3 8 and thus, was unconstitutional.
All five39
concurring Justices rationalized their decision based on inequality.
"Justices Brennan and Marshall concluded that the death penalty was per se
unconstitutional, in part based on its inevitably unequal application.
The
other three concurring Justices, Justices Douglas, Stewart, and White, found
fault with the inequality rooted in the sentencing procedure, as opposed to
the punishment itself.4 ' Justice White wrote in his concurring opinion that
"the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment would render
unconstitutional 'capital sentencing procedures that are purposely constructed to allow maximum possible variation from one case to the next, and
[that] provide no mechanism to prevent that consciously maximized

34. Scott W. Howe, The Troubling Influence of Equality in Constitutional Criminal
Procedure: From Brown to Miranda, Furman and Beyond, 54 VAND. L. REV. 359, 404

(2001).
35. Id. The Eighth Amendment of the United States Constitution states that
"[e]xcessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual
punishment inflicted." U.S. CONST. amend. VIII. The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment of the United States Constitution states that
[n]o State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life,
liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its
jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.

U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
36. Furman, 408 U.S. at 239.
37. Id. at 240.
38. Id. at 239-40.
39. Howe, supra note 34, at 404 (citing Stephen P. Garvey, "As the Gentle Rain From
Heaven": Mercy In CapitalSentencing, 81 CORNELL L. REV. 989, 997 (1996)).
40. Howe, supra note 34, at 405.
41. Id.
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variation from reflecting merely random or arbitrary choice."'' 42 Thus, the
Court left the door open for state legislatures to devise a system, whereby a
defendant could be sentenced to death, if procedurally the sentencing state
could avoid random or arbitrary choice of those defendants selected for
death.
B.

After Furmanv. Georgia

During the three years following Furman, thirty-five states passed new
death penalty statutes.43 Most states elected to implement statutes that
mandated execution upon conviction.4 Conversely, a small number of states
created statutes mandating a separate post-conviction sentencing hearing,
combined with guidelines designed to funnel the judge's or jury's decision
in a certain direction, based upon the circumstances surrounding the criminal
act.45 In 1976, the Court was asked to determine the constitutionality of the
revised capital punishment statutes. 46 Therefore, the Supreme Court granted
certiorari in five cases, originating in North Carolina, Louisiana, Georgia,
Florida, and Texas.4 7 Of the five state statutes analyzed by the Court, North
Carolina and Louisiana mandated capital punishment upon conviction for
murder, whereas Georgia, Florida, and Texas mandated a separate post-conviction sentencing hearing.48 Ultimately, the Court found North Carolina's
and Louisiana's capital punishment statutes unconstitutional, on the same
grounds as Furman. However, the Court held that the death penalty
statutes of Georgia, Florida, and Texas were constitutional, 50 because the
guidelines put into place by those state legislatures reduced the "'substantial
42. Furman, 408 U.S. at 248 n.11 (White, J., concurring) (quoting McGautha v.
California, 402 U.S. 183, 248-49 (1971)) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
43. Howe, supra note 34, at 405 n.241 (citing John W. Poulos, The Supreme Court,
Capital Punishment and the Substantive Criminal Law: The Rise and Fall of Mandatory
CapitalPunishment, 28 ARIZ. L. REV. 143, 226 (1986)).
44. Id. at 405-06.
45. Id. at 406.
46. Id.
47. Id.
48. Howe, supra note 34, at 406.
49. Id. at 406-07 (citing Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280 (1976) (rejecting
the North Carolina system); Roberts v. Louisiana, 428 U.S. 325 (1976) (rejecting the
Louisiana statute)).
50. Id. at 406 (citing to Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976) (upholding the
Georgia system); Proffitt v. Florida, 428 U.S. 242 (1976) (upholding the Florida scheme);
Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262 (1976) (upholding the Texas system)).
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risk' that the capital sanction would be imposed 'in an arbitrary and
capricious manner."' 5' Hence, the Court effectively gave notice to state
legislatures that it was necessary for any sentencing scheme to somehow
narrow the number of defendants eligible for the death penalty.
IH. SURVEY OF STATE DEATH PENALTY STATUTES
States have created three different procedural ways to impose capital
punishment. The first procedural design mandates that a single judge, or
panel of judges, independently make a finding and weighing of aggravating
or mitigating circumstances, before imposing a sentence.
The second
procedural scheme requires a judge to make a finding and weighing of any
aggravating or mitigating circumstances after the jury has made a sentencing
recommendation to the judge based upon their finding of aggravating or
mitigating circumstances.53 The third procedural style calls for a jury to
determine the sentence based upon their finding and weighing of aggravating
and mitigating circumstances. 5 In the third procedural style, the judge does
not make the final decision as he or she would in the first two procedural
styles.5 5
A. State Statutes That Require the Judge to Impose a Sentence,
Independent of a Jury
Five states require a judge, without any recommendation from the jury,
to impose a sentence in capital cases.56 Of these five states, Arizona,57
51.

Id. at 406 (quoting Gregg, 428 U.S. at 188 (plurality opinion)).
ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-703 (West 2001 & Supp. 2001); COLO. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 16-11-103 (West 2001); IDAHO CODE § 19-2515 (Michie 1997 & Supp. 2002); MONT.
CODE ANN. § 46-18-301 (2001); NEB. REV. STAT. § 29-2520 (1995). This process was
declared unconstitutional in Ring v. Arizona, 122 S. Ct. 2428 (2002). See infra Part V for
more details on Ring.
53. ALA. CODE § 13A-5-45 (1994); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 4209 (1995); FLA.
STAT. § 921.141 (2001).
54. See ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-4-603 (Michie 1997).
55. See Liptak, supra note 11.
56. ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-703 (West 2001 & Supp. 2001); COLO. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 16-11-103 (West 2001); IDAHO CODE § 19-2515 (Michie 1997 & Supp. 2002); MONT.
CODE ANN. § 46-18-301 (2001); NEB. REV. STAT. § 29-2520 (1995). This process was
declared unconstitutional in Ring, 122 S. Ct. at 2449. See infra Part V for more details on
Ring.
57. ARiz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-703 (West 2001 & Supp. 2001).
The Arizona statute states in relevant part:

52.
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A. A person guilty of first degree murder as defined in § 13-1105 shall suffer death or
imprisonment in the custody of the state department of corrections for life ....
C. When a defendant is found guilty of or pleads guilty to first degree murder as
defined in § 13-1105, the judge who presided at the trial or before whom the guilty
plea was entered, or any other judge in the event of the death, resignation, incapacity or
disqualification of the judge who presided at the trial or before whom the guilty plea
was entered, shall conduct a separate sentencing hearing to determine the existence or
nonexistence of the circumstances included in subsections G and H of this section, for
the purpose of determining the sentence to be imposed. The hearing shall be conducted before the court alone. The court alone shall make all factual determinations
required by this section or the constitution of the United States or this state.
D. Any information relevant to any mitigating circumstances included in subsection H
of this section may be presented by either the prosecution or the defendant, regardless
of its admissibility under the rules governing admission of evidence at criminal trials,
but the admissibility of information relevant to any of the aggravating circumstances
set forth in subsection G of this section shall be governed by the rules of evidence at
criminal trials....
E. The court shall return a special verdict setting forth its findings as to the existence
or nonexistence of each of the circumstances set forth in subsection G of this section
and as to the existence of any of the circumstances included in subsection H of this
section. In evaluating the mitigating circumstances, the courts shall consider any
information presented by the victim regarding the murdered person and the impact of
the murder on the victim and other family members. The court shall not consider any
recommendation made by the victim regarding the sentence to be imposed.
F. In determining whether to impose a sentence of death or life imprisonment, the
court shall take into account the aggravating and mitigating circumstances included in
subsections G and H of this section and shall impose a sentence of death if the court
finds one or more of the aggravating circumstances enumerated in subsection G of this
section and that there are no mitigating circumstances sufficiently substantial to call
for leniency.
G. The court shall consider the following aggravating circumstances:
1. The defendant has been convicted of another offense in the United States for which
under Arizona law a sentence of life imprisonment or death was imposable.
2. The defendant was previously convicted of a serious offense, whether preparatory or
completed.
3. In the commission of the offense the defendant knowingly created a grave risk of
death to another person or persons in addition to the person murdered during the
commission of the offense.
4. The defendant procured the commission of the offense by payment, or promise of
payment, of anything of pecuniary value.
5. The defendant committed the offense as consideration for the receipt, or in expectation of the receipt, of anything of pecuniary value.
6. The defendant committed the offense in an especially heinous, cruel or depraved
manner.
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Idaho, 58 and Montana' 9 call for a single judfe to impose the penalty, while
the two others, Nebraska and Colorado, require a panel of judges to
impose the sentence. For all five states, the judge is burdened with the task
of determining if any aggravating or mitigating circumstances were present
7. The defendant committed the offense while in the custody of or on authorized or
unauthorized release from the state department of corrections, a law enforcement
agency or a county or city jail.
8. The defendant has been convicted of one or more other homicides, as defined in §
13-1101, which were committed during the commission of the offense.
9. The defendant was an adult at the time the offense was committed or was tried as an
adult and the murdered person was under fifteen years of age or was seventy years of
age or older.
10. The murdered person was an on duty peace officer who was killed in the course of
performing his official duties and the defendant knew, or should have known, that the
murdered person was a peace officer.
H. The court shall consider as mitigating circumstances any factors proffered by the
defendant or the state which are relevant in determining whether to impose a sentence
less than death, including any aspect of the defendant's character, propensities or
record and any of the circumstances of the offense, including but not limited to the
following:
1. The defendant's capacity to appreciate the wrongfulness of his conduct or to conform his conduct to the requirements of law was significantly impaired, but not so
impaired as to constitute a defense to prosecution.
2. The defendant was under unusual and substantial duress, although not such as to
constitute a defense to prosecution.
3. The defendant was legally accountable for the conduct of another under the provisions of § 13-303, but his participation was relatively minor, although not so minor as
to constitute a defense to prosecution.
4. The defendant could not reasonably have foreseen that his conduct in the course of
the commission of the offense for which the defendant was convicted would cause, or
would create a grave risk of causing, death to another person.
5. The defendant's age.

Id.
58. IDAHO CODE ANN. § 19-2515 (Michie 1997 & Supp. 2002). This section of the
Idaho statute is similar to the process provided in section 13-703 of the Arizona statute,
including a listing of aggravating and mitigating factors. Id.
59. MONT. CODE ANN. § 46-18-301, -303, -304 (2001). These three Montana statute
sections combine to form a process similar to section 13-703 of the Arizona statute, including
a listing of aggravating and mitigating factors. Id.
60. NEB. REV. STAT. § 29-2520 (1995). The Nebraska statute is similar to section 13703 of the Arizona statute, except Nebraska uses a panel of judges to determine the
appropriate sentence in a capital case. Id.
61. COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 16-11-103 (West 2001). The Colorado statute is very
similar to section 13-703 of the Arizona statute, except that Colorado mandates that a "panel
of three judges" conduct the sentencing hearing. Id.
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during the crime. 62 If the judge determines that such circumstances existed,
then the judge must weigh those circumstances to determine if the
aggravating circumstances outweigh the mitigating. 63 If they do, then the
judge can impose death; however, if the mitigating circumstances 64outweigh
the aggravating circumstances, then the judge cannot impose death.
B. State Statutes That Require the Jury to Make a Sentencing
Recommendation, but Mandate the Judge Make the FinalSentence
Determination
Three states require a judge to impose a sentence in capital cases after
first receiving a sentencing recommendation by a jury in a separate
and
Those states include Florida,6 ' Alabama,
sentencing hearing.
a
guilty
verdict,
a
jury
renders
Delaware. •In these three states, after
•
• 68
"
"the
trial moves on to a separate sentencing hearing. In the sentencing hearing,
the jur determines if any aggravating circumstances existed during the
crime.
If the answer is no, the jury then advises that life imprisonment
should be imposed.7 ° However, if an aggravating circumstance is found,
then the jury determines if any mitigating circumstances are present to offset
the aggravating circumstances. 7 1 The jury weighs all possible factors and

62. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-703 (West 2001 & Supp. 2001); COLO. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 16-11-103 (West 2001); IDAHO CODE § 19-2515 (Michie 1997 & Supp. 2002); MONT.
CODE ANN. § 46-18-301 (2001); NEB. REV. STAT. § 29-2520 (1995).
63. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-703 (West 2001 & Supp. 2001); COLO. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 16-11-103 (West 2001); IDAHO CODE § 19-2515 (Michie 1997 & Supp. 2002); MONT.
CODE ANN. § 46-18-301 (2001); NEB. REV. STAT. § 29-2520 (1995).
64. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-703 (West 2001 & Supp. 2001); COLO. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 16-11-103 (West 2001); IDAHO CODE § 19-2515 (Michie 1997 & Supp. 2002); MONT.
CODE ANN. § 46-18-301 (2001); NEB. REV. STAT. § 29-2520 (1995).
65. FLA. STAT. § 921.141(3) (2001).
66. ALA. CODE § 13A-5-46(a) (1994).
67. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 4209(d) (1995).
68. ALA. CODE § 13A-5-46(a) (1994); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 4209(b) (1995); FLA.
STAT. § 921.141(1) (2001).
69. ALA. CODE § 13A-5-46(e)(1) (1994); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 4209(c)(3)(a)(1)
(1995); FLA. STAT. § 921.141(2)(a) (2001).
70. ALA. CODE § 13A-5-46(e)(1) (1994); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 4209(d) (1995);
FLA. STAT. § 921.141(3)(a) (2001).
71. ALA. CODE § 13A-5-46(e)(2) (1994); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 4209(c)(3)(a)(2)
(1995); FLA. STAT. § 921.141(2)(b) (2001).
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renders a recommendation to the judge.12 Once the recommendation has
been made, the judge completes the same process as the jury, and renders his
or her decision." Even though the judge often times sides with the jury, he
Thus, while the jury has input, the judge
or she is not required to do So.
makes the ultimate decision, as is done in Arizona, Colorado, Idaho,
Montana, and Nebraska.
C. State Statutes that Require the Jury to Determine a Sentence
The remaining twenty-eight states that allow caVital punishment require
the jury to impose the sentence, and not the judge. The statutes in these
states are similar to those in states where the judge makes the decision after
the jury rendered their sentencing recommendation. However, in these
states, the jury renders a final decision, and not only a recommendation. 76
For example, section 5-4-604 of the Arkansas Code provides a list of
aggravating factors, 7 and section 5-4-605 of the Arkansas Code provides a
list of possible mitigating factors. 78 Both lists are very similar to those
factors found in the Florida Statutes discussed above. In states such as
Arkansas, even though relatively the same aggravating and mitigating factors
are weighed, the jury does this service exclusively.
LV. CASES THAT CREATED THE CONFLICT LEADING TO RING V. ARIZONA
A.

Walton v. Arizona

In the case of Walton v. Arizona,79 Walton was convicted of first-degree
murder in Arizona for the shooting death of one Thomas Powell.80 During
72. ALA. CODE § 13A-5-46(e) (1994); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 4209(c)(3)(b)
(1995); FLA. STAT. § 921.141(2)(c) (2001).
73. ALA. CODE § 13A-5-46(a) (1994); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 4209(d) (1995); FLA.
STAT. § 921.141(3) (2001).
74. See Susan Clary, Appeal: Don't Put 2 to Death, ORLANDO SENTINEL, July 6,
2002, at B 1.
75. See Liptak, supra note 11; DEATH PENALTY INFO. CTR., NUMBER OF EXECUTIONS
BY STATE SINCE 1976, at http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/dpicreg.html (last visited Apr. 10,

2003).
76.
77.

See Liptak, supra note 11.

78.

ARK. CODE ANN.

79.
80.

497 U.S. 639 (1990).
id. at 644-45.

ARK. CODE ANN.
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the separate sentencing hearing, as was mandated by Arizona law, 8' the
judge found two aggravating factors.82 The first aggravating factor was that
the murder was committed "in an especially heinous, and cruel or depraved
manner, ' 83 because Walton shot Thomas as Walton held Thomas to the
ground with his foot on Thomas' neck.84 This act was done after Walton and
his two accomplices spoke in front of Thomas about their plan for disposing
him. 85 The second aggravating
factor was that the murder was "committed
,,86
for pecuniary gain.
This finding was made because Walton and his
accomplices murdered Powell in an effort to steal his car.87
In his defense, Walton argued several potential mitigating factors.8 8
However, the judge found that the aggravating factors outweighed the
mitigating; therefore, the judge sentenced Walton to death. 89
The issue before the United States Supreme Court was whether the
Arizona law, which allowed a judge to determine the existence of aggravating and mitigating circumstances in a separate sentencing hearing, was
constitutional, or did it violate the defendant's Sixth Amendment right to a
jury trial? 90 The Court held that the Arizona capital punishment statute was
constitutional, because the aggravating circumstances were not elements of
the crime, which the jury was required to find. 91 Rather, the aggravating
circumstances were merely "sentencing considerations. 9 2
In justification of its holding, the Court stated that the rule governing a
fact finder in a criminal trialn is that •the jury
93 must decide questions of fact, as
it pertains to the elements of the crime. This means that a jury must make
the factual findings to determine guilt or acquittal.94 The Court went on to
say that this rule did not affect the Arizona statute, because the Arizona
statute allowed the jury to make the findings of fact regarding the elements,

81.
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.
90.
91.
92.
93.
94.

ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-703(c) (West 1989).
Walton, 497 U.S. at 645.
ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-703(g)(6) (West 1989).
Walton, 497 U.S. at 644.
Id.
Id. at 645; see ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-703(g)(5) (West 2001 & Supp. 2001).
Walton, 497 U.S. at 644.
Id at 645.
Id.
Id. at 642.
Id. at 649.
Walton, 497 U.S. at 648.
Id.
Id.
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and thus, the jury determined guilt or acquittal.9 5 Moreover, during the
sentencing portion of the trial, after the jury judged the elements, the judge
was able to examine factors as "considerations," not elements, and choose
96
In making this determination, the
between death or life imprisonment.
Court relied on Hildwin v. Florida as precedent.97 Walton attempted to
distinguish the Florida
statute
•
•98 by •claiming that it used aggravating factors as
considerations, and the Arizona statute used them as elements•. The Court
addressed Walton's argument by citing Poland v. Arizona,99 where the Court
stated that "[a]ggravating circumstances are not separate penalties or
offenses, but are 'standards to guide the making of [the] choice' between the
alternative verdicts of death and life imprisonment."'' 00 Thus, under the
Arizona statute, the judge's findings did not result in a conviction or
acquittal, and therefore, were not findings of elements; rather, they were
sentencing considerations. 10
B.

Apprendi v. New Jersey

Only ten years after Walton, the United States Supreme Court was,
again, faced with the issue of whether a judge could make a finding of fact
that increased the defendant's sentence. That issue was raised in Apprendi v.
New Jersey.'0 2 In Apprendi, the defendant was charged with "fir[ing] several
.22- caliber bullets into the home of an African-American family that had
recently moved into a previously all-white neighborhood."' 3 At the hearing,
the "grand jury returned a 23-count indictment. '04 The defendant took "a
plea agreement, pursuant to which [the defendant] pleaded guilty to two
counts of second-degree possession of a firearm," and one count of third-

95. Id.
96. Id.
97. 490 U.S. 638, 639-40 (1989). In Hildwin, the Court upheld the decision of
Spaziano v. Florida, 468 U.S. 447 (1984), and found the Florida statute at issue was
constitutional because "the Sixth Amendment does not require that the specific findings
authorizing the imposition of the sentence of death be made by the jury." Hildwin, 490 U.S.
at 640-41.
98. Walton, 497 U.S. at 648.
99. 476 U.S. 147 (1986).
100. Id. at 156.

101. Walton, 497 U.S. at 648.
102. 530 U.S. 466 (2000).
103. Id. at 469.
104. Id.
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degree unlawful possession of an antipersonnel bomb.' 05 "[T]he prosecutor
dismissed the [remaining] 20 counts." 0 6 "As part of the plea agreement...
the State reserved the right to request the court to impose a higher 'enhanced07
sentence"' on one of the counts, on the basis that it was racially motivated.
Also, as part of the agreement, the defendant reserved the right to challenge
the constitutionality of the hate crime sentencing enhancement.l18
The trial judge accepted the guilty pleas, and upon the prosecutor's
motion for an extended sentence, held an evidentiary hearing.'0 The judge
"concluded that the evidence supported a finding 'that the crime was
motivated by racial bias.""'o Having made this finding "by a preponderance
of the evidence," • the judge
sentenced
the defendant to twelve years2
•
.111
The statutory maximum for this crime was ten years.1
imprisonment.
Therefore, the sentence imposed by the trial judge exceeded the statutory
maximum by two years. "
The defendant appealed, stating the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment required that the finding of bias be "proved to a jury
beyond a reasonable doubt."' ' 14 The appellate court affirmed the decision
because the "'hate crime enhancement' [was] a 'sentencing factor,' rather
than an element of an underlying offense, and that decision was within the
State's established power to define the elements of its crimes."' 15 Moreover,
the appellate court stated that the factor in dispute was "motive," which is a
"traditional 'sentencing factor,' one not considered an 'essential element.'"' 16

Upon reaching the United States Supreme Court, the issue was whether
the defendant "had a constitutional right to have a jury find such [racial] bias
on the basis of proof beyond a reasonable doubt.""' 7 The Court held that a

105. Id. at 469-70.
106. Id. at 470.
107. Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 470.
108. Id.
109. Id.
110. Id. at 471 (quoting App. to Pet. for Cert. 143a, State v. Apprendi, 698 A.2d 1265
(N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1997)).
111. Id.
112. Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 470.
113. Id. at 471.
114. Id.
115. Id. (citing State v. Apprendi, 698 A.2d 1265 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1997)).
116. Id.
117. Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 475-76.
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defendant does have that right.'
States,' 19 and said that:

8

The Court referenced to Jones v. United

under the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment and the notice and jury trial guarantees of the Sixth Amendment, any fact
(other than prior conviction) that increases the maximum penalty
for a crime must be charged in an indictment, submitted to a jury,
and proven beyond a reasonable doubt. 20
Moreover, the Court said the Fourteenth Amendment deserved
the same
2
treatment, and thus, extended the rule to include state courts.' 1
In the Court's analysis of the issue, it stated that nothing throughout
history indicates that it is "impermissible for judges to exercise discretion;"
however, that discretion must be made "within the range prescribed by
statute."'2
To support this proposition, the Court looked at McMillan v.
Pennsylvania,123 where it decided that mandatory minimum sentences were
constitutional because the mandatory minimum was within the range
prescribed by the statute.124 The Court also stated in regard to McMillan,
that as long as the judge "neither alters the maximum penalty for the crime
committed nor creates a separate offense calling for a separate penalty," then
the judge may change the sentence.125
The Court then examined the sole exception to the rule from McMillan.
The exception, according to Almendarez-Torres
v. United States,126 is a
• . 127
This exception was restated in Jones
defendant's prior felony conviction.
as follows: "[o]ther than the fact of a prior conviction, any fact that
increases the penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed statutory maximum
' 2
must be submitted to a jury, and proved beyond a reasonable doubt." 1
Thus, the exception would have applied in Apprendi if the defendant had a
prior felony conviction. However, a prior felony conviction was never

118. Id. at 476.

119. 526 U.S. 227 (1999).
120. Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 476 (quoting Jones, 526 U.S. at 243).

121. Id. at 476.
122. Id. at 481 (emphasis in original).

123. 477 U.S. 79 (1986).
124. Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 485-486 (citing McMillan, 477 U.S. at 86-88).
125. Id. at 486 (citing McMillan, 477 U.S. at 86-88).

126. 523 U.S. 224 (1998).
127. Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 488 (citing Almendarez-Torres, 523 U.S. at 230).
128. Id. at 490 (quoting Jones, 526 U.S.at 243).
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introduced; 129 and therefore, the rule from McMillan applied in Apprendi,
leaving the judge without the ability to increase the defendant's sentence
beyond the statutory maximum.
The State presented two arguments in opposition to the Court's
application of the McMillan rule in this case. 30 The Court began with the
State's argument that the "finding of biased purpose is not an 'element"' of
the crime; rather, it is a "sentencing factor."'' 3 The Court disagreed with
New Jersey on this point. 132 The Court stated that the statute required the
judge to make a determination of "whether the defendant possessed, at the
time he committed the subject act, a 'purpose to intimidate' on account
of... race." 133 Thus, the statute required the determination "of the
defendant's state of mind," which is commonly known as mens rea.'34 The
Court went on to say that "[tihe defendant's intent in committing the crime is
perhaps as close as one might hope to come to a core criminal offense
'element.' 1 35 The Court concluded their analysis of this argument by saying
the "relevant inquiry is one not of form, but of effect-does the required
finding expose the defendant
to a greater punishment than that authorized by
136
the jury's guilty verdict?"'
The State's second argument was that the exception created by
Almendarez-Torres allowed the judge to impose a sentence beyond the
maximum provided by the substantive statute under which a defendant is
charged."'
This meant that a sentence could be increased above the
maximum if a statute allowed a judge to do so. The Court distinguished
Almendarez-Torres from Apprendi by stating that recidivism had nothing to
do with the New Jersey statute. 138 Instead, "New Jersey's biased purpose
inquiry goes precisely to what happened in the 'commission of the
offense.
Thus, the Court was allowing the objective exception of a prior
felony conviction to remain, but eliminating the allowance of any subjective
exceptions found by a judge.

129. Id. at 466.
130. Id. at 492.

131. Id.
132. Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 492.
133. Id.

134. Id. (citing
135.
136.
137.
138.
139.

BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1137 (rev. 4th ed. 1968)).
Id. at 493.
Id. at 494.
Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 492.
Id. at 496.
Id. (quoting Almendarez-Torres, 523 U.S. at 244).
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In the final section of the majority opinion it stated that Walton
40
remained good law, and furthermore, Apprendi did not overrule Walton.'
However, as Justice O'Connor pointed out in her dissent, Walton and
Apprendi could not coexist.' 4 ' Also in Justice O'Connor's dissent, she
wrote, regarding the conflict between Apprendi and Walton, that "the most
significant impact of the Court's decision will be a practical one-its
unsettling effect on sentencing conducted under current federal and state
determinate-sentencing schemes."' 42 Justice O'Connor felt that "the
Court's decision threaten[s] to unleash a flood of petitions by convicted
defendants seeking to invalidate their sentences in whole or in part on the
authority of the Court's decision [in Apprendi].'
Thus, Justice O'Connor
predicted the procedural problems that were certain to ensue because of the
majority's decision.
V.

RING V. ARIZONA

As Justice O'Connor predicted,' 44 within two years of its decision, the
Supreme Court was faced with an appeal based on Apprendi. In 2002, the
Court granted certiorari in the case of Ring v. Arizona. 145 In Ring, the
defendant, Timothy Stuart Ring, was charged with murder during the
robbery of an armored van with two other accomplices. 46 At trial, "[t]he
jury deadlocked on premeditated murder"' 47 because "'the evidence admitted
at trial failed to prove, beyond a reasonable doubt, that [Ring] was a major
participant in the armed robbery or that he actually murdered Magoch, [the
victim]. ' ' ' 148 However, the jury did return
a verdict of first-degree felony
49

murder for Ring's participation in the act. 1
Between the guilt phase of the trial and the sentencing hearing, James
Greenham, Ring's accomplice, came forward after accepting a plea
agreement, 50 and testifyed that Ring planned "the robbery for several weeks
before it occurred," and "[took] the role as leader because he laid out all the
140. Id. at 496-97.
141.
142.
143.
144.
145.
146.
147.
148.
149.
150.

See id. at 538 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 550 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
Id. at 551 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
See id. (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
122 S. Ct. 2428 (2002).
Id. at 2432-33.
Id. at 2433.
Id. at 2434 (quoting State v. Ring, 25 P.3d 1139, 1152 (Ariz. 2001)).
Id. at 2433.
Ring, 122 S. Ct. at 2435.
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tactics."' 5 1 Ring's accomplice went on to say that "Ring shot [Magoch] with
a rifle equipped with a homemade silencer."'' 52 Lastly, Greenham stated that
while the three "were dividing up the money, Ring upbraided him and
Ferguson for 'forgetting to congratulate [Ring] on [his] shot."" 53
At the sentencing hearing, the judge cited Greenham's testimony before
' 54
concluding "that Ring '[was] the one who shot and killed Mr. Magoch. ,"1
Based on this conclusion, the judge "turned to the determination of
aggravating and mitigating circumstances." 5 5 The judge "found two
aggravating factors."' 1 6 First, "that Ring committed the offense in
expectation of receiving something of 'pecuniary value,' as described in
§ 13-703; '[tlaking the cash from the armored car was the motive and reason
for Mr. Magoch's murder and not just the result."",157 "Second, the judge
found that the offense was committed 'in an especially heinous, cruel or
depraved manner."",15 8 To mitigate the crime,
the judge found only one
' 59
"factor[,] Ring's 'minimal' criminal record."'
On appeal, Ring challenged the constitutionality of the Arizona statute
under Apprendi, but the Supreme Court of Arizona upheld the sentence
' 60
because the majority in Apprendi stated "that Walton remained good law."'
However, the Supreme Court of Arizona went on to confirm that Justice
O'Connor's dissent in Apprendi was correct when she stated that "'[w]ithout
that critical finding [of an aggravating factor], the maximum sentence to
which the defendant [was] exposed is life imprisonment, and not the death
penalty."",16' Therefore, the Supreme Court of Arizona agreed with Justice
O'Connor's interpretation of the Arizona statute.1 62 However, "the Arizona
court understood that it was bound by the Supremacy Clause to apply
Walton, which [the] Court had not overruled. It therefore rejected Ring's
constitutional
attack on the State's capital murder judicial sentencing
163
system."'
151.
152.
153.
154.
155.
156.
157.
158.
159.
160.
161.
162.
163.

Id. at 2435 (quoting testimony of Greenham at sentencing hearing).
Id.
Id.
Id (quoting App. to Pet. for Cert. 47a, State v. Ring, 25 P.3d 1139 (Ariz. 2001)).
Ring, 122 S. Ct. at 2435.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Ring, 122 S. Ct. at 2436.
Id. (quoting State v. Ring, 25 P.3d 1139, 1151 (Ariz. 2001)).
See id.
Id. (quoting Ring, 25 P.3d at 1152).
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On appeal to the United States Supreme Court, the issue was "whether
an aggravating factor may be found by the judge, as Arizona law specifies,
or whether the Sixth Amendment's jury trial guarantee, made applicable to
the States by the Fourteenth Amendment, requires that the aggravating factor
determination be entrusted to the jury[?]" 64 The Court found "that Walton
and Apprendi [were] irreconcilable." 165 Therefore, the Court overruled
Walton, and held that a jury must make such a determination.66
The Court began its analysis of this issue by discussing the cases which
led to this point, Walton and Apprendi.167 The Court stated that in the
Walton holding, the aggravating and mitigating factors were seen "as
'sentencing considerations.""' 68 However, in Apprendi, the Court stated that
a judge could not increase "a defendant's authorized punishment contingent
on the finding of a fact, that fact-no matter how the State labels it-must
be found by a jury beyond a reasonable doubt."' 169 Furthermore, the Court
restated its reconciliation of the two cases in Apprendi by finding that "[t]he
key distinction.., was that a conviction of first-degree murder in Arizona
carried a maximum sentence of death."' 170 However, based upon the
Supreme Court of Arizona's opinion confirming Justice O'Connor's observation regarding the Arizona statute, it appeared that the maximum sentence
was life imprisonment before the judge made a determination of aggravating
or mitigating factors.
Arizona's first argument was the same argument it made in Walton, that
Ring was sentenced within the range of the law.17 1 However, unlike in
Walton, the Court stated that the state's argument "overlook[ed] Apprendi's
instruction that 'the relevant inquiry is one not of form, but of effect.' In
effect 'the required finding [of an aggravated circumstance] expose[d]
[Ring] to a greater punishment than that authorized by the jury's guilty
verdict.'" 172
Arizona's second argument was also based on Walton, which was the
distinction "between elements of an offense and sentencing factors."' 173 The
Court rejected that argument as well, stating that "[a]s to elevation of the
164.
165.
166.
167.
168.
169.
170.
171.
172.
173.

Id. at 2437.
Ring, 122 S. Ct. at 2443.
Id.
Id. at 2437-40.
Id. at 2437 (quoting Walton v. Arizona, 497 U.S. 639, 648 (1990)).
Id. at 2439 (quoting Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 482-83 (1990)).
Ring, 122 S. Ct. at 2440.
Id.
Id. (quoting Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 494).
Id. at 2441.
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maximum punishment... Apprendi repeatedly instructs in that context that
the characterization of a fact or circumstance as an 'element' or a 'sentencing factor' is not determinative of the question 'who decides,' judge or
jury. ' 74 Thus, the Court appeared to see no difference between an
"element" and a "sentencing factor" if the judge's decision increased the
defendant's sentence beyond the maximum allowed under the statute.
Arizona's third argument was that "'[dleath [was] different,"' and
hence, a judge should make the decision to impose death, rather than a
jury. 175 Arizona based this theory on Furman, which required states to
impose factors to minimize the risk of arbitrary rulings of death sentences.176
Aside from the Eighth Amendment argument, which the Furman Court
relied upon, "Arizona present[ed] 'no specific reason for excepting capital
defendants from the constitutional protections ...extend[ed] to defendants
generally, and none is readily apparent."", 177 Moreover, the Court went on to
say that a state legislature could not create laws that restrict one's constitutional protection in order to preserve another.178 However, Arizona
continued that argument by stating "that judicial authority over the finding of
aggravating factors may ...be a better way to guarantee against the arbitrary
imposition of the death penalty."1 79 The Court responded to this version of
the argument by stating that "[t]he Sixth Amendment jury trial right,
however, does not turn on the relative rationality, fairness, or efficiency of
potential factfinders."'' 80 The Court concluded its analysis of this argument
by stating that the majority of states that impose the death penalty do so
without compromising the Eighth Amendment.
In closing, Justice Ginsburg clarified the ruling in this case by stating
"[b]ecause Arizona's enumerated aggravating factors operate as 'the
functional equivalent of an element of a greater
offense,' the Sixth
82
Amendment requires that they be found by a j ury."1
Justice O'Connor, again dissenting as she did in Apprendi, stated that
she would have chosen to overrule Apprendi, not Walton.' 83 Justice
O'Connor went on to say that "Apprendi was a serious mistake," and that
174.
175.
176.
177.
178.
179.
180.
181.
182.
183.

Ring, 122 S. Ct. at 2441 (citing Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 492).
Id.
Id. at 2441-42 (citing Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 522-23).
Id. at 2442 (quoting Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 539).
See id.
Ring, 122 S. Ct. at 2442.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 2443 (quoting Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 494 n.19).
Id. at 2448 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
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"[t]he Court ha[d] failed, both in Apprendi and in the [Ring] decision.., to
'offer any meaningful justification for deviating from years of cases both
suggesting and holding that application of the increase in the 'maximum
penalty rule' is not required by the Constitution."", 184 Furthermore, Justice
O'Connor stated that the "destabilizing effect" that Apprendi had on the
criminal justice system is disastrous. 85 She went on to opine that "[it is
simply beyond dispute that Apprendi threw countless criminal sentences into
doubt and thereby caused an enormous increase in the workload of an
already overburdened judiciary."' 186 Justice O'Connor concluded by
identifying the four state capital sentencing schemes, other than Arizona's,
that Ring effectively declared unconstitutional:
Colorado's, Idaho's,
Montana's, and Nebraska's; and further identified four other states whose
capital sentencing schemes
are now in doubt: Alabama's, Delaware's,
87
Indiana's.
and
Florida's,
VI. LEGAL RAMIFICATIONS OF RING
A.

Short-Term

Due to the Court's decision in Ring, states will be required to decide
three very important issues. First, the states must decide whether their
state's death penalty statute was affected by the ruling. Second, if their
statute was affected, whether death row inmates in their state will receive
new sentencing trials or have their sentences commuted to life imprisonment, as all death penalty sentences were after the landmark decision of
Furman?188 Finally, if their statute was affected, how will they revise their
death penalty statutes?

184. Ring, 122 S. Ct. at 2449 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (quoting Apprendi, 530 U.S.
at 539).
185. Id. at 2449 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
186. Id.
187. Id. at 2449-50 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). Indiana's new capital sentencing
scheme, which requires a unanimous jury to render the final sentencing decision, went into

effect

on

July

1,

2002.

DEATH

PENALTY

INFO.

CTR.;

INDIANA,

at

http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/indiana.html (last visited Mar. 22, 2003). Thus, while
Indiana's new capital sentencing scheme appears to be safe from constitutional challenges,
current death row inmates sentenced under the old scheme may have a constitutional claim.
See Death Sentence Laws in Five States Overturned, (June 24, 2002), at
http://www.msnbc.com/news/771488.asp?pne=msn.
188. See Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972).
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The Ring decision makes the death penalty statutes in Arizona, Idaho,
Montana, Colorado, and Nebraska unconstitutional, 189 because a judge
makes the sole determination in those states of aggravating or mitigating
factors. Thus, the judge is essentially making factual findings to increase the
sentence beyond what the jury finding of guilt deemed appropriate.
Therefore, those state statutes are in direct violation of Ring, and thus,
unconstitutional.
The fate of Alabama, Delaware, and Florida's 190 death penalty statutes
are not so easily determined. In those states, the judge renders a final order
after the jury makes a sentencing recommendation to the judge.' 9' This
process is misleading because one might think that the jury's extended role
makes the statute constitutional. This procedure, however, is unconstitutional. First, since the judge is not required to sentence the defendant in
accordance with the jury's verdict, the judge, in essence, possesses the same
power in these three states as the judge possessed in Arizona. Second, as
Justice Ginsburg said in Ring, the test is in effect, not form.' 92 Therefore, if
you look at the effect of these three state statutes on a defendant's sentencing
hearing, instead of the form, it becomes clearer that the jury's recommendation means little or nothing, and the judge makes the necessary factual
finding of any aggravating or mitigating circumstances. Thus, when
Apprendi is applied to the state death penalty statutes of Alabama, Delaware,
and Florida, it appears they will be declared unconstitutional, even though
they have been declared constitutional in the past, 93 as was Walton.' 94
All other states possessing the death penalty currently require the jury
to sentence the defendant in capital cases.
Meaning, the judge plays no
role in determining whether aggravating or mitigating circumstances are
present. Therefore, those statutes should be unaffected by Ring.
For the eight states mentioned as having unconstitutional death penalty
statutes, their legislatures must decide what procedure to put into place for
the death row inmates who were sentenced under those unconstitutional
189. Liptak, supra note 11.
190. The Supreme Court of Florida has already stayed the executions of two death row
inmates until it can decide how Ring effects, if at all, Florida's death penalty statute. Phil
Long, FloridaSupreme Court Halts Two Executions, MIAMI HERALD, July 9, 2002, at A2. The
Supreme Court of Florida's decision is expected in the Fall of 2002. Id.
191. Liptak, supranote 11.
192. Ring, 122 S. Ct. at 2440.
193. Hildwin v. Florida, 490 U.S. 638 (1989); Spaziano v. Florida, 468 U.S. 447
(1984).
194. Walton v. Arizona, 497 497 U.S. 639 (1990).
195. Liptak, supra note 11.
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sentencing procedures. For example, after Furman was decided, all inmates
on death row had their sentences commuted to life. 196 The states at that time
did not have the aggravating or mitigating circumstances in place to offer as
sentencing guidelines for juries and judges. Therefore, commuting the
sentences appears to have been the only viable choice. However, at this
moment, other state death penalty statutes can work as a model for a
constitutional statute, and new sentencing hearings are more possible. Thus,
it is just a matter of whether the states are willing to spend the money and
time to provide new sentencing hearings.
Regardless of whether the affected states create a new death penalty
statute for new sentencing hearings, or the states choose to commute the
death sentences to life imprisonment, they must still decide how to create a
new capital punishment statute for future offenders. Three obvious options
exist. First, the affected states can model their statutes after a state statute
that has not been declared unconstitutional, and thus, require a jury to make
the final sentencing decision. Second, an affected state can attempt to
cleverly structure a statute where the judge still has some input in the
process, in hopes that the Supreme Court will find the new statute constitutional. One thing is certain, a state cannot get around Ring by making death
the mandatory sentence, and allowing the judge to lower the sentence to life
in prison, because this idea was struck down in Furman.'97 Finally, the state
can abolish the death penalty. While this may be possible in some of the
affected states, those such as Florida may find this option politically
impossible since it executes such a high number of prisoners,198 and a large
majority of the public supports its use.

196. See John W. Poulos, The Supreme Court, CapitalPunishmentand the Substantive
Criminal Law: The Rise and Fall of Mandatory CapitalPunishment, 28 ARIz. L. REV. 143,

145 (1986).
197. Howe, supra note 34, at 406 (citing Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280
(1976) (rejecting the North Carolina system)); Roberts v. Louisiana, 428 U.S. 325 (1976)
(rejecting the Louisiana statute)).
198. Florida has ranked fourth on the list for most executions since 1976. DEATH
PENALTY INFO.
CTR.,
NUMBER OF EXECUTIONS
BY STATE SINCE
1976, at
http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/dpicreg.html (last visited Apr. 10, 2003).
199. Staff, Opinion Editorial, THE NEwS-PRESS (Ft. Myers, Fla.), Jan. 18, 2003, at 8B.
"Support for the death penalty remains high [in Florida] at about 70 percent .... " Id.
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Long-Term

The long-term effects of Ring are fewer in number, but possibly greater
in value. 200 Ring might not bring an end to the death penalty, but it could
decrease the number of defendants sentenced to death. According to Ronald
J. Tabak, the co-chairman of an American Bar Association committee on the
death penalty, "[flar, far, far more often when the judges override the jury, it
is in order to impose the death penalty when the jury has recommended
life." 20' Mr. Tabak stated that this is evident in those states, such as Florida
202
and Alabama, where the jury only Provides a sentencing recommendation,
but the judge still has the final say.
Thus, if all eight states where death
penalty statutes have been called into question are forced to change their
death sentencing procedure, then there might be a reduction in the number of
death sentences rendered in the future.
VII. CONCLUSION

In conclusion, the Court succeeded in providing some clarity of
Apprendi in Ring, but left an unsettling question for some states as to Ring's
range. The Court has experienced difficulty in determining how to allow
states to apply the death penalty. This difficulty apparently began in 1972
with Furman, extended through 1990 with Walton, and apparently has
continued through 2002 with Ring. It is possible that inevitable appeals from
states such as Alabama, Florida, and Delaware will clarify Ring's impact
even more, but unfortunately, death row inmates in those states will have to
wait patiently until the Supreme Court decides to revisit the issue-once
again.

200. If you value life over questionable deterrence and retribution, then less executions
might provide a greater value.
201. Liptak, supra note 11.
202. "James S. Liebman, [a law professor at Columbia University], said that: 'about a
quarter of the death row in Alabama is made up of people whom juries sentenced to life in
prison but judges sentenced to death."' Liptak, supra note 11.

203. Id.
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I. INTRODUCTION

In an era flourishing with scientific innovation, the importance of
pharmaceutical drug development is evident. Pharmaceutical drugs aid in
the fight against cancer, heart disease, mental illness, and a plethora of other
diseases that affect the daily lives of many Americans. 1 However, for
*

J.D. candidate 2004, Nova Southeastern University, Shepard Broad Law Center;

B.A. University of Miami, 2000. Thanks to the members of Nova Law Review for their time and
dedication in editing this note. Special thanks to John Powers for his support throughout the
writing process.
1.
See Pharmaceutical Research and Manufacturers of America, Delivering on the
Promise of PharmaceuticalInnovation: The Need to Maintain Strong and Predictable
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something that affects life so tremendously, there is a drawback-the cost of
pharmaceuticals. Due to the patent protection provided for new drugs,
pioneer companies may enjoy a twenty-year monopoly.2 Patent exclusivity
available for an innovator is a key factor in promoting the entrance of new
drugs to the market. Without the exclusivity provided to pioneer drug
companies, the rate of innovation would likely be dampened. With the
temporary monopoly, pioneer drug companies may set drug prices at a level
necessary to regain the investment of discovery and research. Yet, with the
approval of new drugs comes the opportunity for a generic company to rely
on a pioneer company's studies to apply for approval of a generic drug even
before the patent expires on the pioneer drug.3
The complicated process of pioneer drug and generic drug approval is
detailed in the Hatch-Waxman Act ("Act").4 Although criticized for
containing loopholes that allegedly allow pioneer companies to extend their6
exclusivity, 5 the Act serves the purpose Congress originally intended.
Currently, a bill is being reviewed by Congress, which will amend the Act
in order to promote an increase in generic drug marketing. However, the
provisions of the bill do not accurately address the problems of the HatchWaxman Act. Instead, an alternate solution is more advisable to precisely
reflect the original purposes of the Act. Furthermore, it is the Food and
Drug Administration (FDA) that ultimately decides whether a new or generic
drug is approved for marketing. 8
The purpose of this note is to examine whether reformation of the
Hatch-Waxman Act is the appropriate solution to further promote the dual
purposes of the Act. Part H1 reviews the importance of patent rights in
Intellectual Property Rights 4, available at http://www.phrma.org/publications/policy/200206-24-436.pdf (Apr. 22, 2002).
2.
See 35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(2) (2000).
3.
See 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(1) (2000).
4.
See Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act of 1984, Pub. L.
No. 98-417, 98 Stat. 1585 (1984) (codified at 21 U.S.C. § 355 (2000); 35 U.S.C. §§ 156, 271

(2000)).
5.
Julie Appleby & Jayne O'Donnell, Consumers Pay as Drug Firms Fight Over
Generics, USA Today, June 6, 2002, at IA. Senator Charles Schumer, D-N.Y., criticized the
pioneer companies when stating, "'These companies figure out a new way to keep the dollars
rolling in, stooping to a new low every day to maintain their exclusivity rights."' Id. at 2A.
6.
See H.R. Rep. No. 98-857, at 1, 37 (1984), reprintedin 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2647,
2670.
7.
See Greater Access to Affordable Pharmaceuticals Act of 2001, S. 812, 107th
Cong. (2001).
8.
Am. Bioscience, Inc. v. Thompson, 141 F. Supp. 2d 88,90 (D.D.C. Cir. 2001).
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stimulating innovation, especially in the pharmaceutical industry. Part 111
explores the history and provisions of the Act, which create a balance
between the interests of generic drug and pioneer drug companies. Part IV
discusses the successful enforcement of the Act by the FDA and the courts.
Part V details the inadequate provisions of the bill introduced in the Senate
to reform the Act. Finally, the note concludes by suggesting a possible
alternative to revising the Act to further maintain balance between
promoting generic marketing and pioneer innovation.
11. THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN PATENT LAW AND DRUG APPROVAL

Patent rights are an important part of society, stemming back to the
United States Constitution. 9 Patents serve "to promote invention, to encourage development and commercialization of inventions, and to encourage
inventors to disclose their inventions."' 0 A patent issued by the United
States Patent and Trademark Office provides an inventor with the right to
exclude others from manufacturing, using or selling the patented invention
for twenty years." The right to exclude others is exemplified in the right to
sue those who infringe upon the patent. "Patent infringement is defined as
making, using, offering to sell, or selling a patented invention without
authority."' 12 Without patent protection, an invention could be copied by
competitors at significantly lower prices, thereby reducing an inventor's
ability to recover costs associated with innovation. 13

9.

U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.

10.

Kurt M. Saunders, Patent Nonuse and the Role of Public Interest as a Deterrent

to Technology Suppression, 15 Harv. J.L. & Tech. 389, 426 (2002) (citing Kewanee Oil Co. v.
Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470 (1974)). The author discusses how the purpose of the
Constitution's intellectual property clause was to instill in Congress the power to promote
public interest by providing patent rights. Id. at 447-48.
11. 35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(2); Laura Giles, Note, Promoting Generic Drug Availability:
Reforming the Hatch-Waxman Act to Prevent Unnecessary Delays to Consumers, 75 St.

John's L. Rev. 357, 360 (2001). "The [Patent and Trademark Office] was established under
the Department of Commerce to create a government agency to decide what ideas and
products were worthy of this protection." Plain Talk About Prescription Drug Patents, at
http://www.phrma.org/publications/policy/02.21.2002.426.cfm (last visited Apr. 4, 2003).
12. Giles, supra note 11, at 364; see 35 U.S.C. § 27 1(a).
13. Lara J. Glasgow, Stretching the Limits of Intellectual Property Rights: Has the
PharmaceuticalIndustry Gone Too Far?,41 IDEA 227, 229 (2001).
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The profit protection provided by patents is clearly evidenced in
statutes regarding drug innovation. 14 In 1984, Congress enacted the HatchWaxman Act, also known as the Drug Price Competition and Patent Term
Restoration Act of 1984, which amended Title 21, section 355 of the United
States Code (known as the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act) and Title
35, sections 156 and 271 of the United States Code, which are sections of the
patent code.' 5 In relation to patent protection, section 156 was amended in
order to provide pioneer drug companies with an extension on their patents
based on the time lost in obtaining FDA approval.16 In addition, section 271
was amended *to allow generic drug companies to apply for FDA approval
before the pioneer drug patent expires.' 7 The provision authorizes generic
drug companies to conditionally infringe on pioneer drug patents without the
consequences of a patent infringement lawsuit.' 8 However, the authorization
has its limits. The exemption from infringement only allows generic drug
companies to infringe so long as it is related to gaining FDA approval.' 9 If
generic drug companies go beyond simply seeking approval by the FDA,
pioneer drug companies may seek money damages or injunctive relief in
order to protect their patent interests.2 °
III. HISTORY OF THE HATCH-WAXMAN ACT
A.

Drug Approval ProcessBefore 1984

Before the Act was introduced in 1984, the drug industry was regulated
by the 1962 amendments to the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act,
"which required proof that a drug was safe and effective" before the FDA
submitted approval. 2 1 However, the 1962 amendments did not include
14. See id. at 231.
15. Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act of 1984, Pub. L. No.
98-417, 98 Stat. 1585, 1598, 1603 (1984) (codified at 21 U.S.C. § 355 (2000); 35 U.S.C. §§
156, 271 (2000)).
16. H.R. Rep. No. 98-857, at 37.
17. See 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(1); Shashank Upadhye, Understanding Patent
Infringement Under 35 U.S.C. § 2 71(e): The CollisionsBetween Patent,Medical Device, and
Drug Laws, 17 Computer & High Tech. L.J. 1, 42-43 (2000).
18. See § 271(e)(3).
19. Upadhye, supra note 17, at 43.
20. 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(4)(B)-(C).
21. Alfred B. Engelberg, Special Patent Provisionsfor Pharmaceuticals: Have They
Outlived Their Usefulness? A Political, Legislative and Legal History of U.S. Law and
Observationsfor the Future, 39 IDEA 389, 396 (1999) (citing 21 U.S.C. § 355(b) (1994)).
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provisions for a separate and more economical approval process for generic
22
drugs. Instead, generic drug companies were forced to go through the same
procedures for FDA approval as pioneer drug companies-filing a New
Drug Application (NDA) .23 However, the procedure for filing an NDA is
complex and costly considering that:
The NDA is a massive report on the drug, and contains summaries
of all the animal and human studies conducted, demonstrating that
the new drug is safe and efficacious, details of how and where the
new drug will be manufactured, how the manufacturing process is
validated, how the drug's performance will be maintained, stability
tests on the drug, and how the drug will be packaged, labeled, and
marketed.24
Due to the lack of finances to undertake the expensive process of clinical
studies to prove a drug was safe and effective, few generic drugs entered the
market by filing NDAs. 25
B.

Provisions of the Hatch-Waxman Act

As a result of long debates over the contents of the Act, Congress
finally came to a compromise and President Ronald Reagan enacted the bill
into law on September 24, 1984.26 Provisions of the Act enable inventors to
have an opportunity to recover development costs, and to ultimately make a
profit off of the specified exclusivity period.27 In addition to recovering
development time, the Act also gives generic drug companies advantages
unavailable before 1984.
The first advantage to generics is evident in Title I of the Act, which
amended section 355 of Title 21 of the United States Code by introducing an
22. Id.
23. Id. at 396-97 (citing Alan H. Kaplan, Fifty Years of Drug Amendments Revisited:
In Easy-To-Swallow Capsule Form, 50 Food & Drug L.J. 179, 188-89 (1995)).
24. William M. Brown, A "Highly Artificial Act of Infringement," Indeed, But It Can
Still Cost You Attorneys' Fees ... Comment on Yamanouchi v. Danbury, 33 U.W.L.A. L.
Rev. 117, 125 (2001).
25. See Engelberg, supra note 21, at 397.
26. Id. at 407; Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act of 1984,
Pub. L. No. 98-417, 98 Stat. 1585, 1605 (1984) (codified at 21 U.S.C. § 355 (2000); 35
U.S.C. §§ 156, 271 (2000)).
27. Engelberg, supra note 21, at 406. See generally 35 U.S.C. § 156 (discussing the
patent extension period available to NDA applicants).
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abbreviated process for generic drug availability. 28 Through an Abbreviated
New Drug Application (ANDA), a generic drug company may rely on the
accomplishments of pioneer drug companies to obtain faster FDA approval. 29 Ultimately, the ANDA allows generic drugs to reach the market at
reasonable costs to consumers. 3 Furthermore, Title HI aided generics by
amending section 271 of Title 35 of the United States Code to allow generic
drug companies to conditionally infringe on pioneer drug companies
patents. So long as the infringement is for the purpose of obtaining FDA
approval of a generic drug, a generic drug company's use of patented
methods or products does not constitute infringement. 32 In addition to
allowing generic drugs to be approved based upon the safety and efficacy of
a pioneer drug, the Act also33provides a way for a generic drug company to
challenge a pioneer's patent.
1.

Generic Drug Approval Process

As discussed, one of the purposes of the Act is to "enabl[e] competitors
to bring low-cost, generic copies of [pioneer] drugs to the market., 34 Instead
of filing an NDA with the FDA, as was required before 1984, generic drug
companies may file an ANDA with information detailing that the generic
drug is the bioequivalent of a previously approved pioneer drug, referred to
as the "listed drug. ' ' 35 Essentially, a generic drug must contain the same
36
active ingredient as the listed drug, but the inactive ingredients may vary.
Along with bioequivalency information, the ANDA applicant must certify

28.

Pub. L. No. 98-417, 98 Stat. 1585.

29.

See 21 U.S.C. § 3550).

30. Andrx Pharms., Inc. v. Biovail Corp., 276 F.3d 1368, 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2002).
31. See 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(1).
32. Id. Section 271(e)(1) states:
It shall not be an act of infringement to make, use, offer to sell, or sell within the
United States or import into the United States a patented invention ...solely for uses
reasonably related to the development and submission of information under a Federal
law which regulates the manufacture, use, or sale of drugs ....
Id.
33. See 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(2)(A)(vii).
34. Andrx Pharns., Inc., 276 F.3d at 1371. The other purpose of the Act is to
"induc[e] pioneering research and development of new drugs." Id.

35.

21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(2)(A).

36. Am. Bioscience, Inc. v. Shalala, 142 F. Supp. 2d 1, 3 (D.D.C. 2000) (citing
United States v. Generix Drug Corp., 460 U.S. 453, 455 (1983)).
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that the drug will not interfere with the listed drug patents of an NDA holder
by submitting
a certification, in the opinion of the applicant and to the best of his
knowledge, with respect to each patent which claims the listed drug
(I) that such patent information has not been filed,
(II) that such patent has expired,
(III) of the date on which such patent will expire, or
(IV) that such patent is invalid or will not be infringed by the
manufacture, use, or sale of the new drug for which the application
is submitted ....

The specific certification submitted by the generic drug company is referred
38

to as either a Paragraph I, II, HI, or IV certification.
Furthermore, if a generic drug company files an ANDA with a
Paragraph IV certification, the company is required to give the patent holder
and the NDA holder notice of the reasons why the patent listed is invalid or
why the generic drug does not infringe on the listed patent. 39 According to
the Act, the requisite notice must include a "detailed statement of the factual
and legal basis of the [ANDA] applicant's opinion that the patent is not valid
or will not be infringed. ' ' 40 The purpose of the notice is to provide NDA and
patent holders with an opportunity to protect their patent rights through
"inquiry, investigation or litigation." 41 However, the ANDA applicant is not
required to submit the notice to the FDA.42 The FDA does not review the
notice because
it lacks the expertise in patent law. Moreover, neither the FDA nor
the United States Patent and Trademark Office currently has access
to the additional resources that would be necessary to review these
notices, and a patent certification review system would subject the
agency's decisions to questioning that would require further re-

37.
38.
39.

21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(2)(A)(vii)(I-IV).
Andrx Pharms., Inc., 276 F.3d at 1371.
21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(2)(B)(i-ii).

40.

21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(2)(B)(ii).

41. Astrazeneca AB v. Mut. Pharm. Co., 221 F. Supp. 2d 528, 534 (E.D. Pa. 2002).
42. Minn. Mining & Mfg. Co. v. Barr Labs., Inc., 289 F.3d 775, 787 (Fed. Cir. 2002)
(Garijarsa, J., concurring).
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source expenditures and create delays in the statutory patent certification and challenge process. 43
In addition, Paragraph IV certification brings forth another obstacle
generic drug companies must tackle.
Pursuant to Title 35, section
271(e)(2)(A), the filing of a Paragraph IV certification is considered an act
of infringement. 44 Subsequent to receiving notice from the ANDA applicant,
the NDA and patent holders have forty-five days to commence a lawsuit
against the generic drug company for patent infringement. 45 The Act states:
If the [ANDA] applicant made a [Paragraph IV] certification...
the [FDA] approval shall be made effective immediately unless an
action is brought for infringement of a patent which is the subject
of the certification before the expiration of forty-five days from the
date the notice ... is received. If such an action is brought before

the expiration of such days, the approval shall be made effective
upon the expiration of the thirty-month period beginning on the
date of the receipt of the notice provided .

.

. or such shorter or

longer period as the court may order because either party to the action failed to reasonably cooperate in expediting the action .... 46
The thirty-month stay allows the parties to litigate the patent infringement
suit, thereby7 guaranteeing that the generic drug will not immediately enter
the market.
Generic drug companies take a significant risk by filing a Paragraph IV
certification. If the patent holder timely files suit, initiating the stay of
generic drug approval up to thirty months, the generic drug company is
forced to await a court's decision concerning the patent before the generic
may hit the market.4 8 However, generic drug companies have a great
43.

Id. at 788 (GarJarsa, J., concurring).

44.

35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(2)(A); aaiPharma Inc. v. Thompson, 296 F.3d 227, 232 (4th

Cir. 2002).
45. 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(5)(B)(iii).
46. Id.
47. Ben Venue Labs., Inc. v. Novartis Pharm. Corp., 146 F. Supp. 2d 572, 579
(D.N.J. 2001).

Id.

It is important to remember that the purpose of the 30-month stay is not
necessarily to extend the patent holder's monopoly, but to create an adequate window
of time, during which to litigate the question of whether a generic will infringe the
patented product, without actually having to introduce the generic product to the
market.

48.

21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(5)(B)(iii).
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incentive to file a Paragraph IV certification with their ANDA.49 Under the
Act, the first company to file an ANDA with a Paragraph IV certification is
granted a 180-day marketing exclusivity period.5 °
Although the 180-day period enables the first ANDA filer with a
Paragraph IV certification to temporarily block out other ANDA applicants
from marketing their versions of the drug, subsequent ANDA filers may be
able to bypass this provision.
According to Title 21, section
355(j)(5)(B)(iv), if a second ANDA also containing a Paragraph IV
certification is submitted, the FDA will not approve the application until 180
days after:
(I) the date the Secretary [of the FDA] receives notice from the
applicant under the previous application of the first commercial
marketing of the drug under the previous application, or
(II) the date of a decision of a court in an action described in an
action ... holding the patent which is the subject of the certification to be invalid or not infringed, whichever is earlier. 5'
Section 355(j)(5)(B)(iv)(II) of the Act includes not only court decisions
finding that the first ANDA filer has not infringed or that the patent is
invalid, but also decisions involving the second ANDA filer. 52 If the NDA
or patent holder sues a second ANDA filer, the case could be resolved prior
to a case against the first ANDA filer. Therefore, a second ANDA filer may
ultimately succeed in obtaining the 180-day exclusivity period, thereby
excluding the first ANDA filer from the market for the period. 53 "The
provision allowing a second ANDA filer to trigger the period by a 'court
decision' comports with the statute and the intent of Congress. 54
The various provisions of the Act enable generic drug companies to
reap benefits. The benefits of the 180-day exclusivity period, in addition to
the financial advantages of relying on a pioneer drug company's studies,
49. See Eli Lilly & Co. v. Zenith Goldline Pharms., Inc., No. IP 99-38-C H/K, 2001
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18361, at *53 (S.D. Ind. Oct. 12, 2001).

50.

21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(5)(B)(iv).

51. Id.
52. Minn. Mining & Mfg., 289 F.3d at 778 (citing Teva Pharms., USA, Inc. v. United
States FDA, 182 F.3d 1003, 1010 (D.C. Cir. 1999)).
53. Minn. Mining & Mfg. Co. v. Barr Labs., Inc., 289 F.3d 775, 780 (Fed. Cir. 2002).
"The District of Columbia Circuit has explicitly held that § 355j)(5)(B)(iv)(II) is triggered by
the termination of an action commenced by the second ANDA filer .... Id. (citing Teva
Pharms., 182 F.3d at 1010).
54. Id. at 786 (Garjarsa, J., concurring).
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allow generic drugs to gain approval by the FDA and enter the market at a
rate unknown before 1984. Yet, the Act goes beyond benefiting simply
generic drug companies.
Besides promoting competition of low-cost
generics, the Act also allows patent term restoration for pioneer drug
companies.55
2.

Patent Right Protection

As a compromise to the provisions of the Act allowing a generic drug
company to rely on a pioneer company's studies to obtain FDA approval, the
patent provisions of the Act provide pioneer drug companies with an
incentive. Since obtaining FDA approval for an innovator drug takes a
considerable amount of time, the patent holder loses time available to profit
from marketing the drug. 56 Thus, an additional purpose of the Act is to
provide pioneer companies with patent term extensions to make up for the
time involved in regulatory approval." Pioneer companies receive "an
extension [of the patent] term eq1ual to one-half of the time of the investigational new drug (IND) period."5 The IND period begins when the pioneer
company commences human clinical studies and ends when the FDA
approves the NDA.59
Along with patent term extension, the Act also protects the patent rights
of pioneer companies. If a generic drug company files an ANDA with a
Paragraph IV certification, the pioneer company has forty-five days to file a
lawsuit against the generic company for patent infringement. 60 If the pioneer
company does not file a lawsuit by then, the FDA may approve the ANDA
upon expiration of the forty-five day period. 6 1 However, if the pioneer
company does file a lawsuit within the time allotted, approval of the ANDA
is stayed pending

55. See 35 U.S.C. § 156 (2000).
56. Giles, supra note 11, at 361 (citing David J. Bloch, If It's Regulated Like a
Duck... Uncertainties in Implementing the Patent Exceptions of the Drug Price Competition
and Patent Term RestorationAct, 54 Food & Drug L.J. 111, 112 (1999)). "''hisloss of patent
protection as a result of regulatory delay is referred to as 'front end distortion."' Id.
57. Id.
58. Gerald J. Mossinghoff, Overview of the Hatch-Waxman Act and Its Impact on the
Drug Development Process, 54 Food & Drug L.J. 187, 190 (1999) (citing 35 U.S.C. §156
(1994)).
59. Id. at 192.
60. 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(5)(B)(iii).
61. Id.
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the expiration of the thirty-month period beginning on the date of
the receipt of notice provided [to the NDA and patent holder] or

such shorter or longer period as the court may order because either
party to the action failed to reasonably cooperate in expediting the
action, except that(I) if before the expiration of such period the court decides that
such patent is invalid or not infringed, the approval shall be made
effective on the date of the court decision,
(II) if before the expiration of such period the court decides that
such patent has been infringed, the approval shall be made effec-

tive on such date as the court orders.., or
(III) if before the expiration of such period the court grants a preliminary injunction prohibiting the applicant form engaging in the
commercial manufacture or sale of the drug until the court decides
the issues of patent validity and infringement and if the court decides that such patent is invalid or not infringed, the62approval shall
be made effective on the date of such court decision.
The thirty-month stay provision of the Act enables pioneer companies to
63
protect their patent rights prior to approval of generic drugs for marketing.
The provision "is a trade-off for having stripped the pharmaceutical industrof the other patent protection afforded to every other U.S. industry."
However, if pioneer companies do not list applicable patents appropriately
relating to FDA approved drug, then pioneer companyies
cannot take
65
advantage of the ANDA stay in order to protect their rights.
Restoration of time, which pioneer companies lose in the FDA approval
process, is an adequate measure, considering the tremendous investment
pioneer companies make in developing drugs. Pioneers are able to take
advantage of the extended patent term to regain finances while generics take
advantage of pioneers' financial investments to develop generic versions.
Although the procedures to obtain these advantages are complex, the success
of the intricate drug approval process is evident through the interaction
between pioneers, generics, the FDA, and the courts.

62. Id.
63. aaiPharma Inc. v. Thompson, 296 F.3d 227, 232 (4th Cir. 2002).
64. Plain
Talk
About
Prescription
Drug
Patents,
http://www.phrma.org/publications/policy/02.01.2002.426.cfm (last visited Apr. 4, 2003).
65. aaiPharma,296 F.3d at 232.
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IV. ENFORCEMENT OF THE ACT

A.

FDA Review and Approval

The FDA is responsible for supporting the public interest, 66 which may
be a difficult task considering the complex role it has in approving drugs.
The FDA accepts applications for drug approval, and determines whether
approval for marketing is appropriate based on safety and efficacy studies. 67
Since an ANDA for a generic drug relies on the studies performed by
pioneer companies, the generic drug companies, in certifying their
application, are required to refer to a pioneer's listed patent.68 Thus, the Act
requires that pioneer drug companies provide the FDA with a list of all
patents that claim an FDA approved drug or a method of using the drug. 69
When a related patent is issued subsequent to NDA approval, the NDA
holder has thirty days to list the patent with the FDA. 7° However, if the
NDA holder does not notify the FDA of the patent, an ANDA applicant is
not required to amend its application to include the late-listed patent.7 Late
listing comports with the dual purposes of the Act by protecting ANDA
filers from having to re-certify late patent submissions, yet allowing
NDA
' 72
holders to "benefit from the public notice that stems from listing.
Regardless of the timing of the submission of patents, the list of patents
is published by the FDA in the Approved Drug Products with Therapeutic

66. Am. Bioscience, Inc. v. Shalala, 142 F. Supp. 2d 1, 16, n.11 (D.D.C. 2000).
67. 21 U.S.C. § 355(b)(1).
68. 21 U.S.C. § 355(b)(2)(A).
69. aaiPharma,296 F.3d at 230; see 21 U.S.C. § 355(b)(1), (c)(2).
70. 21 U.S.C. § 355(c)(2).
71. Am. Bioscience, Inc. v. Thompson, 269 F.3d 1077, 1079 (D.C. Cir. 2001). The
FDA refers to the listing of patents subsequent to the thirty days provided as "late listing."
See Shalala, 142 F. Supp. 2d at 11. The FDA regulation regarding "late listing" provides:
If a patent on the listed drug is issued and the holder of the approved application for
the listed drug does not submit the required information on the patent within 30 days of
issuance of the patent, an applicant who submitted an abbreviated new drug application for that drug that contained an appropriate patent certification before the submission of the patent information is not required to submit an amended certification. An
applicant whose abbreviated new drug application is submitted after a late submission
of patent information, or whose pending abbreviated application was previously
submitted but did not contain an appropriate patent certification at the time of the
patent submission, shall submit a certification ... as to that patent.

Id. at 11 n.6 (citing 21 C.F.R. 314.94(a)(12)(vi) (2001)).
72. Id. at 14.
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Equivalence Evaluations, generally referred to as the Orange Book.73
However, the FDA only plays a ministerial role in overseeing the Orange
Book listings.74 The role of the FDA "is not to ensure the correctness of the
list of patents submitted for Orange Book listing, but simply to ensure that
either a patent list has been75 filed or a declaration has been made that there
are no patents to be listed.,
Although the Act does not contain a provision allowing a cause of
action to challenge a listing in the Orange Book,
the FDA has provided a limited process for disputing the accuracy
or relevance of patent information submitted to the FDA and listed
in the Orange Book. One who questions the accuracy of the patent
information may write to the FDA, and the FDA will request that
the applicant confirm the information. According to the FDA's
regulations, however, "[u]nless the application holder withdraws or
amends its patent information in response to FDA's request, the
agency will not change the patent information in the list" and an
ANDA applicant must76still make certifications for each patent despite its disagreement.
Even so, the FDA warns that if a pioneer company does submit an invalid
list, the company may be liable to the FDA.77
In addition, the generic drug company may still gain approval despite
the improper listing if established by a court order.78 Since the Act does not
require the FDA to review listing of patents in the Orange Book, the
approval of an ANDA with Paragraph IV certification rests on a court's
decision that the ANDA does not infringe upon the listed patent.79

73.

See Thompson, 269 F.3d at 1079.

74.
75.

aaiPharma Inc. v. Thompson, 296 F.3d 227, 237 (4th Cir. 2002).
Id. at 239.

76.

Mylan Pharms., Inc. v. Thompson, 268 F.3d 1323, 1327 (Fed. Cir. 2001)

(alteration in original) (citations omitted).
77. aaiPharma,296 F.3d at 242.
78. Abbott Labs. v. Novopharm Ltd., 104 F.3d 1305, 1309 (Fed. Cir. 1997).

79.

See 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(5)(B)(iii).
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Court Decisions Reflecting Balance
1.

Listing of Additional Patents

The listing of additional patents in the Orange Book has not only
caused lawsuits filed by pioneer drug companies against generic drug
companies, but has also led to lawsuits initiated by generic drug companies
against the FDA. A pinnacle case discussing the listing of additional patents
was Mylan Pharmaceuticals,Inc. v. Thompson. In Mylan, a generic drug
company was ready to market their approved drug upon expiration of the
listed pioneer drug, but hours before expiration the pioneer company listed
81
additional patents in the Orange Book. Mylan filed suit against the pioneer
company and the FDA seeking a declaratory judgment that the pioneer
improperly listed the patent. 82 The United States Court of Appeals for the
Federal Circuit reversed the district court's decision, which directed the
pioneer company to delist its patent from the Orange Book. 83 The court held84
that there is no private right of action for delisting a patent under the Act.
In rendering this decision, the court reviewed the purpose and relevant
legislative history of the Act, and it stated the generic drug company's
claim is not a recognized defense to patent infringement. There is
no indication in 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(5)(B)(iii)(III) that Congress intended to provide an additional defense. Instead it indicates that
Congress only envisioned that recognized defenses could be raised
in declaratoryjudgments in patent infringement actions.... Finally, the parties have shown nothing in the scant legislative history
of the amendments pointing to an intent to provide such a defense,
or to create a private action for delisting a patent from the
Orange
85
Book for a patentee's failure to comply with section 355.
Even though there is no private right of action for delisting a patent,
there may be other avenues to obtain ANDA approval. In another case
80. 268 F.3d 1323 (Fed. Cir. 2001).
81. Id. at 1327-28.
82. Id. at 1328.
83. Id. at 1325. The district court reasoned that Mylan was entitled to relief because
Mylan could have used the claim of improper listing as a defense in an infringement suit
initiated by the pioneer company. Id. at 1328.
84. Mylan Pharms., 268 F.3d at 1332.
85. Id. (emphasis added) (citations omitted).
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before the Federal Circuit, Andrx Pharmaceuticals,Inc. v. Biovail Corp.,86
the court suggested in dicta that a generic ANDA applicant could sue the
FDA directly under the Administrative Procedure Act (APA). 81 Under the
APA, if the FDA's denial of the ANDA is "arbitrary, capricious, or not in
accordance with law," the FDA may be compelled to approve the ANDA. 8
Therefore, if a generic drug company prevails in an APA claim, the remedy
usually will be vacature of the FDA's order and immediate approval of the
ANDA. 89 In addition, the Federal Circuit in Abbott Laboratories v.
Novopharm Ltd. affirmed a lower court decision that a court may order an
additional patent to be delisted by the patent holder. 90
The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia has
also rendered a decision
involving a claim brought against
the FDA under
92
91
the APA. 9' In American Bioscience v. Thompson, Inc., the patent holder of
a listed drug patent sued the FDA, claiming that the agency acted contrary to
the APA when it approved an ANDA, regardless of the listing of a related
patent in the Orange Book.93 The court vacated the FDA's order approving
the generic,
holding that the agency's actions were "arbitrary and capri94
cious.

Ultimately, the courts have enforced patent listing in the Orange Book.
The Act specifically empowers the courts to review the validity of patents in
patent infringement suits initiated according to section 355(j)(5)(B)(iii) of
Title 21 of the United States Code.95
2.

Paragraph IV Certification

In addition to patent listing disputes, Paragraph IV certification has
stimulated various lawsuits between drug companies. Since a company
submitting a Paragraph IV certification with their ANDA has to wait for
FDA approval to market the drug, there is technically no actual infringement
of the listed patent. However, in Eli Lilly & Co., v. Medronic, Inc.,96 Justice
86.

276 F.3d 1368 (Fed. Cir. 2002).

87.
88.
89.
90.
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.
96.

Id. at 1378; see 5 U.S.C. §§ 702-706.
Id.
Id. at 1379.
104 F.3d 1305, 1309 (Fed. Cir. 1997).
Am. Bioscience, Inc. v. Thompson, 269 F.3d 1077 (D.C. Cir. 2001).
Id.
Id. at 1083.
Id. at 1086.
See 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(5)(B)(iii) (2000).
496 U.S. 661 (1990).
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Scalia, writing for the United States Supreme Court, stated that submitting
an ANDA with a Paragraph IV certification is a "highly artificial act of
infringement., 97 Therefore, the court is allowed to decide whether
infringement will occur, once the drug is marketed upon FDA approval of
the ANDA. 98 In order to succeed in a patent infringement lawsuit, the
patentee must prove "by a preponderance of the evidence that the alleged
infringer will likely market an infringing product." 99 In conducting
infringement analysis the court reviews the ANDA, the materials submitted
to the FDA, and other evidence submitted by the parties. 00
The Federal Circuit recently heard a case concerning the controversial
use of the requirements of the Paragraph IV certification to obtain the 180day exclusivity.10' In Minnesota Mining & Manufacturing Co. v. Barr
Laboratories, Inc., 102 a second ANDA filer did not provide enough
information in the required notice of Paragraph IV certification to the NDA
holder. 0 3 The NDA holder subsequently filed a lawsuit against the second
ANDA filer within the forty-five day statutory window of time.' 4 The
initiation of the suit caused ANDA approval of the generic drug to be stayed
for thirty months or until termination of the litigation. 0 5 Through discovery,
the NDA holder was convinced that the second generic applicant did not
infringe
on thea listed
held by the
the pioneer
drug company.
NDA
holder filed
motionpatent
to dismiss
case without
prejudice 06inThe
order
to

97. Id. at 678.
98. Glaxo, Inc. v. Novopharm, Ltd., 110 F.3d 1562, 1569 (Fed. Cir. 1997). The court
stated:
[S]ection 271 (e)(2)(A) makes it possible for a patent owner to have the court determine
whether, if a particular drug were put on the market, it would infringe the relevant
patent. If the court determines that the patent is not invalid and that infringement
would occur, and that therefore the ANDA applicant's paragraph IV certification is
incorrect, the patent owner is entitled to an order that FDA approval of the ANDA
containing the paragraph IV certification not be effective until the patent expires. See
21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(4)(B)(iii)(Il): 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(4)(A).
Id. (alteration in original) (emphasis in original).
99. Id. at 1570. In Glaxo, the court affirmed the district court's decision that the
patentee, Glaxo, Inc., had not proven infringement of its patents by Novopharm, Ltd. by a
preponderance of the evidence. Id. at 1572.
100. Id. at 1570.
101. Minn. Mining & Mfg. Co. v. Barr Labs., Inc., 289 F.3d 775 (Fed. Cir. 2002).

102. Id.
103.
104.
105.
106.

See id. at 779.
Id.
Id.
Minn. Mining & Mfg., 289 F.3d at 779.
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prevent the second ANDA filer from obtaining the 180-day exclusivity.' 17
The district court, however, dismissed the case with prejudice, thereby
triggering the exclusivity period.' °8 Subsequently, the NDA holder filed an
appeal of the decision in the Federal Circuit.'0 9 The main issue on appeal
was whether the district court erred in determining that the second ANDA
filer complied with the notice requirement of the Act." 0 On appeal, the
court held that the NDA holder could not "seek a judicial determination of
whether a private party's Paragraph IV certification complies with 21 U.S.C.
§ 355(j)(2)(B)."' i
3.

Allegations of Patent Infringement

Although lawsuits initiated by pioneer drug companies have recently
been scrutinized,' 2 it is up to the courts to decide whether the cases are
meritorious. Patent infringement suits initiated by pioneer companies
against ANDA applicants are literally provided for as a method for a generic
drug to enter the market before patent expiration." 3 However, it is the
court's obligation as a tribunal to review the cases for merit and decide
whether the ANDA actually infringes on the listed patent. Patents for
pharmaceutical drugs may be extremely complex and difficult to determine
if they infringe on another patent; therefore, it may be necessary to review
every component of the patent before deciding on the issue of infringement.
For example, in Biovail Corp. International v. Andrx Pharmaceuticals,
Inc., 114 the court was faced with determining whether a "homogeneous
admixture" was formed in the generic product, thus infringing on the pioneer
company's patent.' 5 The patent history was reviewed and expert testimony
was heard in order for the court to properly determine the meaning of terms
107. Id. The NDA holder, 3M, felt that the second ANDA filer had tricked 3M into
filing an infringement lawsuit in order to gain the 180-day exclusivity period, although the
ANDA did not infringe the listed patent. Id.
108. Id. The district court found that the second ANDA filer's assurances that the
generic drug did not infringe the listed patent were "'sufficient to satisfy the notice
requirements of the [Act]."' Id. (quoting Minn. Min. & Mfg. Co. v. Bar Labs. Inc., 139 F.
Supp. 2d 1109, 1115 (D. Minn. 2001)).
109. Minn. Mining & Mfg., 289 F.3d at 779.
110. Id. at 779-80.
111. Id. at 783.
112. Appleby & O'Donnell, supra note 5.
113. 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(5)(B)(iii).
114. 239 F.3d 1297 (Fed.Cir. 2001).
115. 239 F.3d 1297, 1303 (Fed.Cir. 2001).

Published by NSUWorks, 2003

129

Nova Law Review, Vol. 27, Iss. 3 [2003], Art. 1

Nova Law Review

[Vol. 27:527

contained in the patents. 16 The court ultimately determined that the generic
patent did not infringe upon the pioneer patent. 1 7 However, without a
thorough review by the court, the issues of infringement could not have been
properly determined.
Recently, the patent infringement lawsuits commenced by pioneer
companies have been labeled as a frivolous attempt to enjoy the financial
benefits of the thirty-month stay." 18 A recent case decided by the District
Court for the Southern District of New York was confronted with this
proposition." 9 In In re Buspirone Antitrust Litigation,120 the pioneer
company, Bristol-Myers, listed an additional
S121patent in the Orange Book
hours before its original patent was to expire.
Bristol-Myers claimed that
the new patent "covered a method of using the [pioneer] drug," when the
patent actually did not. 22 However, Bristol-Myers filed suit against the
generic drug company for patent infringement, thereby initiating the thirtymonth stay. 123 The district court judge
granted summary judgment of non124
infringement against Bristol-Myers.
Following the court's decision, the plaintiffs filed suit alleging that
Bristol-Myers abused the provisions of the Act in order to obtain "an
unlawful monopoly over the market."' 125 Essentially, the plaintiffs alleged
that Bristol-Myers exercised bad faith in interfering with the marketing of a
generic version of its drug by abusing the provisions of the Act to obtain the
thirty-month stay. 26 In granting a pre-trial motion in this case, the court

116. Id.
117. Id. at 1305.
118. See Appleby & O'Donnell, supra note 5. The authors discuss the problems with
the thirty-month stay, stating:
Because blockbuster drugs-those earning more than $1 billion a year-are so profitable, antitrust enforcers say the firms will try almost anything to keep the market to
themselves, even for a few additional months. The companies spend millions of dollars
pursuing patent-infringement lawsuits or cutting deals with potential generic competitors because the potential payoff is so huge.
Id.
119. In re Buspirone Antitrust Litig., 208 F.R.D. 516 (S.D.N.Y. 2002).
119. Id.at 516.
121. Id.at 518-19.
122. Id.at 519.
123. Id.
124. Buspirone, 208 F.R.D. at 518.
125. Id. at 519.
126. Id.
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stated that Bristol-Myers had to be active in the litigation process or the
court would order the stay terminated. 127
The courts involved in Bristol-Myers' attempt to delay the introduction
of generic drugs onto the market have disposed of the cases properly. The
case is an example of courts' roles in assuring that pioneer companies do not
take unfair advantage of the stay provided to them in patent infringement
suits. Although pioneer companies at times abuse the provisions of the Act
establishing the thirty-month stay of generic drug approval, the courts have
adequately prevented the abuse by granting motions for summary judgment
in favor of generic companies.128 In fact, provisions of the Act specifically
authorize courts to shorten the thirty-month stay if "either
' 29party to the action
action."'
the
expediting
in
cooperate
reasonably
to
fail[s]
As part of a litigious society, pioneer companies are justified in
protecting their legal rights and interests. It is up to the courts "to determine
whether the parties are complying with that requirement of the statute."' 3 °
Although a trend has been set by Mylan and Andrx regarding the consistently
3
discussed issues of the Act, involving patents to be settled by the APA,' 1
courts are still "in the best position to assess the conduct of the parties and
grant appropriate relief."' 3 Furthermore, if a pioneer company alleges
patent infringement and a court rules that the generic company did not
infringe on the patent, the generic company also has the opportunity to sue
for attorneys' fees.
4.

Exceptional Cases for Attorneys' Fees

The patent code allows the court to award attorneys' fees to the
prevailing party "in exceptional cases."1 33 Types of misconduct that lead to
127. Id. at 525.
128. See, e.g., Minn. Mining & Mfg. Co. v. Barr Labs., Inc. 289 So. F.3d 775 (Fed.
Cir. 2002); Abbott Labs. V. Vovopharm Ltd., 104 F.3d 1305 (Fed. Cir. 1997); In re
Buspirone Patent Litig., 185 F. Supp. 2d 340 (S.D.N.Y. 2002).
129. 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(5)(B)(iii) (2000); Minn. Mining & Mfg. Co. v. Barr Labs.,
Inc., 295 F.3d 1274, 1276 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (stating "if an NDA holder sought to delay the
litigation [and thus prolong its exclusivity] by challenging compliance with § 355(j)(2)(B)(ii),
the district court could expedite the suit so as to mitigate any timing advantage the NDA
holder might have gained.").
130. Minn. Mining & Mfg., 295 F.3d at 1276.
131. Id. at 1277 (referring to Mylan Pharms, Inc. v. Thompson, 268 F.3d 1323 (Fed.
Cir. 2001) and Andrx Pharms., Inc., v. Biovail Corp., 276 F.3d 1368 (Fed. Cir. 2002)).
132. Id.
133. 35 U.S.C. § 285 (2000).
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an exceptional case include "willful infringement, inequitable conduct
before the [Patent Trademark Office], offensive litigation tactics, vexatious
or unjustified litigation, or frivolous filings."' 34 Exceptions have been based
not only on the actions of pioneer companies, but also on the actions of
generic drug companies. For example, in Yamanouchi PharmaceuticalCo.
v. Danbury Pharmacal, Inc., 135 the court found that the generic drug
company, Danbury, had willfully infringed on the pioneer company's
patent.1 6 The court determined that the actions by Danbury, in willfully
infringing on the patent, constituted
an exceptional case for an award of
37
attorney fees to Yamanouchi.1
Conversely, there have been cases in which courts have not found an
exceptional case to merit an award of attorneys' fees. In Merck & Co. v.
Mylan Pharmaceuticals,Inc.,' 38 the generic drug company, Mylan, was
granted summary judgment on non-infringement and later initiated a motion
to recover attorneys' fees on the basis that Merck "engaged in vexatious or
unjustified litigation techniques in order to delay FDA approval of Mylan's
generic compound and increase the burdens on Mylan."' The court denied
the motion, holding that "the evidence ...does not meet the clear and
convincing standard of outrageous or exceptional behavior which warrants
an award of attorney fees."'' 40 The judge further acknowledged:
Merck's infringement claim, albeit erroneous, was not baseless. Its
course of conduct in pursuing the claim was neither vexatious, unusual nor disproportionate to the rather high stakes involved. Finally, Merck's alternate form of relief, whether meritorious or not,
cannot alone support an award of one and a half million dollars in
attorneys fees, especially when the claim was never pursued by
either party. 141

134. Yamanouchi Pharm. Co. v. Danbury Pharmacal, Inc., 231 F.3d 1339, 1347 (Fed.
Cir. 2000) (internal citation omitted) (citing Avia Group Int'l., Inc. v. L.A. Gear Cal., Inc.,
853 F.2d 1557, 1567 (Fed. Cir. 1988); Rosemount, Inc. v. Beckman Instruments, Inc., 727
F.2d 1540, 1548 (Fed. Cir. 1984); Hoffmann-La Roche, Inc. v. Invamed, Inc., 213 F.3d 1359,
1365 (Fed. Cir. 2000); Beckman Instruments, Inc. v. LKB Produkter AB, 892 F.2d 1547,
1551 (Fed. Cir. 1989)).
135. Id.at 1339.
136. Id. at 1341.
137. Id. at 1343.
138. 79 F. Supp. 2d 552 (E.D. Pa. 2000).
139. Id. at 553.
140. Id. at 558.
141. Id.
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Ultimately, the interpretation of whether actions meet the "exceptional"
standard is up to the courts to determine in awarding attorneys' fees.
V.

A.

UNNECESSARY REFORMATION OF THE ACT

ProposedReformation

On May 7, 2001, Senators John McCain and Charles Schumer
introduced a bill in the United States Senate to amend the Act in order "to
loosen the restrictions on generic ANDA applicants."'' 42 The proposed
purposes of the Greater Access to Affordable Pharmaceuticals Act of 2001
are: "(1) to increase competition, thereby helping all Americans, especially
seniors and the uninsured, to have access to more affordable medication; and
(2) to ensure fair marketplace practices and deter pharmaceutical companies
(including generic companies) from engaging in anticompetitive action or
actions that tend to unfairly restrain trade.' 43 The bill is estimated to save
consumers sixty billion dollars in prescription drugs, but, this estimate is
"highly speculative" according to the Pharmaceutical Research and
Manufacturers of America.'4 The terms of the bill include, among other
things, amending the thirty-month stay provision "by preventing any stay for
patents listed after the initial NDA filing (even if they are listed before an
ANDA is submitted).' 4 5

142. Mylan Pharms., Inc. v. Thompson, 268 F.3d 1323, 1333 (Fed. Cir. 2001); see
Greater Access to Affordable Pharmaceuticals Act of 2001, S. 812, 107th Cong. (2001).
143. S.812.
144. Senator Schumer Claims His Bill Saves Consumers Money-But How Much?, at

http://www.phrma.org/mediaroom/press/releases/25.07.2002.467.cfm (July 25, 2002). The
Pharmaceutical Research and Manufacturers of America notes that
over 60% of total savings are predicted to take place in 2010-12-and nominal in
comparison to the savings conferred by a prescription drug benefit. Further, these
savings do not consider the ultimate cost of S.812. The uncertainty created by the bill
may jeopardize the lengthy, costly research needed to develop new cures and better
treatments.
Id., at http://www.phrma.org/mediaroom/press/releases/25.07.2002.467.cfm (July 25, 2002).
145. Points
on
the
FTC
Report
vs.
S.
812,
at
http://www.phrma.org/publications/quickfacts/30.07.2002.295.cfm (last visited Apr. 4, 2003)
(emphasis in original).

Published by NSUWorks, 2003

133

Nova Law Review, Vol. 27, Iss. 3 [2003], Art. 1

Nova Law Review
B.

[Vol. 27:527

CompromisingPatent Rights

The major problem with the proposed bill is it does not comply with the
original purposes of the Act. Recall that one of the purposes of the Act is to
provide pioneer companies with patent term restoration for the time spent in
obtaining FDA approval.146 The bill instead "would forfeit the patent rights
of the innovator companies altogether
if they do not comply with the bill's
47
requirements."
procedural
arbitrary
Moreover, a patent is presumed to be valid unless proven by clear and
convincing evidence to the contrary. 148 Perhaps some drug companies are
initiating infringement suits against generic companies to illegitimately
prolong entrance of generics on the market; however, other infringement
suits are created to resolve valid patent disputes. 149 Patent rights give
pioneer companies an incentive to devote time and finances to research and
develop new drugs "that are expensive to [initially] produce but quite
inexpensive to copy.' 50 Generic drug companies take advantage of the
benefits of provisions of the Act, and then criticize the parts of the Act that
benefit pioneer companies. However, the Act was not written solely to
benefit generic drug companies.' 5 1 The Act is a compromise between patent
restoration for pioneer
companies and the speedy introduction of generics
52
into the market.
C.

Reduction of Incentivesfor New Drug Innovation

The reformation of the Act would also contravene the very purpose of
Title II of the Act, which "is to create a new incentive for increased
expenditures for research and development of certain products which are

146. H.R. Rep. No. 98-857, at 15 (1984), reprintedin 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2647, 2648.
147. Points
on
the
FTC
Report
vs.
S.812,
at
http://www.phrma.org/publications/quickfacts/30.07.2002.295.cfm (last visited Apr. 4, 2003)
(emphasis in original).
148. Engelberg, supra note 21, at 422 (citing 21 U.S.C. § 355(b) (1994)); see 35
U.S.C. § 282 (2000).
149. See Glasgow, supra note 13, at 238-39.
150. Arti K. Rai, The Information Revolution Reaches Pharmaceuticals: Balancing
Innovation Incentives, Cost, and Access in the Post-Genomics Era, 2001 U. I11.
L. Rev. 173,
181 (2001).
151. See H.R. Rep. No. 98-857, at 15, 37 (1984), reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N.
2647, 2648, 2670.
152. H.R. Rep. No. 98-857, at 15, reprintedin 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2647.
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subject to premarket government approval."'' 53 The process of introducing a
new drug to the market is very time consuming. The drug development
process itself takes an estimated fourteen years and seven months to
complete. 154 Generic drug development, on the other hand, takes only
approximately three to five years. 1 5 However, "there is no real incentive to
develop a generic drug until the market has been established and any postapproval issues of safety and efficacy have been resolved by broad use in the
general population.
The fact is that forty-nine percent of drugs
prescribed are generic. 5 7 Moreover, since 1984, "[o]f the 8,000 drugs that
have come off patent
... 94% moved from brand name to generic without a
58
dispute."
patent
Nevertheless, without the option to litigate a patent dispute, the purpose
59
of the Act's patent term restoration provision would be meaningless.
Patent term• restoration~160
gives drug
•• companies the incentive to introduce new
drugs into the market.
By revising the Act to prevent "the ability of brand6
name companies to automatically win those 30 months of exclusivity,"' '
there will be no way to adequately assure that pioneer companies are
provided with the patent term restoration they deserve. Pioneer companies
should not be disadvantaged by a loss in ability to enforce their patent rights.
Regardless, the ability of pioneer companies to protect their finances gained
through the marketing exclusivity of drugs further promotes discovery and
research of new drugs, which in turn may later be copied into an inexpensive
generic version.

153. H.R. Rep. No. 98-857, at 15, reprintedin 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2647, 2648.
154. Richard J. Findlay, Originator Drug Development, 54 Food & Drug L.J. 227
(1999). There are four phases to the drug development process:
During the clinical testing period, originators conduct tests for safety in Phase I,
efficacy in Phase II, and for side effects and long-term use effects in Phase In... prior
to submitting a new drug application (NDA) and receiving Food and Drug Administration (FDA) approval. After FDA approval, postmarketing testing continues in Phase
IV for, inter alia, side effects, clinical education, and possible new indications.

Id.
155. Id. at 229.
156. Engelberg, supra note 21, at 406.
157. Appleby & O'Donnell, supra note 5, at 2A.
158. Id. (discussing the response of Jeff Trewhitt, spokesman for the Pharmaceutical
Research and Manufactures of America, to the proposed legislation to change the Act).
159. H.R. Rep. No. 98-857, at 15, reprintedin 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2647, 2648.
160. H.R. Rep. No. 98-857, at 17, reprintedin 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2647, 2650.
161. Appleby & O'Donnell, supra note 5, at 2A.
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VI. CONCLUSION

"The Congressional policy with respect to generic drugs is clear:
generic manufacturing of a drug should be allowed as soon as it is
determined that it does not violate patent rights."'' 62 Congress was not only
concerned with marketing generics faster in order to save consumers money,
but also with not violating the patent rights of pioneer companies. However,
problems have arisen that have instigated the idea in the minds of generic
drug companies and legislators that the Act needs to be reformed. Through
analysis of the Act and court cases, it is apparent that the true problem with
the Act is the Paragraph IV certification. It allows generic drug companies
to challenge a pioneer company's listed patent. In essence, when a generic
drug company files an ANDA with a Paragraph IV certification, it should
expect the pioneer company to fight for its patent rights. If a generic drug
company wants to enter the market before the pioneer patent has expired, the
generic is going to have to fight for the position. Patent rights provide
innovators with the exclusive right to sell the product for the patent term.
"Exclusive" is the key term. If a generic drug company wants to challenge
the validity of a patent listed in the Orange Book, then it must take the issue
to court. Complaining about the drafting of the Act does not further the
goals the Act was set forth to accomplish.
To review, the purpose of the Act is to promote the availability of
generic drugs and to give back pioneers some of the patent protection time
lost in the drug approval process. 163 Redrafting the Act to make the
provisions of the Act weigh more heavily towards only promoting the
availability of generics would go against the very purpose of the Act. If the
Act were meant to only benefit generic drug companies then the official
name of the Act would not have included the terms "Patent Term Restoration." The Act has provided generic drug companies with an opportunity to
save money in discovery and research, which in turn saves consumers
millions of dollars. If any reform is necessary, it is the reform of the FDA's
role in administering the Act. The FDA should be responsible for overseeing that a patent listed in the Orange Book actually "claims the drug...
or which claims a method of using such drug."' 164 Although the FDA claims
162. Minn. Mining & Mfg. Co. v. Barr Labs., Inc., 289 F.3d 775, 786 (Fed. Cir. 2002)
(emphasis added).
163. See H.R. Rep. No. 98-857, at 14-15 (1984), reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N.
2647-48.
164. 21 U.S.C. § 355(c)(2) (2000). The pioneer company is required to file any patents
issued after the NDA was approved, no later than thirty days after the patent was issued. Id.
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that this may not be feasible due to the scientific expertise required to
interpret the patents, perhaps the FDA should consider hiring a few patent
attorneys and pharmaceutical experts. Reformation of the Act is an
unnecessary resolution to the underlying problem-administration of the
Act.

However, according to the provisions of the Act, the courts are responsible for determining
whether the patent is valid. See § 355(j)(5)(B)(iii).
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